Abstract
Chapter 1 showed that, in many circumstances, majority voting is both inadequate and inaccurate. It is ‘fit for purpose’ (a) if the subject is not controversial and the minority is willing to accept the outcome; (b) if and when only two options are possible, and such occasions should be rare in any democracy which aspires to be plural. Accordingly, this chapter starts by trying to define decision-making.
There are better ways of resolving disputes. The text first looks at the theory and practice of improved forms of majority voting, before next conducting a similar analysis of the best known methodologies of multi-option voting. Then consensus voting in all its roles is examined. Finally, the text offers a draft definition of democratic decision-making.
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Notes
- 1.
In 1997, for example, the British government asked Lord Jenkins to chair a supposedly independent commission for a referendum on Britain's electoral system. As stipulated by the terms of reference, he was told to make only one proposal. A more independent commission would have allowed for a multi-option approach, as was the case in New Zealand. (Sect. 2.6 and the epilogue.)
- 2.
This sometimes leads to the rather confusing situation where those in favour of something vote “no” and those against vote “yes”, for that is what you have to do when you want to retain or repeal that something in what is called an abrogative referendum, as in Italy.
- 3.
The largest weighting in use is a five-sixths majority, the requirement for certain constitutional amendments and/or fiscal policies in the Finnish parliament (McRae 1997: 290).
- 4.
Interestingly enough, the Czechoslovak model was initiated by one Joseph Stalin, a politician not always associated with democratic reforms. Furthermore, throughout Stalin’s reign, this system of decision-making never failed because, in those grim days, no major decisions were taken in Prague anyway; everything of importance was decided in the Kremlin.
- 5.
‘The three national parties had secretly agreed before the [1990] elections to form a coalition government…’ (Silber and Little 1995: 232), so to exclude the non-sectarian parties.
- 6.
This example is an adaptation of one used by (Saari 2001: 13–14). If instead of just three members, the committee consisted of 11 persons who favoured D A B C, 10 who preferred C D A B and 9 who liked B C D A, the three votes would have been passed with comfortable, convincing and compelling majorities of 63%, 67% and 70%.
- 7.
This is actually a single transferable vote, STV, or to give it its American name, instant run-off voting, IRV.
- 8.
It is often said that av ensures that the winning option enjoys majority support. If, however, many voters cast only a few preferences, many votes might become non-transferable (Chap. 4, note 7).
- 9.
av/stv is not monotonic (see glossary and Emerson P 1998: 87–8).
- 10.
Some people prefer a slightly different rule: instead of (n, n-1, …, 1), they use (n-1, n-2, …, 0). If all the voters have submitted full ballots, the outcome will be the same.
- 11.
This procedure is sometimes called a preferendum.
- 12.
Jean-Charles de Borda proposed that the voter’s last preference should get one point, his penultimate two points, and so on. Mathematically, this is the same as the (m, m-1, …, 1) rule. Unfortunately, many social choice scientists, and in their wake political scientists, have adopted the (n-1, n-2, …, 0) rule, which does not cater for partial voting. I think the source of this mistake was Duncan Black. (Black 1958: 59) (See also Emerson forthcoming.)
- 13.
In Article 13, the Security Council ‘Recalls… that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations.’
- 14.
Nothing, of course, is perfect. Condorcet might produce a paradox, but not the bc/mbc; the latter, but not Condorcet, is subject to clones and irrelevant alternatives (see glossary).
Imagine three voters are voting on two options, A and B, with two voters having preferences A B and one voter preferring B A. In this situation, A wins the Borda count with 5 points to B’s 4 points. If we now introduce a third option, a clone, B′, such that everyone prefers B to B′, the voters’ profiles are two of A B B′ and one of B B′ A, and the bc scores are now A 7, B 7 and B′ 4. Add another clone, option B′′, such that the profiles are two of A B B′ B′′ and one of B B′ B′′ A, and the scores are A 9, B 10, B′ 7 and B′′ 4. In other words, the introduction of two clones could turn an A Borda victory into an A Borda defeat.
An irrelevant alternative, option D, may also have this effect. If two people have preferences A-B-C and one prefers B-C-A then, as above, the scores are A 7, B 7, C 4. If there is an option D on the ballot paper as well, such that two prefer A-B-D-C and one favours B-C-D-A, then the scores will be A 9, B 10, C 5, D 6, and again, A is no longer the joint winner. In all of these examples, however, A remains the Condorcet winner.
Given these two defects of the bc/mbc and the paradox of Condorcet, many experts, often working independently, have come to the conclusion that the best possible methodology is indeed a combined Condorcet/Borda count. (Emerson P 2007: 17 note 6)
- 15.
The 1947 un resolution on Kashmir called for a referendum but none has yet been held.
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Emerson, P. (2012). Pluralist Decision-Making. In: Defining Democracy. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20904-8_2
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