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Passive Cryptanalysis of the UnConditionally Secure Authentication Protocol for RFID Systems

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Book cover Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC 2010 (ICISC 2010)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 6829))

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Abstract

Recently, Alomair et al. proposed the first UnConditionally Secure mutual authentication protocol for low-cost RFID systems(UCS-RFID). The security of the UCS-RFID relies on five dynamic secret keys which are updated at every protocol run using a fresh random number (nonce) secretly transmitted from a reader to tags.

Our results show that, at the highest security level of the protocol (security parameter= 256), inferring a nonce is feasible with the probability of 0.99 by eavesdropping(observing) about 90 runs of the protocol. Finding a nonce enables a passive attacker to recover all five secret keys of the protocol. To do so, we propose a three-phase probabilistic approach in this paper. Our attack recovers the secret keys with a probability that increases by accessing more protocol runs. We also show that tracing a tag using this protocol is also possible even with less runs of the protocol.

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Sohizadeh Abyaneh, M.R. (2011). Passive Cryptanalysis of the UnConditionally Secure Authentication Protocol for RFID Systems. In: Rhee, KH., Nyang, D. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC 2010. ICISC 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6829. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24209-0_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24209-0_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-24208-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-24209-0

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