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Rational Universal Benevolence: Simpler, Safer, and Wiser Than “Friendly AI”

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 6830))

Abstract

Insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different result. “Friendly AI” (FAI) meets these criteria on four separate counts by expecting a good result after: 1) it not only puts all of humanity’s eggs into one basket but relies upon a totally new and untested basket, 2) it allows fear to dictate our lives, 3) it divides the universe into us vs. them, and finally 4) it rejects the value of diversity. In addition, FAI goal initialization relies on being able to correctly calculate a “Coherent Extrapolated Volition of Humanity” (CEV) via some as-yet-undiscovered algorithm. Rational Universal Benevolence (RUB) is based upon established game theory and evolutionary ethics and is simple, safe, stable, self-correcting, and sensitive to current human thinking, intuitions, and feelings. Which strategy would you prefer to rest the fate of humanity upon?

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© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Waser, M. (2011). Rational Universal Benevolence: Simpler, Safer, and Wiser Than “Friendly AI”. In: Schmidhuber, J., Thórisson, K.R., Looks, M. (eds) Artificial General Intelligence. AGI 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 6830. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22887-2_16

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22887-2_16

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-22886-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-22887-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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