African States and the Institutions of the Common Heritage of Mankind Regime in the Area

Egede, Edwin

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-17662-3_5

Edwin Egede²

Abstract

This chapter will examine the rather intricate institutional framework of the regime established by Part XI of the LOSC, as modified by the 1994 Agreement. It will seek to discover whether the institution reflects effective democratic participation by all States. Are African States adequately represented at the various organs developed under this regime?

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution

Chapter: USD 29.95; Price excludes VAT (USA)

eBook: USD 84.99; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Softcover Book: USD 109.99; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Hardcover Book: USD 109.99; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

1.
Allott (1983), pp. 1 at 13–14. These structures can be equated to the structures contained in a typical democratic setting found in municipal governments. The Assembly could be said to be a type of legislative arm, while the Council, with its Commissions, could be placed as the executive. Of course the Seabed Chamber of the ITLOS would be the judicial arm. However, despite this analogy with the municipal democratic system it must, of course, be pointed out that whatever similarities exist between the international and municipal law systems, there are peculiarities which distinguish the two. For example, in respect of the international law system, sovereignty and the formal equality of states require the consent of states before they can be bound by decisions of an international organisation. On this see generally Sands and Klein (2001), pp. 261–438.
2.
Rembe (1980), pp. 57–68; See generally Adede (1979), pp. 31–63.
3.
Para. 22 of Document A/CONF.62/33, UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. III, p. 63.
4.
DOALOS (1996), p. 115. See also the views of the following African states on the institutional framework of the regime: Egypt in UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. I, p. 76, para. 72, and Kenya; Madagascar; Tanzania; Congo; Tunisia; Algeria; Libya in UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. II, pp. 19–20, paras. 27–32; pp. 20–21, paras. 38–39; Tanzania, p. 33, paras. 38 and 40; p. 35, paras. 67 and 69; p. 36, para. 3; p. 41, paras. 52–56; p. 43, paras. 79–80, respectively.
5.
See the 1974 Declaration of O.A.U, A/CONF.62/33. Also see the Conclusions in the General Report of the African States’ Regional Seminar on the Law of the Sea, Yaoundé, 20–30 June 1972, 12 ILM 210 (1973), Recommendations III(4) & (5) and IV(1) that stressed the necessity for the Authority to function democratically devoid of any veto and weighted voting system. Also for the Authority to be structured and operated in such a way that the developing states would be the primary controllers and beneficiaries.
6.
See Chap. IV(General Assembly) and Chap. V (Security Council) of the United Nations Charter and Sands and Klein (2001).
7.
Rembe (1980), pp. 64–68.
8.
Oxman (1994), pp. 687 at 689.
9.
Oxman (1994), p. 690.
10.
Section 3(2) of the Annex to the Agreement.
11.
The voting procedures include the requirement of a majority decision in respect of procedural matters and two-thirds majority in respect of substantive matters. See for example Sect. 3(3) and (5) of the Annex to the Agreement.
12.
Section 3(4) and (7) of the Annex to the Agreement.
13.
Oxman (1994), p. 695.
14.
See generally Cox and Jacobson (1973). Also on the procedural aspects of decision making in international organisations, see Sands and Klein (2001), pp. 263–275.
15.
This requires the agreement of all members. See, for example, Art. 5 of the Covenant of the League of Nations which stated: “Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or by the terms of the present Treaty, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of the League represented at the meeting”.
16.
This may be by way of a simple majority or a qualified majority such as two-thirds or three-quarters. See for example Art. 18 (2) and (3) of the United Nations Charter which states: “Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting”. “Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting”.
17.
This is a system whereby votes are allocated to members of an international organisation on the basis of political, economic, financial or other predetermined relevant criteria. This usually gives certain members of the Organisation a veto over certain decisions of the organisation. See for example Art. V Sect. 3 of the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which states: “(a) Each member shall have two hundred fifty votes plus one additional vote for each share of stock held; (b) Except as otherwise specifically provided, all matters before the Bank shall be decided by a majority of the votes cast”. http://go.worldbank.org/W01PGBIFM0.
18.
This is when the decision is made in the absence of formal objection by any of the Parties. See for example Art. IX of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation, 33 ILM 1144(1994), which states: “The WTO shall continue the practice of decision-making by consensus followed under GATT 1947. Except as otherwise provided, where a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter shall be decided by voting”. This method of decision making was adopted by the UNCLOS III. See Buzan (1981), pp. 324–348. On decision making in international organisations generally, see Sands and Klein (2001), pp. 263–275.
19.
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations Case, ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 174. See generally Montaldo (1970), pp. 111–155 and also Sands and Klein (2001), pp. 469–531.
20.
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations Case, ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 179.
21.
Art. 156 (2) of LOSC.
22.
See having become parties to the LOSC on 16 November, 2004, 23 December 2004 and 25 January 2005 respectively.
23.
See Art. 156 (3) of LOSC.
24.
http://www.isa.org.jm/en/about/members/states/observers. African observer states are Burundi, Central African Republic, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, Niger, Rwanda and Swaziland.
25.
Art. 157 (3) of LOSC.
26.
Art. 156 (4) of LOSC. On 26 August 1999 and 17 December 2003 the Headquarters Agreement and the Supplementary Agreement was signed between the government of Jamaica and the ISA to regulate the relationship between the ISA and the host state, as well as the facilities to be utilised by the ISA in the territory of Jamaica. See paras. 60–64 of the Report of the Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority under Art. 166, para. 4, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ISBA/10/A/3 of 31 March 2004.
27.
Art. 156 (5) of LOSC.
28.
Art. 157 (2) of LOSC and Sect. 1, para. 1 of the Agreement.
29.
Art. 157 (1) of LOSC and Sect. 1, para. 1 of the Annex to the Agreement.
30.
Arts. 140 and 160(f) of LOSC.
31.
Art. 133 (a) and (b) of LOSC.
32.
Art. 112 of LOSC.
33.
Arts. 143 and 256 of LOSC.
34.
Art. 87 of LOSC and also see Churchill and Lowe (1999), pp. 239–240.
35.
Statement of Satya N. Nandan, Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority, Agenda Item 30(a): Oceans and the Law of the Sea, 56th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 28 November 2001, p. 5.
36.
Borgese (1998), pp. 171and 199; Borgese (2001), pp. 391–397.
37.
Borgese (2001), pp. 393–394.
38.
Paras. 65–68 of the Report of the Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority, ISBA/16/A/2 of 8 March 2010.
39.
It has been suggested, for instance, that the potential market uses of hyperthermophilic bacteria, much of which may be found round the hydrothermal vents on the deep seabed, are worth US$3 billion annually. See Anthon (1998), pp. 341 at 348–349. Also see generally Glowka (1999), pp. 56–66.
40.
The restricted definition of the resources of the Area can be compared with the wider definition of the natural resources of the continental shelf under Art. 77 of LOSC which not only includes minerals but also “… other non-living resources of the sea-bed and subsoil together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species, that is to say, organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the sea-bed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the sea-bed or the subsoil”. See Borgese (1998), pp. 170–171.
41.
Borgese (2001), p. 395. More recently Professor Tullio Scovazzi of the University of Milano-Bicocca, Milan, Italy urged closer scrutiny of the mandate of the ISA in the exploration of genetic resources since this would be a more immediate and profitable activity on the seabed. See International Seabed Authority, Press Release, SB/10/20 of 4 June 2004. See also Scovazzi (2004), pp. 383–409.
42.
Borgese (2001), pp. 395–396.
43.
Art. 79 of LOSC. Borgese (2001), p. 396.
44.
Borgese (2001), pp. 396–397.
45.
Freestone and Oude Elferink (2004).
46.
Art. 319 (2) (e) of LOSC. For example, there is a precedent in the SPLOS decision, which in essence extended the date of submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) for broad-margin states that were parties to the LOSC before 13 May 1999, by determining that their ten year deadline “shall be taken as having commenced on 13 May 1999”. See SPLOS/72 of 29 May 2001. This amounted to an “amendment” of Art. 4 of Annex II of LOSC. See Treves (2004). However, it must be pointed out that the extension of the deadline for submissions was in the interests of all states parties.
47.
Art. 87 of LOSC and paras. 90 and 93 of the Report on the work of the United Nations Open-ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea at its fifth meeting, A/59/122 of 1 July 2004. See also Anthon (1998), pp. 360–361.
48.
Art. 88 of LOSC.
49.
Borgese (2001), p. 397.
50.
Art. 140 of LOSC.
51.
Art. 145 of LOSC. See Kaye (2004), pp. 221 at 224–225; Halfar and Fujita (2002), pp. 103–106 and International Seabed Authority, Press Release, SB/10/8 of 27 May 2004.
52.
Art. 146 of LOSC.
53.
Art. 143 of LOSC. See the ISA Endowment Fund on Marine Scientific Research, paras. 33–38 of ISBA/14/A/2.
54.
Arts. 1 (3) and 133 of LOSC.
55.
Section 1, para. 5 of the Annex to the Agreement.
56.
The Regulation on Polymetallic Nodules was adopted by the Assembly on 13 July 2000 and that of Polymetallic Sulphides was adopted on 7 May 2010. For more on the Regulation for Polymetallic Nodules see Lodge (2002).
57.
For more on pioneer investors, see Sect. 6.2.3 of Chap. 6 of this book.
58.
See paras. 84–86 of ISBA/14/A/2.
59.
Arts. 152 of LOSC.
60.
See Art. 148 of LOSC and Chap. 7 of this book. The ISA has now embarked on sensitization seminars on the work of the organisation. One of such seminars to sensitise African States on the work of the ISA was held in Abuja, Nigeria from 24 to 26 March 2009 , ISBA/15/A/4 of 6 May 2009.
61.
See Sect. 1.2.1 of Chap. 1.
62.
Art. 82(4) of LOSC.
63.
Art. 158 (1) of LOSC.
64.
Section 1, para. 4 of the Annex of the Agreement.
65.
Section 2, para. 1 of the Annex of the Agreement.
66.
International Seabed Authority (2002b), pp. 15–16.
67.
See Sect. 1, paras. 2 and 3 of the Annex to Agreement.
68.
See Arts. 159–160 of LOSC 82 and Sect. 1, para. 4 of the Annex to the Agreement.
69.
See Art. 159 (1) of LOSC.
70.
A majority of the members of the ISA constitutes a quorum. Art. 159(5) of the LOSC. See paras. 6–8 of ISBA/14/A/2.
71.
Para. 14 of ISBA/10/A/3 of 31 March 2004.
72.
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Mozambique, Senegal, Sudan and Uganda. See Credentials of representatives to the Twelfth session of the Assembly of the International Seabed Authority, Report of the Credentials Committee, ISBA/12/A/8 of 15 August 2006.
73.
Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and United Republic of Tanzania. See Credentials of representatives to the Thirteenth session of the Assembly of the International Seabed Authority, Report of the Credentials Committee, ISBA/13/A/4 of 17 July 2007.
74.
Cameroon, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal, South Africa, the Sudan, and the United Republic of Tanzania. See Credentials of representatives to the Fourteenth session of the Assembly of the International Seabed Authority, Report of the Credentials Committee, ISBA/14/A/10 of 4 June 2008.
75.
United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-eighth session, 64^th plenary meeting, Monday, 24 November 2003, 3p.m, New York, Official Records,A/58/PV.64, p. 14.
