Skip to main content

Single Parameter FPT-Algorithms for Non-trivial Games

  • Conference paper

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 6460))

Abstract

We know that k -Uniform Nash is W[2]-Complete when we consider imitation symmetric win-lose games (with k as the parameter) even when we have two players. However, this paper provides positive results regarding Nash equilibria. We show that consideration of sparse games or limitations of the support result in fixed-parameter algorithms with respect to one parameter only for the k -Uniform Nash problem. That is, we show that a sample uniform Nash equilibrium in r-sparse imitation symmetric win-lose games is not as hard because it can be found in FPT time (i.e polynomial in the size of the game, but maybe exponential in r). Moreover, we show that, although NP-Complete, the problem of Best Nash Equilibrium is also fix-parameter tractable.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Abbott, T., Kane, D., Valiant, P.: On the complexity of two-player win-lose games. In: 46th Annual IEEE Symp. on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2005, pp. 113–122. IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos (2005)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Bonifaci, V., Iorio, U.D., Laura, L.: The complexity of uniform Nash equilibria and related regular subgraph problems. Theoretical Computer Science 401(1-3), 144–152 (2008)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  3. Chen, J., Chor, B., Fellows, M., Huang, X., Juedes, D., Kanj, I., Xia, X.: Tight lower bounds for certain parameterized NP-hard problems. Information and Computation 201(2), 216–231 (2005)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  4. Chen, X., Deng, X., Teng, S.-H.: Sparse games are hard. In: Spirakis, P.G., Mavronicolas, M., Kontogiannis, S.C. (eds.) WINE 2006. LNCS, vol. 4286, pp. 262–273. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  5. Codenotti, B., Stefankovic, D.: On the computational complexity of Nash equilibria for (0,1) bimatrix games. Information Processing Letters 94, 145–150 (2005)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  6. Conitzer, V., Sandholm, T.: Complexity results about Nash equilibria. In: Gottlob, G., Walsh, T. (eds.) 18th Int. Joint Conf. on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2003, pp. 765–771. Morgan Kaufmann, Acapulco (2003)

    Google Scholar 

  7. Estivill-Castro, V., Parsa, M.: The parameterized complexity of uniform Nash equilibria in win-lose games (submitted for publication)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Estivill-Castro, V., Parsa, M.: Computing Nash equilibria gets harder— new results show hardness even for parameterized complexity. In: Downey, R., Manyem, P. (eds.) The Australasian Theory Symposium (CATS 2009). CRPIT, vol. 94. Australian Computer Society, Inc., Wellington (2009)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Fotakis, D., Kontogiannis, S., Koutsoupias, E., Mavronicolas, M., Spirakis, P.: The structure and complexity of Nash equilibria for a selfish routing game. Theoretical Computer Science 410(36), 3305–3326 (2009)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  10. Gassner, E., Hatzl, J., Krumke, S., Sperber, H., Woeginger, G.: How hard is it to find extreme Nash equilibria in network congestion games?. Theoretical Computer Science 410(47-49), 4989–4999 (2009)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  11. Gilboa, I., Zemel, E.: Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations. Games and Economic Behavior 1(1), 80–93 (1989)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  12. Hermelin, D., Huang, C.C., Kratsch, S., Wahlstrom, M.: Parameterized two-player Nash equilibrium, personal communication

    Google Scholar 

  13. von Stengel, B.: Computing equilibria for two-person games. In: Aumann, R.J., Hart, S. (eds.) Handbook of Game Theory. ch.45, vol. 3, pp. 1723–1759. Elsevier, Amsterdam (2002)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Estivill-Castro, V., Parsa, M. (2011). Single Parameter FPT-Algorithms for Non-trivial Games. In: Iliopoulos, C.S., Smyth, W.F. (eds) Combinatorial Algorithms. IWOCA 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6460. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19222-7_13

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19222-7_13

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-19221-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-19222-7

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics