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Determining the Integrity of Application Binaries on Unsecure Legacy Machines Using Software Based Remote Attestation

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 6503))

Abstract

Integrity of computing platforms is paramount. A platform is as secure as the applications executing on it. All applications are created with some inherent vulnerability or loophole. Attackers can analyze the presence of flaws in a particular binary and exploit them. Traditional virus scanners are also binaries which can be attacked by malware. This paper implements a method known as Remote Attestation entirely in software to attest the integrity of a process using a trusted external server. The trusted external server issues a challenge to the client machine which responds to the challenge. The response determines the integrity of the application.

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Srinivasan, R., Dasgupta, P., Gohad, T., Bhattacharya, A. (2010). Determining the Integrity of Application Binaries on Unsecure Legacy Machines Using Software Based Remote Attestation. In: Jha, S., Mathuria, A. (eds) Information Systems Security. ICISS 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6503. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17714-9_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17714-9_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-17713-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-17714-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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