76.
Paras. 12–14 of the Report of the Secretary-General of the ISA. see Para. 14 of ISBA/10/A/3 of 31 March 2004.
77.
See Sect. 3, para. 1 of the Annex of the Agreement.
78.
Art. 160 (2) of LOSC.
79.
On issues of finance and budgetary matters the Assembly can only act upon the recommendation of the Council and the Finance Committee. See Sect. 3, paras 4 and 7 of the Annex to the Agreement and below on decision-making.
80.
Art. 160 (f) of the LOSC and Sect. 3, para. 4 of Annex to the Agreement.
81.
Art. 160 (1) of LOSC.
82.
See para. 22 of the O.A.U. Declaration on Issues of the Law of the Sea which called for “… an assembly of all members which shall be the repository of all powers …”.
83.
2 ILM 766(1963).
84.
Art. VII.
85.
Art. VIII.
86.
Art. 5 of the African Union Constitutive Act, http://www.africa-union.org/home/Welcome.htm.
87.
Art. 6(2), of the African Union Constitutive Act, http://www.africa-union.org/home/Welcome.htm.
88.
33 ILM 1067(1994).
89.
32 ILM 116(1993).
90.
Revised Treaty 35 ILM 663 (1996).
91.
30 ILM 1241 (1991).
92.
For example, ECOWAS (Conference of Heads of State/Government; Council of Ministers; Executive Secretariat; Court of Justice and Specialised Technical Commissions); SADC (Summit; Troika; Organ on Politics, Defence and Security; Council of Ministers; Integrated Committee of Ministers; Tribunal; Secretariat; Standing Committee of Senior officials; National Committees); COMESA (the Authority of Heads of State/Government; the Council of Ministers; the Court of Justice; Secretariat; Committee of Governors of Central Banks; the Intergovernmental Committee; Technical Committees; the Consultative Committee); AEC (Assembly of Heads of State/Government; Council of Ministers; Pan-African Parliament; General Secretariat; the Court of Justice; Specialised Technical Committees); AU (the Assembly; the Executive Council; the Pan-African Parliament; the Court of Justice; the Commission; the Permanent Representatives Committee; the Specialised Technical Committees; the Economic, Social and Cultural Council and Financial Institutions).
93.
For AEC see Arts. 7–10 of its constituent treaty.
94.
For COMESA see Arts. 7 (1) and 8 of the constituent treaty.
95.
For SADC see Arts. 9 and 10 of the constituent treaty.
96.
For ECOWAS, see Arts. 6 and 7 of the Constituent treaty.
97.
See Art. 160(1) of LOSC and Sect. 3, para. 1 of the Annex to the Agreement. Also see Churchill and Lowe (1999), p. 240.
98.
Brown (2001), p. 311.
99.
Art. 159 (6) of LOSC.
100.
Art. 159 (7) and (8) of LOSC.
101.
Art. 159 (9) of LOSC.
102.
Section 3 (2) of the Annex to the Agreement.
103.
Section 3, para. 3 of the Annex to the Agreement.
104.
Art. 160 (1) of LOSC.
105.
Section 3, para. 1 of the Annex to the Agreement.
106.
Section 3, para. 4 of the Annex to the Agreement.
107.
Section 3, para. 7 of the Annex to the Agreement.
108.
See Brown (2001), p. 297.
109.
Art. 162 (1) of the LOSC.
110.
Section 3, para. 5 of the Annex to the Agreement.
111.
See Art. 161 (1) of LOSC and Sect. 3, para. 16 of the Annex to the Agreement.
112.
Section 3, para. 15 of the Annex to the Agreement.
113.
There were, however, some changes in the consumer/importer group [the deletion of the word “socialist” and an addition that the state from the Eastern region should have “… the largest economy in that region in terms of gross domestic product” as well as replacing the largest consumer state with “the state, on the date of entry into force of the Convention, having the largest economy in terms of gross domestic product”, if such states wish to be represented in this group]; the investor group [the deletion by the Agreement of the phrase in the LOSC, “… including at least one state from the Eastern European (Socialist) region”] ; and developing states representing special interests [the Agreement includes island states as part of this group]. See Art. 161 (1) (a) (b) and (d) of LOSC and compare with Sect. 3, para. 15(a) (b) and (d) of the Annex to the Agreement.
114.
Section 3, para. 10 of the Annex to the Agreement.
115.
Section 3, para. 9(b) of the Agreement.
116.
See for e.g. Indicative List of States Members of the International Seabed Authority which would fulfil the Criteria for Membership in the Various Groups of States in the Council in accordance with para. 15 of Sect. 3 of the Annex to the Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, ISBA/16/A/CRP.2 of 16 March 2010, prepared in line with Sect. 3, para. 9(b) of the Agreement.
117.
See Rule 83 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, ISBA/A/L.2.
118.
Section 3, para. 15(a) of the Annex to the Agreement.
119.
This is reminiscent of the permanent seats in the Security Council of the United Nations. See Art. 23 of the United Nations Charter. See Murphy (2004), pp. 173 at 174, where arguments in support of the U.S. adherence to the LOSC, referring to the guaranteed seat of the U.S. in the Council of the ISA, alluded to the effective veto it would have (in combination with two other consumer states).
120.
Note the positioning of the phrase incorporating the freeze date suggesting that it applies only to the state with the largest economy, i.e. the United States of America.
121.
For instance, in 2004 ten new member states were admitted into the European Union, including states in Eastern Europe such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. In 2007 another two States from Eastern Europe – Bulgaria and Romania – were admitted to the European Union.
122.
See ISBA/16/A/CRP.2.
123.
Section 3, para. 15(b).
124.
See ISBA/16/A/CRP.2. Under Art. 161(1) of the LOSC, which Sect. 3, para. 16 of the Agreement declares shall not apply, this group was required to include at least one state from the Eastern European (Socialist) region.
125.
Section 3, para. 15(c).
126.
ISBA/16/A/CRP.2.
127.
Section 3, para. 15(d).
128.
ISBA/14/A/CRP.2.
129.
Section 3, para. 15(e) of the Annex to the Agreement.
130.
See Informal Understanding contained in Annex II of document A/48/950, quoted in General Assembly, 48th Session 101st meeting, Thursday, 28 July, 1994, New York, Official Records A/48/PV.101.
131.
See International Seabed Authority (2008), p. 13.
132.
Borgese describes it as a three-dimensional jigsaw puzzle. See Borgese (1998), p. 175.
