Abstract
This chapter has three sections. The first summarizes the conduct coverage of, the tests of legality promulgated by, and the defenses recognized by U.S. antitrust law and points out certain mistakes that U.S. courts and various scholars have made when addressing these issues. The second presents a parallel analysis of the E.C./E.U. competition law. And the third compares the above aspects of U.S. antitrust law and E.C./E.U. competition law. This chapter will not discuss (1) the approaches that U.S. and E.C./E.U. officials and scholars take to market definition, (2) the assumptions they make about the connection between a firm’s market share and its monopoly, oligopoly, and overall market power, or (3) the conclusions they have reached about the monopolizing character and/or likely competitive impact of various types of conduct or particular exemplars of specific types of conduct. These issues will be addressed respectively in Chaps. 8–15. This chapter will also not discuss the institutional framework of U.S. and E.C./E.U. antitrust law (i.e., the nature of their enforcement “agencies” and courts and the roles each such authority plays in the creation and enforcement of competition law), the procedures those various State actors are bound to follow (inter alia, the various notification requirements imposed on the law’s addressees and the time-constraints imposed on the “agencies” review of notified mergers), and the “remedial” options available to U.S. and E.C./E.U. antitrust decision-makers. Chapter 12 discusses the U.S. and E.C./E.U. notification and “agency”-review protocols for horizontal mergers.
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Notes
- 1.
The FTC’s special authority to define illegal price discrimination was granted by 15 U.S.C. § 13(a). For the FTC’s decision to rescind its one use of this authority, see 58 Fed. Reg. 35907–01. A 1994 amendment to Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (which contains “the unfair methods of competition” language to which the text refers) is (largely) consistent with my claim that the FTC is authorized to apply only the Clayton Act’s “lessening competition” test of illegality. According to the (admittedly-poorly-drafted) 1994 amendment, the FTC may not deem conduct “unfair unless the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by the consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(n). 15 U.S.C. § 21 provides that the FTC does not have jurisdiction to enforce the Sherman Act. Although some authorities believe that this limitation in the FTC’s authority has no practical significance in that any act or practice that violates the Sherman Act will also constitute an “unfair method of competition” that violates Section 5 of the FTC Act, I believe that, although the textual and prudential arguments that support this conclusion would be convincing in isolation, they are trumped by 15 U.S.C. § 21’s declaration that the FTC does not have jurisdiction to enforce the Sherman Act. See contra elhauge and geradin 6.
- 2.
See United States v. Grinnell Corp. 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966). For recent confirmations of this position, see Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407–08 (2004); Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 455–59 (1993); Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992); and Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 596 n.19 (1985).
- 3.
In part, I reach this conclusion because this type of judicial practice is not self-legitimating or self-validating—i.e., does not render the decisions in question consistent with the society’s moral commitments or, relatedly, correct as a matter of law, and, in part, I do so because (by and large) the relevant practices do not sacrifice accuracy or create a bias in favor of one class of litigants (in this instance, defendants) in individual cases.
- 4.
See Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
- 5.
See Eastman Kodak v. Images Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451, 483 and n.32 (1992) and Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605, 608 (1985).
- 6.
Id. at 596 (quoting jury instructions).
- 7.
einer elhauge and damien geradin, global antitrust law and economics 328 (hereinafter elhauge and geradin) (Hart Publishing, 2007).
- 8.
See United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
- 9.
See Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar, 334 U.S. 219 (1948); United States v. Brown University, 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993); Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 907 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1990); Quality Auto Body v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (1982); and Weyerhaueser v. Ross-Simmons Hardware Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007). I hasten to add that it is critical to distinguish the claims (1) that the non-predatory exercise of buying power by an individual buyer or monopsonist violates the Sherman Act and (2) that non-predatory buyer coops or non-predatory joint-purchasing arrangements of other sorts violate the Sherman Act from the claim (3) that individual-firm or multifirm predatory buying violates the Sherman Act. This last claim, which is clearly correct as a matter of law, will be analyzed in Chap. 11.
- 10.
See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines at Section 1.0 p. 5: “The exercise of market power by buyers has wealth transfer and resource misallocation effects analogous to those associated with the exercise of market power by sellers.”
- 11.
See Judge (formerly Professor) Richard Posner, writing in Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1361 (7th Cir. 1996). See, more generally, roger blair and jeffrey harrison, monopsony (Princeton Univ. Press, 1993).
- 12.
