Abstract
Routing protocols aim at establishing a route between nodes on a network. Secured versions of routing protocols have been proposed in order to provide more guarantees on the resulting routes. Formal methods have proved their usefulness when analysing standard security protocols such as confidentiality or authentication protocols. However, existing results and tools do not apply to routing protocols. This is due in particular to the fact that all possible topologies (infinitely many) have to be considered.
In this paper, we propose a simple reduction result: when looking for attacks on properties such as the validity of the route, it is sufficient to consider topologies with only four nodes, resulting in a number of just five distinct topologies to consider. As an application, we analyse the SRP applied to DSR and the SDMSR protocols using the ProVerif tool.
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These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) / ERC grant agreement no 258865, project ProSecure, and the ANR project JCJC VIP no 11 JS02 006 01.
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Cortier, V., Degrieck, J., Delaune, S. (2012). Analysing Routing Protocols: Four Nodes Topologies Are Sufficient. In: Degano, P., Guttman, J.D. (eds) Principles of Security and Trust. POST 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7215. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28641-4_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28641-4_3
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