133.
Brown (1992b), p. 300.
134.
Brown (1992b), pp. 300–301.
135.
Borgese (1998), pp. 176–177.
136.
Art. 162 (1) of LOSC.
137.
Section 3, para. 1 of the Annex to the Agreement.
138.
See Art. 162 (2) of LOSC and Sect. 1, paras. 6 and 15; Sect. 2, para. 2, Sect. 3 and Sect. 7, para. 1(a) of the Annex to the Agreement.
139.
Art. 162 (2) (s) of LOSC and Sect. 3, para. 4 of the Annex to the Agreement.
140.
Advisory Opinion of 3 March, 1950. See International Law Reports 1950, Vol. 17, pp. 326–330.
141.
Advisory Opinion of 3 March, 1950. See International Law Reports 1950, Vol. 17, p. 329.
142.
Art. 160 (1) of LOSC.
143.
Section 3, para. 1 of the Annex to the Agreement.
144.
Section 3, para. 4 of the Annex to the Agreement.
145.
Section 3, para. 9(a) of the Annex to the Agreement. For an analysis of the decision-making process in the Council, see Brauninger (2003), p. 681 at 688–703.
146.
Art. 161 (6) and (7) of LOSC.
147.
Art. 161 (7) (d) and (f) of LOSC.
148.
Section 3, para. 2 of the Annex to the Agreement.
149.
Section 3, para. 6 of the Annex to the Agreement.
150.
Section 3(8) of the Annex to the Agreement states that the provisions of Art. 161 (8) (b) and (c) of the LOSC “shall not apply”.
151.
Section 3, para. 5 of the Annex to the Agreement.
152.
Section 3, para. 11(a) of the Annex to the Agreement. Para. 11(b) of this section declares that the provisions of Art. 162(2)(j) of LOSC that categorically require the Council to act upon a plan of work within 60 days of its submission by the Legal and Technical Commission “shall not apply”.
153.
Brown (1992b), p. 307.
154.
Section 3, para. 5 of the Annex to the Agreement.
155.
Oxman (1994), p. 691.
156.
Nelson (1995), pp. 189 at 197–198.
157.
See Foroohar et al. (2002), p. 38.
158.
Art. 163 of LOSC and Sect. 1, para. 4 of the Annex to the Agreement. The Legal and Technical Commission is to perform the functions of the Economic Planning Commission until the Council decides otherwise or until the approval of the first plan of work for exploitation.
159.
Section 9 of the Annex to the Agreement.
160.
Art. 162 (2) (d) of LOSC states that the Council shall “establish, as appropriate, and with due regard to economy and efficiency, such subsidiary organs as it finds necessary for the exercise of its functions in accordance with this Part. In the composition of subsidiary organs, emphasis shall be placed on the need for members qualified and competent in relevant technical matters dealt with by those organs provided that due account shall be taken of the principle of equitable geographical distribution and of special interests”. This is not tampered with by the Agreement. See also Art. 162 (2) (y) of LOSC that empowers the Council to establish a subsidiary organ to deal with financial matters. Under Sect. 9, para. 9 of the Agreement the Finance Committee is deemed to be established under Art. 162 (2) (y) of LOSC. On subsidiary organs under the United Nations, see Sarooshi (1996), pp. 411–478.
161.
Art. 163 (2) of LOSC.
162.
ISBA/C/L.3.
163.
ISBA/7/C/6.
164.
Art. 163 (7) of LOSC.
165.
Art. 165 (1) of LOSC.
166.
Art. 164 (1) of LOSC.
167.
Art. 163 (4) of the LOSC. Certain members of the Council have expressed concerns that the requirements for equitable geographical representation and representation of special interests were not being respected in the present composition of the Legal and Technical Commission. See para. 30 of ISBA/10/A/3 of 31 March 2004.
168.
Art. 163 (6) of the LOSC.
169.
Art. 163 (8) of the LOSC.
170.
Art. 163 (8) of the LOSC.
171.
See Table 5.7 (comparative analysis of the number of each regional grouping in the Legal and Technical Commission).
172.
Para. 33 of ISBA/10/A/3 of 31 March 2004.
173.
International Seabed Authority, Press Releases, SB/9/11 of 5 August 2003 and SB/10/9 of 31 May 2004.
174.
International Seabed Authority, Press Releases, SB/10/11 of 1 June 2004.
175.
See para. 29 of ISBA/14/A/2.
176.
This figures are as on 5 October 2010. See International Seabed Authority Handbook 2009 (Jamaica, International Seabed Authority 2009), pp. 8–9 and DOALOS website. The representation of regional grouping in Table 5.1 does not include the European Union which is also a member of the ISA.
177.
See General Information-Judges http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html. The agreed allocation of seats to each regional grouping is African group(5); Asian group(5); Latin American and Caribbean group(4); Western European and Other States group(4) and Eastern European group(3). See SPLOS/34 of 21 April 1999.
178.
See the recent proceedings before the ITLOS – Responsibilities and obligations of States sponsoring persons and entities with respect to activities in the International Seabed Area (Request for Advisory Opinion submitted to the Seabed Disputes Chamber), ITLOS Case No. 17.
179.
Art. 165 (2) of the LOSC and Sect. 1, para. 6 of the Annex to the Agreement.
180.
See, for example, Draft Regulations on prospecting and exploration for polymetallic nodules in the Area-Proposed by the Legal and Technical Commission, ISBA/4/C/4/Rev.1 of 29 April 1998.
181.
See, for example, Recommendations for the guidance of the contractors for the assessment of the possible environmental impacts arising from exploration for polymetallic nodules in the Area, ISBA/7/LTC/1/Rev.1** of 13 February 2002.
182.
See, for example, Status of Annual Reports received from Contractors, ISBA/10/LTC/2 of 10 May 2004.
183.
See paras. 11–14 of Report of the Chairman of the Legal and Technical Commission on the work of the Commission during the Fourteenth Session of the ISA, ISBA/14/C/8 of 28 May 2008.
184.
Art. 163 (11) of LOSC.
185.
Art. 163 (11) of LOSC.
186.
Section 3, para. 13 of the Annex to the Agreement.
187.
Section 3, para. 2 of the Annex to the Agreement.
188.
Rule 44 of the Annex to the Decision of the Council of the Authority Concerning the Rules of Procedure of the Legal and Technical Commission, ISBA/6/C/9 of 13 July 2000.
189.
Art. 165 (2) of LOSC and Sect. 1, para. 6(a) of the Annex to the Agreement.
190.
Section 3, para. 11 (a) of the Annex to the Agreement.
191.
Section 9 of the Annex to the Agreement.
192.
Section 9, para. 9 of the Annex to the Agreement and Art. 162(2) (y) of the LOSC.
193.