A supply curve is a diagrammatic representation of a schedule that indicates the quantities of a specified good that will be supplied at different prices. The vertical axis in a supply-curve diagram measures some monetary unit (say, dollars), and the horizontal axis, the quantity of the good that will be supplied. When a buyer faces an upward-sloping supply curve, it will have to offer successively higher prices to elicit the supply of additional units of the product in question.
- 13.
15 U.S.C. § 13 (1936). The Robinson–Patman Act is an amendment to Section 2 of the Clayton Act.
- 14.
Two related points should be noted. First, a language point. The Robinson–Patman Act and U.S. lawyers define price discrimination to be the act of charging different prices for “commodities of like grade and quality” and then speak of cost-justified price discrimination (which the Act permits) when the price-differences in question are cost-justified. In the language of economics, the concept of “cost-justified price discrimination” is an oxymoron: if price-differences are cost-justified, there is no price discrimination. Second, the Robinson–Patman Act’s reference to “commodities” has caused it to be interpreted not to cover price discrimination on services, and Clayton Act Section 3’s reference to “goods” has caused it to be interpreted not to cover otherwise-covered arrangements involving services, land, or inputs. The text will largely ignore these (to my mind, contestable if not wrong) limitations of coverage.
- 15.
For this purpose, the fact that we almost certainly devote too many resources to product R&D from the perspective of economic efficiency is irrelevant. (For an explanation of why we devote too many resources to product R&D from the perspective of economic efficiency, see Richard S. Markovits, On the Economic Efficiency of Using Law to Increase Research and Development: A Critique of Various Tax, Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and Tort Law Rules and Policy Proposals, 39 harv. j. on leg. 63 (2002).) The crucial point is that U.S. legislators have protected discoveries at least in part because they believed that they would increase economic efficiency by doing so.
- 16.
The case is Philadelphia National Bank v. United States, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). I describe this position as dicta because the court did not find that the merger involved in the case in question would increase competition in any market: it just noted the possibility that it might.
- 17.
See Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 136–39 (1969).
- 18.
See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines at Section 5 and 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines at Section 11.
- 19.
For a relevant lower-court opinion, see United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 332 F. Supp. 970, 972 (1971). In United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 537–38 (1973), the Supreme Court acknowledged that “[t]here are traces of this view [i.e., that the toe-hold merger doctrine is correct as a matter of law] in our cases, citing Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 567 (majority opinion) and 587 (Burger, C.J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (1972), FTC v. Proctor & Gamble, 386 U.S. 568, 580 (majority opinion) and 586 (Harlan, J., concurring) (1976), and United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158, 173 (1964). However, the Court then proceeded to state that it “has not squarely faced the question, for no other reason than because there has been no necessity to consider it” (footnote omitted), denying (at note 14) that “certain language in the Court’s opinion in United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 464 (1976)” warrants a “contrary” conclusion.
- 20.
See United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964). For current purposes, the dubiousness of the relevant Court’s belief that the presence of the non-entering parent would increase competition in the market in question even though in fact it would not enter under any foreseeable circumstances is beside the point.
- 21.
See ICI v. Commission, Case 48/69, E.U.R. 619 (1972).
- 22.
See elhauge and geradin 61, citing CMA CGM-FETTSCA, Case T 213/00, E.U.R. II 913 at Section 183 (2003).
- 23.
See Volk v. Vervaecke, Case 5/69, E.U.R. 295 (1969).
- 24.
Commission Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance Which Do Not Appreciably Restrict Competition, OJ C 372/15 (2001).
- 25.
Commission Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance, OJ C 368/13 at Section 11 (2001).
- 26.
Commission Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance Which Do Not Appreciably Restrict Competition, OJ C 372/15 (2001).
- 27.
See Reynolds v. Commission, (1987) E.U.R. 4487 (1987).
- 28.
See BAT, Cases 142 and 156/84 (1984).
- 29.
In this category are “transfer of technology” agreements, distribution agreements, specialization agreements, and R&D agreements. See, respectively, Commission Regulation 772/2004 of 27 April 2004 on the Application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements OJ 123/11 (2004); Commission Regulation 2790/1999 of 22 December 1999 on the Application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices, OJ L 336/21; Commission Regulation 2658/2000 of 29 November 2000 on the Application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Specialization Agreements, OJ L 304/3 (2000); and Commission Regulation 2659/2000 of 29 November 2000 on the Application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Research and Development Agreements, OJ L 304/7 (2000).
