A Dynamic Analysis of Interactive Rationality

  • Eric Pacuit
  • Olivier Roy
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-24130-7_18

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6953)
Cite this paper as:
Pacuit E., Roy O. (2011) A Dynamic Analysis of Interactive Rationality. In: van Ditmarsch H., Lang J., Ju S. (eds) Logic, Rationality, and Interaction. LORI 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6953. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

Epistemic game theory has shown the importance of informational contexts in understanding strategic interaction. We propose a general framework to analyze how such contexts may arise. The idea is to view informational contexts as the fixed-points of iterated, “rational responses” to incoming information about the agents’ possible choices. We show general conditions for the stabilization of such sequences of rational responses, in terms of structural properties of both the decision rule and the information update policy.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Eric Pacuit
    • 1
  • Olivier Roy
    • 2
  1. 1.Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of ScienceNetherlands
  2. 2.Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LMUGermany

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