Section 9, para. 1 of the Annex to the Agreement.
194.
Section 9, para. 6 of the Annex to the Agreement.
195.
Section 9, para. 3 of the Annex to the Agreement.
196.
Section 9, paras. 4 and 5 of the Annex to the Agreement.
197.
Para. 33 of ISBA/10/A/3 of 31 March 2004.
198.
Section 9, para. 7 of the Annex to the Agreement.
199.
See Appointment of an Auditor, ISBA/9/FC/1 of 25 July 2003 and para. 28 of ISBA/10/A/3 of 31 March 2004.
200.
Section 9, para. 8 of the Annex to the Agreement. See Murphy (2004), p. 173 at 174–175, where arguments in support of the U.S. adherence to the LOSC alluded to the absolute veto it would have in the Finance Committee with respect to any decision with financial implications as well as the distribution of all revenues generated from the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.
201.
ISBA/F/WP.1, 24 July, 1996, Rule 21. See Brown (1992b), p. 316.
202.
Section 9, para. 7 of the Annex to the Agreement.
203.
ISA/00/01 of 20 April, 1999, Rule 22(2).
204.
Section 4 of the Annex to the Agreement and Arts. 314, 315 and 316 of LOSC.
205.
Para. 28 of ISBA/10/A/3 of 31 March 2004.
206.
Art. 158 (1) and 166 of LOSC. See generally on the secretariat of international organisations, Sands and Klein (2001), pp. 302–315; Schermers and Blokker (1997), pp. 433–547 and specifically on the United Nations Secretariat see Meron (1976), pp. 659–693.
207.
Section 2, para. 1 of the Annex to the Agreement.
208.
Sands and Klein (2001), p. 302.
209.
Art. 166 (3) of LOSC.
210.
International Seabed Authority (2008), p. 66.
211.
Art. 167 of LOSC.
212.
See Art. 11 of the Agreement concerning the Relationship between the United Nations and the International Seabed Authority annexed to General Assembly Resolution A/RES/52/27 of 26 January 1997 which was adopted by consensus on 26 November 1997. Also see generally the Staff Regulations of the ISA, ISBA/6/C/10 of 13 July, 2000 and ISBA/7/A/5 of 10 July 2001.
213.
Art. 167 (2) of LOSC.
214.
Art. 168 (1) of LOSC.
215.
222 F. Supp. 106 at 108 (E.D.N.Y., 1963).
216.
Art. 168 (2) of LOSC and Regulations 35 and 36 of the Mining Code, ISBA/6/A/18 of 4 October 2000.
217.
ISBA/14/A/L.3 of 4 June 2008.
218.
See International Seabed Authority Press Releases, SB/6/16 of 31 March 2000 and SB/10/20 of 4 June 2004.
219.
The candidates were Satya N. Nandan (Fiji); Luis Preval Paez (Cuba); Kenneth Rattray (Jamaica) and Joseph Warioba (Tanzania).
220.
See para. 36 of ISBA/10/A/3 of 31 March 2004.
221.
International Seabed Authority, Press Release, SB/10/20 of 4 June 2004.
222.
Arts. 166 and 169 of LOSC. See http://www.isa.org.jm/en/about/secretariat.
223.
Section 2, para. 1 of the Annex of the Agreement. See discussion below, Sect. 5.1.3.1.1.IV, on the Enterprise.
224.
Art. 167 (3) and 168 (1) and (3) of LOSC.
225.
Arts. 167 (3) and 168 (3) and (4) of the LOSC and Art. 2 of the 1994 Agreement.
226.
See generally International Seabed Authority (2002a) and Lee (1980), pp. 62–74.
227.
See Art. 170 (2) and Art. 13 (2) of Annex IV, LOSC. The creation of the Enterprise as the operational arm of the exploitation system was first proposed in 1971 by thirteen Latin American Countries who submitted to the Seabed Committee a working paper on the seabed regime. See A/AC.135/49 of 1971. This was later adopted by the group of 77. See Lee (1980), p. 62.
228.
Art. 170 (3) of LOSC.
229.
Section 2, paras. 1 and 2 of the Annex to the Agreement.
230.
Section 2, para. 1 of the Annex to the Agreement.
231.
See A/CONF.62/C.1/L.28, 23^d August 1980 UNCLOS III Official Records, Vol. XIV, p. 167 and Brown (1992b), p. 323.
232.
See Art. 5 of Annex IV of LOSC. The members of the Governing Board are to continue in office until their successors are elected. See Art. 6 of Annex IV of LOSC for the powers and functions of the Board.
233.
Art. 5 (1) of Annex IV of LOSC.
234.
Art. 7 (1) and (2) of Annex IV of LOSC.
235.
Art. 7 (3) of Annex IV of LOSC.
236.
Art. 170 (1) of LOSC.
237.
Arts. 153, 144 and Annex III, Arts. 5 and 9 of the LOSC.
238.
Anand (1985), pp. 73 at 82–83 and also Oxman (1977), p. 247 at 254.
239.
Nelson (1995), p. 189 at 196.
240.
“Information Note concerning the Secretary-General’s informal consultation on outstanding issues relating to the deep seabed mining provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of Sea, New York, 25 March 1991” in International Seabed Authority (2002b), p. 15.
241.
Compare with Art. 144 (2) (b) of the LOSC that merely requires transfer to be, “… under fair and reasonable terms and condition”.
242.
Section 5, para. 1 of the Annex to the 1994 Agreement.
243.
Section 2, paras. 3 and 4 of the Annex to the 1994 Agreement.
244.
Section 2, para. 1 of the Annex to the 1994 Agreement.
245.
Section 2, para. 2 of the Annex to the Agreement.
246.
Section 2, para. 2 of the Annex to the Agreement.
247.
United Nations General Assembly, Forty-eighth Session, Official Records, A/48/PV.101 of 28 July 1994, p. 9.
248.
Arts. 5 and 6 of Annex IV to LOSC.
249.
Art. 5 (7) of Annex IV to LOSC.
250.
Art. 5 (8) of Annex IV to LOSC.
251.
Art. 5 (1) and (4) of Annex IV to LOSC.
252.
Art. 7 (2) of Annex IV to LOSC.
253.
Section 2, para. 1 of the Annex to Agreement.
254.
Arts. 286–296 of LOSC. See Brown (1997), pp. 17–43.
255.
See the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Annex VI to LOSC and Mensah (1997), pp. 466–477.
256.
Art. 21 of Annex VI to the LOSC.
257.
Art. 1 (1) and (2) of Annex VI to the LOSC.
258.
Art. 1 (3) of Annex VI to the LOSC. This is similar to Art. 22 of the Statute of the ICJ which was used for the first time in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project Case (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgement, (1997) I.C.J Rep. 7.
259.
Art. 2 (1) of Annex VI of LOSC. Compare with Art. 2 of the Statute of the ICJ which states: “The Court shall be composed of a body of independent judges, elected regardless of their nationality from among persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognised competence in international law”.
260.
Art. 2 (2) of Annex VI to the LOSC. Compare with Art. 9 of the Statute of the ICJ which states that the electors should in addition to the professional qualifications of the candidates also take into consideration “… that in the body as a whole the representation of the main forms of civilisation and of the principal systems of the world should be assured”.