- 30.
In this category are agreements in the motor-vehicle-distribution sector and in the insurance sector. See, respectively, Commission Regulation 1400/2002 of 31 July 2002 on the Application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices in the Motor Vehicle Sector, OJ L 203/30 (2000) and Commission Regulation 358/2003 of 27 February 2003 on the Application of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Agreements, Decisions and Concerted Practices in the Insurance Sector, OJ L 53/8 (2003).
- 31.
See DG Competition Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses at Section 43 at pp. 46–50 and at Section 5.4 at pp. 74–76 (Dec. 2005).
- 32.
See Tetra Pak II v. Commission of the E.U., OJ L 72/1, pp. 135–38 (1992), stating that then Article 82 of the E.C. Treaty (now Article 102 of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty) prohibits as unfair the practice of renting a machine for a price that equals the sale price of the machine.
- 33.
See United Brands Co. v. Commission of the E.U., (27/76), 1978 WL 58871 (1978), stating that the article that is now Article 102 of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty prohibits a dominant firm from charging excessive prices, defined to be prices that bear no reasonable relation to the economic value of the product in question.
- 34.
See Manufacture Française des Pneumatiques Michelin v. Commission (Michelin II), Case T 203/01, E.U.R. II-4071, p. 54 (2003).
- 35.
For the Director General’s recognition that clause (c) does not cover price discrimination that reduces primary-line competition, see DG Competition Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses at Section 5.5.3 (Dec. 2005); for scholarship that manifests academics’ realization that clause (c) does not cover such discrimination, see Damien Geradin and Nicolas Petit, Price Discrimination Under EC Law: The Need for a Case-by-Case Approach, 2 J. of Competition Law and Econ. 479, 487 (2006) and the sources cited therein; for a case in which the ECJ recognized the fact that the clauses (a)–(d) list in Article 102 (then Article 82) is not comprehensive (in the court’s terms, is only “indicative”), see Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v. Commission, ECJ 6-72, ECR [1973] 215 at § 26 (Feb. 21, 1973); for discussions of the fact that the EC and the E.C./E.U. courts have applied Article 102 to cases in which the price discrimination at issue was alleged to have reduced primary-line competition, see Damien Geradin and Nicolas Petit, Price Discrimination Under EC Law: The Need for a Case-by-Case Approach, 2 J. of Competition Law and Econ. 479, 488–89 (2006) and the sources cited therein; and for a claim that price discrimination that lessens primary-line competition is covered by clause (b) of Article 102, see id.
- 36.
The text ignores another issue raised by clause (c) of now-Article 102 to which neither the EC nor the E.C./E.U. courts have paid much attention—viz., under what conditions should goods or services be characterized as “equivalent” for the purpose of determining whether clause (c) of now-Article 102 applies to discrimination in the terms on which they are sold. I think there are correct ways of responding to all the questions that others think are connected to this issue. I will discuss three such issues in this note. First, differences in the cost a seller has to incur to supply different buyers with the same good do not in themselves call into question the equivalence of the transactions in question, although such cost differences must be taken into account when deciding whether the terms offered different buyers are discriminatory. As I have already noted, economists have resolved this definitional issue correctly. Differences in prices (or other terms) are properly/usefully deemed discriminatory only if the differences are not cost-justified: the U.S. legal practice of calling term-differences discriminatory and then asking whether the discrimination is cost-justified is cumbersome at best and probably misleading. Second, products that buyers value differently (e.g., high-season, low-season, and intermediate-season plane tickets) are not equivalent and transactions involving them are not “equivalent transactions.” Third and relatedly, the act of charging different absolute or percentage markups on different products should not be characterized as discrimination.
- 37.
DG Competition Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses at Section 5.1 (Dec. 2005).
- 38.
EC Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, C 45/02 p. 19 (2009).
- 39.
Hoffman-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission, E.U.R. 461, p. 91 (1979).
- 40.
DG Competition Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses at Section 5.1 (Dec. 2005).
- 41.
AKZO, OJ L 375, p. 81 (Dec. 12, 1985).
- 42.
See Manufacture Française des Pneumatiques Michelin v. Commission (Michelin II), Case T 203/01, E.U.R. II 4071, p. 107 (2003).
- 43.
Id. at p. 110.
- 44.
DG Competition Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses at Section 5.1 (Dec. 2005).
- 45.
Id. at p. 5.2.
- 46.