261.
Art. 3 of Annex VI to LOSC.
262.
Art. 7 of Annex VI to LOSC.Compare with Arts. 16 and 17 of Statute of ICJ.
263.
Art. 5 of Annex VI to LOSC. Compare with Art. 13 of the Statute of the ICJ. At the first election the terms of seven members expired at the end of three years and that of seven more members expired at the end of 6 years. Lots were drawn by the secretary-general immediately after the first election to choose these members. See SPLOS/9 of 31 May 1996.
264.
Boualem Bouguetaia (Algeria), Jose Luis Jesus (Cape Verde), Tafsir Malick Ndiaye (Senegal), James Kateka (United Republic of Tanzania) and Albert Hoffmann (South Africa).
265.
See Art. 17 and also Arts. 2, 8 and 11 of Annex VI to LOSC. Compare with Art. 31 (2) of the Statute of ICJ.
266.
The ICJ with 15 judges has three African judges – Raymond Ranjeva (Madagascar); Abdul G. Koroma (Sierra Leone) and Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf (Somalia). See http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/icjgnnot.html On African representation at the ICJ, see Bedi (1999), pp. 181–222 and Higgins (1999), pp. 343–369.
267.
Art. 15 of Annex VI to LOSC. Compare with Arts. 26 and 27 of Statute of ICJ. Pursuant to Art. 15 the following chambers have been formed – the Chamber of Summary Procedure, the Chamber for Fisheries Disputes, the Chamber for Marine Environment Disputes and at the request of Chile and the European Community, a special chamber was formed to deal with the Case Concerning the Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean. See General Information-Overview: International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (Accessed on 6 December 2004).
268.
Art. 186 of LOSC and Art. 14 of Annex VI.
269.
See Adede (1987), pp. 185–186. Also Eiriksson (2000), p. 68.
270.
Arts. 35 and 15 (5) of Annex VI.
271.
Eiriksson (2000), pp. 68–69 and 283–285.
272.
Art. 35 (2) of Annex VI.
273.
Art. 191 of LOSC. See responsibilities and obligations of states sponsoring persons and entities with respect to activities in the International Seabed Area (Request for Advisory opinion submitted to the Seabed Disputes Chamber), ITLOS case No. 17, http://www.Itlos.org/
274.
Art. 314 of LOSC and Art. 41 of Annex VI.
275.
Art. 19 (1) of Annex VI.
276.
Art. 35 (1) and (3) of Annex VI. Art. 22 of ITLOS Rules of the Tribunal, ITLOS/8 of 21 September 2001.
277.
Art. 35 (2) of Annex VI.
278.
Art. 35 (4) of Annex VI; Art. 26 of ITLOS Rules of the Tribunal, ITLOS/8.
279.
Art. 35 (7) of Annex VI.
280.
Art. 20 of Annex VI and Art. 187(c), (d) and (e) of LOSC. Compare with Art. 34(1) of the Statute of the ICJ which allows only states to be parties to contentious cases.
281.
Art. 287 (2) of LOSC.
282.
Art. 187 of LOSC.
283.
Arts. 1 (1) and 2 (1) of the 1994 Agreement.
284.
Art. 189 of LOSC.
285.
For more on the jurisdiction of the Seabed Chambers see Brown (1992b), pp. 357–369.
286.
Art. 191 of LOSC.
287.
Allott (1983), pp. 1 at 15–16.
288.
See Arts. 187 (f) and 288 (3) of LOSC.
289.
Art. 191 of LOSC.
290.
See generally Arts. 279–296 of LOSC.
291.
Art. 20 (2) of Annex VI says: “The Tribunal shall be open to entities other than States Parties in any case expressly provided for in Part XI or in any case submitted pursuant to any other agreement conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal which is accepted by all the parties to that case”. (Emphasis added). While Art. 21 of Annex VI provides that, “The jurisdiction of the Tribunal shall comprise all disputes and applications submitted to it in accordance with this Convention and all matters specifically provided for in any other agreement which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal”.
292.
Art. 188 (1) of LOSC.
293.
Art. 188(1) (b) of LOSC and Art. 36 of Annex VI. See also Art. 27 of ITLOS Rules of Procedure of the Tribunal, ITLOS/8 of 27 April 2005.
294.
Under Art. 27(2) of ITLOS Rules of Procedure of the Tribunal, ITLOS/8, if within a time-limit fixed by the President of the Seabed Disputes Chamber the parties do not agree on the composition of the Ad Hoc Chamber the President shall establish a time limit for the parties to make the necessary appointments.
295.
Art. 36 (2) of Annex VI.
296.
Art. 36 of Annex VI.
297.
Schwebel (1987), pp. 831 at 854.
298.
Brown (1992b), pp. 356–357; Also Brown (1997), p. 38.
299.
See the Gulf of Maine Judgement (1984) ICJ Rep. 361; Frontier Dispute Case (Burkina Faso/Mali) (1986) ICJ Rep. 554; Elettronica Sicula Case, Supra; Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras) (1987) ICJ Rep. 12 and Frontier Dispute Case(Benin/Niger), Order of 27 November 2002(2002) ICJ Rep. 1.
300.
However, Judge Mensah disagrees that a proliferation of international tribunals would necessarily lead to a danger of fragmentation of jurisprudence or conflicting decisions. He argues that such a view on the danger of fragmented jurisprudence is based on mere speculation, with no evidence in support. See Mensah (1999), pp. 81 at 92.
301.
Art. 15 (1) of Annex VI and footnote 276.
302.
Art. 15 (2) of Annex VI and Arts. 29 to 30 of ITLOS Rules of Procedure, ITLOS/8 of 27 April 2005.
303.
Arts. 187 (a) and 188(1) (a) of LOSC.
304.
Art. 15 (5) of Annex VI.
305.
Art. 29 (1) of Annex VI and ITLOS, Internal Judicial Practice, ITLOS/10 of 31 October 1997. For the ITLOS the quorum of sitting judges is eleven, while for the Seabed Disputes Chamber it is seven. Of course for the Ad Hoc Chambers all three members must be present and voting.
306.
Art. 125 (2) of ITLOS Rules of Procedure of the Tribunal, ITLOS/8.
307.
Art. 29 (2) of Annex VI.
308.
See generally Suh (1969), pp. 224–236.
309.
For example, Judge Jesus (Cape Verde), another current member of the Chamber was a delegate and head of Cape Verde’s delegation to UNCLOS III from 1979 to 1982 and also Chairman, Group of 77 for the Law of the Sea (1986) and Chairman of the PrepCom 1987–1995. A previous member of the Chamber, until 30 September 2002, Judge Bamela Engo (Cameroon) and still a member of ITLOS, was not only a member of the Cameroonian delegation to UNCLOS III but was also the Chairman of the First Committee. See General Information-Judges http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (Accessed on 12 December 2004).
310.
(2001) I.C.J. Rep. 40.
311.
(2001) I.C.J. Rep. 40 at pp. 145–214.
312.
(2001) I.C.J. Rep. 40 at p. 159, para. 38.
313.
See also Judge ad hoc Georges Abi-Saab (Egypt)’s separate opinion in the Chamber of the ICJ decision in the Case concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali), (1986) ICJ Rep. pp. 554 at 659–663, especially at p. 659, para. 4.
314.
Schwebel (1987), p. 846.
315.
Art. 7 of Annex VI.
316.
Art. 8 of Annex VI.
317.
Arts. 7 (3) and 8 (4) of Annex VI.
318.
Arts. 11 (2) and (3), 32 (4) and 33 of ITLOS Rules of the Tribunal, ITLOS/8.
319.
Arts. 39 (2) and (3) of ITLOS Rules of the Tribunal, ITLOS/8.
320.
Eiriksson (2000), p. 260.
321.
Art. 35 (1) of Annex VI.
322.
Art. 26 (1) of ITLOS Rules of the Tribunal, ITLOS/8.
323.
Art. 39 of Annex VI to LOSC.
324.
Art. 151 (8).
325.
Section 6, paras. 1(f) (I) and 4.
326.
Section 6(1) (f) (ii) and 4.
327.
As at 5 October 2010 the following African states were members of WTO: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote d’ Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. See http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm.
328.
See WTO Dispute settlement – Status in brief of the disputes, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm and Romano (2002), p. 367 at 385–397.
329.
Art. 188 (2) (a) of LOSC. Generally on African states and commercial arbitration, see Asouzu (2001).
330.
Art. 188 (2) (c) of LOSC.
331.
Art. 188 (2) (a) of LOSC.
332.
Art. 188 (2) (b) of LOSC.
333.
See generally on financial aspects of international organisations Sands and Klein (2001), pp. 565–580.
334.
See the example of the United States of America, a major financial contributor to the United Nations system forcing reforms in the United Nations and the UNESCO. See http://www.globalpolicy.org/finance/chronol/index.htm and http://www.un.org/reform/dossier.htm (Accessed on 12 December 2004). Also see Nelson (1986), pp. 973–983; Zoller (1987), pp. 610–634 and Chimni (2004), pp. 1 at 2–4.
335.
Arts. 171–175 of LOSC and Sects. 1, paras. 1(12)(c)(i) and 14; 2, para. 3; 3, para. 7 and 9, para. 7(c) of the Annex to the 1994 Agreement as well as the Financial Regulations, ISBA/6/A/3 of 28 March 2000.
336.
The budget has been between the range of $4,697,100 for 1998 and $12,516,500 recommended by the Finance Committee for the 2009–2010 financial years. See ISBA/14/A/7 – ISBA/14/C/6 of 29 May 2008. In 2006 the Assembly adopted a budget of $11, 782,000 for 2007–2008 financial year. ISBA/13/A/7 of 19 July 2007.
337.
Art. 171 of LOSC; Sect. 7, para. 2 of Agreement and Reg. 6.1 of the Financial Regulations.
338.
Art. 160 (2) (e) of LOSC and Sect. 1, para. 14 of the 1994 Agreement. The present United Nations scale is capped at a maximum assessment rate of 22% and a minimum assessment rate of 0.01%.
339.
Section 9, para. 7 of the Annex to the Agreement.
340.
Section 3, para. 7 of the Annex to the Agreement.
341.
See Sect. 3, para. 4 of the Annex to the Agreement which allows the Assembly to refuse to accept the recommendations of the Council and to return such to the Council for further consideration in the light of the views expressed by the Assembly.
342.
Oxman (1994), p. 689.
343.
The African states in arrears were Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, the Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Seychelles, Somalia, the Sudan, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. See para. 27 of ISBA/14/A/2 of 14 April 2008.
344.
See International Seabed Authority, Press Release, SB/10/18 of 3 June 2004.
345.
Art. 184 of LOSC and Rule 80 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly. See para. 58, ISBA/10/A/3 of 31 March 2004.
346.
Section 2, para. 1 of the Annex to the Agreement.
347.
See Art. 170 (2) and Arts. 2 and 13 (2) of Annex IV, LOSC.
348.
Art. 11 of Annex IV.
349.
Art 11(3) of Annex IV.
350.
Section 2, para. 3(b) of the Annex to the Agreement.
351.
Art. 10 (3) of Annex IV and Sect. 2, para. 4 of the Annex to the Agreement.
352.
International Seabed Authority (2002a), pp. 183–187.
353.
General Assembly, Forty-eighth Session, 101st Meeting, A/48/PV.101 of 28 July 1994, p. 11.
354.
Art. 19 (1) of the Statute of ITLOS. The first meeting of SPLOS was convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in the exercise of his powers under Art. 319 (2) (e) of LOSC in New York on 21 November 1994. SPLOS/3 of 28 February 1995.
355.
See Decisions on budgetary matters of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea for 2002, Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, New York, 14–18 May 2001, SPLOS/70 of 17 May 2001, para. 4.
356.
See SPLOS/180 of 20 June 2008. The 2009–2010 budget is to be based on a ceiling rate of 22% and a floor rate of 0.01%.
357.
The working group is a compromise solution to arrive at a balance between two groups at the SPLOS, on the one hand those which wanted a Finance Committee to be set up to serve as a subsidiary organ to consider the budget and other financial matters and thereafter make recommendations to the SPLOS, and on the other hand those who wanted no such body but wanted all the details of the budget to be considered by the plenary body. See SPLOS/71 of 17 May 2001 and SPLOS/73 of 14 June 2001, pp. 8–9, paras. 47–50.
358.
SPLOS/73, at p. 7, para. 38.
359.
Rule 53 of SPLOS Rules of Procedure, SPLOS/2/Rev.3 of 26 July 1995.
360.
SPLOS/73, at p. 8, paras. 45 and 46.
361.
It is however pertinent to note that at the second meeting of the SPLOS it was agreed that the principle of cost effectiveness would apply to all aspects of the ITLOS’s work. See SPLOS/4 of 26 July 1995, p. 9, para. 25 (e).
362.
As at 31 December 2007 there was an unpaid balance of assessed contributions covering the period from 1996 to 2007 amounting to 1,072,495 euros. See SPLOS/174 of 25 March 2008. See SPLOS/174 of 25 March 2008. There is, however, no indication as to the exact defaulting states in documents in the public domain, unlike the ISA.
363.
Art. 19 (2) of Annex VI to LOSC.
364.
Eiriksson (2000), p. 282.
365.
Most African states started to emerge as independent states and active participants in the international community in the 1960s.
366.
Friedheim (1993), p. 256.