See Atlantic Container Lines judgment, Case T 191/98, p. 1460 (Sept. 30, 2003).
- 47.
I should indicate that the EC also recognizes two other “defences” in Article-102 exclusionary-abuse cases. The first, so-called objective necessity defence enables a dominant firm to exonerate itself by demonstrating that the conduct under scrutiny was indispensable (usually for “reasons of safety or health related to the dangerous nature of the product in question”) to the permissibility of producing or distributing the product in question. (I assume that this defence would be critical only when the production and distribution of the “product” the conduct in question enables the dominant firm to supply by increasing its safety or healthfulness decreases the competition the dominant firm faces by inducing the exit of a rival product or deterring the introduction of a rival product.) See DG Competition Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses at Section 5.51 (Dec. 2005). The second non-efficiency defence is a “meeting-competition defence.” This defence enables a dominant firm to exonerate itself by demonstrating that it engaged in the conduct in question “to minimize the short-run losses resulting directly from competitors’ actions….” See id. at Section 5.5.2. Although I doubt that the EC had this possibility in mind and admit that the losses the relevant conduct would enable a defendant to avoid would not be just short-run losses, I suspect that this defence would be most relevant to a dominant firm that used tying or reciprocity agreements for quality-control purposes or included resale-price-maintenance, vertical-territorial-restraint, or vertical-customer-allocation clauses in its contracts with independent distributors to induce them to make jointly-profitable advertising, door-to-door-sales, pre-sales-advice, and post-sales-service decisions when nondominant rivals were engaging in similar practices for the same reasons. Admittedly, however, the availability of the defence might be affected by the existence of other, less-profitable ways of achieving the same objectives (by the possible non-indispensability of the conduct) or, in some cases, by the fact that the combination of the dominant firm’s conduct and its rivals’ parallel conduct gave the dominant firm an advantage. For further discussions of this possibility, see the subsequent text of this subsection and Chap. 14 infra.
- 48.
DG Competition Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses at Section 5.5.3 (Dec. 2005). That conclusion also seems to be implied by p. 19 of the 2009 EC Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct, which is quoted in the text to which footnote-number 79 is attached.
- 49.
See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines at Section 4 and as revised in 1997 and 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines at Section 10.
- 50.
Relatedly, both the EC and E.C./E.U.-competition-law courts have also insisted that a firm cannot be shown to occupy a dominant position (a set of firms cannot be shown to have a collectively-dominant position) without defining the market it dominates (they collectively dominate). See, e.g., akzo Chemie BV v. Commission, Case C 62/86, E.U.R. I-3359 (1991); Hoffman-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission, Case 85/76, E.U.R. 461 (1979); and United Brands Co. v. Commission of the E.U., Case 27/76, 1978 WL 58871 (ECJ 1978).
- 51.
See Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can, Inc. v. Commission, Case 6/72, G.C.R. 215 (1973).
- 52.
See, e.g., EC Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, OJ C 291/1 (2000).
- 53.
Id. at Section 1.1.
- 54.
Admittedly, in one case, the Supreme Court held that a practice that would be illegal for a well-established firm to use because, by increasing its proficiency, it would weaken the positions of its marginal and potential competitors would be lawful for a marginal or potential competitor to use because, by increasing its proficiency, it would help the firm in question to survive or enter. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). However, this parimutual-handicapping decision is very much an outlier.
- 55.
Council Regulation 139/2004 on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings (May 1, 2004). (In E.C./E.U. competition-law parlance, mergers [and acquisitions] are referred to as “concentrations.”)
- 56.
See elhauge and gerardin 875.
- 57.
Council Regulation 4064/89 on the New Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, OJ L 395/1 (1989).
- 58.
See id. at Article 2.
- 59.
See EC Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers at Section VII, OJ C 31/5 (2004), 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines as revised in 1997 at Section 4, and 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines at Section 10. I hasten to add that this efficiency defence is less generous to defendants than the organizational-economic-efficiency defence that I think legally appropriate to read into the Clayton Act and is also less generous to defendants than the Sherman Act (since, under that statute’s test of illegality, mergers and acquisitions will not be illegal if their participants believed ex ante that the private benefits the transaction in question would confer on them by generating economic efficiencies, by yielding tax advantages, by enabling one or more participants to liquidate their assets and/or escape managerial responsibilities, and by increasing the ability of the merged firm relative to that of its antecedents to profit by converting buyer into seller surplus would be sufficiently large to render the relevant transaction ex ante profitable, regardless of whether it was predicted to, should have been predicted to, or actually did inflict a net-equivalent-dollar loss on the participants’ customers and the customers of the participants’ product rivals).
- 60.
EC Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers at Section VIII, OJ C 31/5 (2004). See also 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines at Section 5 and 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines at Section 11.
- 61.
United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors at Section 4.2 (2000).
- 62.
I say “what they take to be” because, for three reasons, I do not think that such vertical territorial restraints and customer-allocation clauses infringe the “liberty” of independent distributors:
(1) the independent distributors agreed to the restrictions in question under conditions that do not suggest that they were coerced into doing so;
(2) if, as I suspect will often be the case, prohibitions of such clauses may result in the producers’ integrating forward into distribution, the clauses might very well increase the set of options available to potential independent distributors; and
(3) I doubt the issue is appropriately characterized as a liberty issue in any event.
This third point requires some elucidation. If it is to make a useful contribution to moral and political debate in a liberal, rights-based society, the concept of liberty should be invoked only when the choice that is restricted plays an important role in (1) an individual’s choosing the values he wants his life to instantiate or (2) living a life that is consonant with the choice he made. For this reason, prohibitions of an individual’s driving north on a one-way-southbound street or prohibitions of an individual’s sticking a knife in someone else’s gut when there is no justification for his doing so should not be said to restrict his liberty. In my judgment, contractual restrictions on the territories within which an independent distributor can operate or on the buyers to which it can sell are not restrictions on its liberty as that concept should be operationally defined in a liberal, rights-based society (which places a lexically-highest value on individuals’ having a meaningful opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity by taking their moral obligations seriously and by taking seriously as well the task of choosing the conception of “the good” to which they personally subscribe and conforming their lives to that choice). Although it may be unwise (as well as incorrect) for me to say this, I suspect that the European proclivity to value the independence of independent distributors is an anachronistic survivor of a feudal past in which an individual was defined by his or her occupation as opposed to (as in a liberal, rights-based society) by his or her moral choices and integrity.
- 63.
Admittedly, some U.S. officials (most prominently, Justice William O. Douglas of the U.S. Supreme Court) have also been concerned with this alleged “liberty of traders” issue.
- 64.
Some such research may be not only unprofitable but economically inefficient (at least, on otherwise-Pareto-perfect assumptions). But some might be unprofitable but economically efficient on such assumptions. This result may obtain if four conditions are fulfilled:
(1) the producer of the product to whose production process the relevant research relates is liable only for accident losses caused by its negligence;
(2) either because of doctrinal error or because of the difficulty of assessing the negligence of decisions not to execute accident-loss-reducing production-process research, the relevant producer’s decision not to do such research will never, in practice, be assessed for negligence;
(3) the relevant potential production-process researcher is a producer of the good to whose production process the relevant research relates; and
(4) if the potential researcher discovers an accident-loss-reducing production process whose use would reduce accident losses by more than it increased other variable costs of production, it would be negligent for it not to shift to the safer production process in question.
Conditions (1) and (2) are fulfilled for most producers in both common-law and civil-law countries. Condition (4) will be fulfilled unless the discoverer can keep its discovery secret. Because information that is relevant to making the kind of discovery in question is often impacted to actors that produce the good in question, condition (3) will frequently be fulfilled, at least when the individual producer/potential researcher is the only producer of the product in question that can finance the necessary research or the number of possible producer-researchers is sufficiently small for each to face a critical natural oligopolistic disincentive in relation to the research (for each to know inter alia that if it starts to do such research one or more rivals will follow suit but, if it does not, no-one else will do so either because it would do research if the other did).
I should add that the third sentence in the preceding paragraph states that “this result may obtain” (emphasis added) because the fulfillment of the conditions just specified guarantees only that the incentives of the producer to do the relevant production-process research will be deflated. Whether those incentives are critically deflated will depend on the economic efficiency of the relevant research, the market share of the relevant producer/potential researcher, and the weighted-average-expected number of days by which the producer’s decision not to do the relevant research will delay the relevant discovery.
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Markovits, R.S. (2014). Chapter 4 The Actor-Coverage of, Conduct-Coverage of, Tests of Illegality Promulgated by, and Defenses Recognized by U.S. Antitrust Law and E.C./E.U. Competition Law. In: Economics and the Interpretation and Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24307-3_4
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