References

Adede AO (1979) The group of 77 and the establishment of the International Sea-Bed Authority. Ocean Dev Int Law 7:31–63
Article Google Scholar
Adede AO (1987) The system for settlement of disputes under United Nations convention on the law of the sea: a drafting history and a commentary. Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht
Google Scholar
Allott P (1983) Power sharing in the law of the sea. Am J Int Law 77:1–34
Article Google Scholar
Anand RP (1985) Odd man out: the United States and the U.N Convention on the law of the sea. In: Van Dyke JM (ed) Consensus and confrontation: the United States and the law of the sea convention, a workshop of the law of the Sea Institute, Honolulu, Hawaii, January 9–13, 1984. The Law of the Sea Institute, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, pp 73–124
Google Scholar
Anthon DK (1998) Law of the sea's biological diversity. Columbia J Trans Law 36:341–371
Google Scholar
Asouzu A (2001) International commercial arbitration and african states: practice, participation and institutional development. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Book Google Scholar
Bedi RSB (1999) African participation in the international court of justice (1946-1998). In: Yusuf AA (ed) African yearbook of international law, vol 6. Kluwer Law International, The Hague, pp 181–222
Google Scholar
Borgese EM (1998) The oceanic circle: governing the seas as a global resource. United Nations Press, Tokyo
Google Scholar
Borgese EM (2001) Caird medal address. Marine Policy 25(6):391–397
Article Google Scholar
Brauninger T (2003) When simple voting doesn’t work: multicameral systems for the representation and aggregation of interests in international organizations. Br J Polit Sci 33(4):681–703
Article Google Scholar
Brown ED (1992b) Sea-bed energy and minerals: the international legal regime: continental shelf, vol 2. Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht
Google Scholar
Brown ED (1997) Dispute settlement and the law of the sea: the UN convention regime. Mar Pol 21(1):17–43
Article Google Scholar
Brown ED (2001) Sea-bed energy and minerals: the international legal regime-sea bed mining, vol 2. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague
Google Scholar
Buzan B (1981) Negotiating by consensus: developments in technique at the United Nations conference on the law of the sea. Am J Int Law 75:324–348
Article Google Scholar
Chimni BS (2004) International institutions today: an imperial global state in the making. Eur J Int Law 15(1):1–37
Article Google Scholar
Churchill RR, Lowe AV (1999) Law of the sea. Manchester University Press, Manchester
Google Scholar
Cox RW, Jacobson HK (eds) (1973) The anatomy of influence: decision making in international organization. Yale University Press, New Haven
Google Scholar
DOALOS (1996) The law of the sea, concept of the common heritage of mankind, legislative history of articles 133 to 150 and 311(6) of the United Nations convention on the law of the sea. United Nations, New York
Google Scholar
Eiriksson G (2000) International tribunal for the law of the sea. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague
Google Scholar
Foroohar R, Mackinnon I, Margolis M, Mooney P, Ashurst M (2002) The poor speak up. Newsweek Magazine, 11 February 2002, pp 38–42
Google Scholar
Friedheim RL (1993) Negotiating the new ocean regime. University of South Carolina Press, Columbia
Google Scholar
Glowka L (1999) Genetic resources, marine scientific research and the international seabed area. Rev Eur Commun Int Environ Law (RECIEL) 8(1):56–66
Article Google Scholar
Halfar J, Fujita RM (2002) Precautionary management of deep-sea mining. Mar Pol 26(2):103–106
Article Google Scholar
Higgins R (1999) The international court of justice and Africa. In: Yakpo E, Boumedra T (eds) Liber Amicorum – Mohammed Bedjaoui. Kluwer Law International, The Hague, pp 343–369
Google Scholar
International Seabed Authority (2002a) Legislative history of the enterprise under the United Nations convention on the law of the sea and the agreement relating to the implementation of part XI of the convention. International Seabed Authority, Jamaica
Google Scholar
International Seabed Authority (2002b) Secretary-general's informal consultations on outstanding issues relating to the deep seabed mining provisions of the United Nations convention on the law of the sea: collected documents. International Seabed Authority, Jamaica
Google Scholar
International Seabed Authority (2008) International seabed authority handbook 2008. International Seabed Authority, Jamaica
Google Scholar
International Seabed Authority (2009) Issues associated with the implementation of article 82 of the United Nations convention on the law of the sea, technical study no. 4. International Seabed Authority, Kingston
Google Scholar
Kaye S (2004) Implementing high seas biodiversity conservation: global geopolitical considerations. Mar Pol 28(3):221–226
Article Google Scholar
Lee RS (1980) The enterprise: operational aspects and implications. Columbia J World Bus 15(4):62–74
Google Scholar
Mensah T (1997) The place of the international tribunal for the law of the sea in the international system for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Indian J Int Law 37:466–477
Google Scholar
Mensah T (1999) The role of peaceful settlement in contemporary ocean policy and law. In: Vidas D, Ostreng W (eds) Order for the oceans at the turn of the century. Kluwer Law International, Hague, pp 81–94
Google Scholar
Meron T (1976) Staff of the United Nations secretariat: problems and directions. Am J Int Law 70(4):659–693
Article Google Scholar
Montaldo R (1970) International legal personality and implied powers of international organisations. Br Yearbook Int Law 44:111–155
Google Scholar
Murphy SD (ed) (2004) Senate testimony regarding U.S adherence to law of the sea convention. Am J Int Law 98(1):173–175
Google Scholar
Nelson RW (1986) International law and US withholding of payments to international organizations. Am J Int Law 80:973–983
Article Google Scholar
Nelson LDM (1995) The new deep sea-bed mining regime. Int J Mar Coast Law 10(2):189–203
Article Google Scholar
Oude Elferink AG (2004) The continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles: the relationship between the CLCS and third party dispute settlement. In: Oude Elferink AG, Rothwell DR (eds) Ocean management in the 21st century: institutional frameworks and responses. Koninklijke Brill NV, The Netherlands, pp 107–124
Google Scholar
Oxman BH (1977) The third United Nations conference on the law of the sea: the 1976 New York sessions. Am J Int Law 71(2):247–269
Article Google Scholar
Oxman BH (1994) The 1994 agreement and the convention. Am J Int Law 88(4):687–696
Article Google Scholar
Rembe NS (1980) Africa and the international law of the sea: a study of the contribution of the African states to the third United Nations conference on the law of the sea. Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Alphen aan den Rijn
Google Scholar
Romano CPR (2002) International justice and developing countries: a quantitative analysis. Law Pract Int Court Tribunal 1(2):367–399
Google Scholar
Sands P, Klein P (2001) Bowett’s law of international institutions, 5th edn. Sweet & Maxwell, London
Google Scholar
Sarooshi D (1996) The legal framework governing United Nations subsidiary organs. Br Yearbook Int Law LXVII:411–478
Google Scholar
Schermers H, Blokker N (1997) International institutional law – unity within diversity. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague
Google Scholar
Schwebel SM (1987) Ad hoc chambers of the international court of justice. Am J Int Law 81:831–854
Article Google Scholar
Scovazzi T (2004) Mining, protection of the environment, scientific research and bio prospecting: some considerations on the role of the international sea-bed authority. Int J Mar Coast Law 19(4):383–409
Article Google Scholar
Suh IR (1969) Voting behaviour of national judges in international courts. Am J Int Law 63:224–236
Article Google Scholar
Treves T (2004) The general assembly and the meeting of the states parties in the implementation of the UN law of the sea convention. Paper presented at the 3rd Verzijl symposium on the stability and change in the law of the sea: selected issues, Utrecht University, The Netherlands, 3 December 2004
Google Scholar
Zoller E (1987) The "Corporate Will" of the United Nations and the rights of the minority. Am J Int Law 81(3):610–634
Article Google Scholar
Lodge M (2002) The international seabed authority’s regulations on prospecting and exploration for polymetallic nodules in the area. Cent Energy Petroleum Miner Law Policy J:10(2). http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/journal/html/volume10.html

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Department of Politics, Cardiff University, Park Place 65-68, CF10 3AS, Cardiff, United Kingdom
Dr. Edwin Egede (Lecturer in international law & international relations)

Authors

Dr. Edwin Egede
View author publications
You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Edwin Egede .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Egede, E. (2011). African States and the Institutions of the Common Heritage of Mankind Regime in the Area. In: Africa and the Deep Seabed Regime: Politics and International Law of the Common Heritage of Mankind. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17662-3_5

Download citation

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17662-3_5
Published: 26 January 2011
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-17661-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-17662-3
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics