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Africa and the Deep Seabed Regime: Politics and International Law of the Common Heritage of Mankind pp 55–73Cite as

The Legal Status of the Area: Common Heritage of Mankind and African States

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Abstract

The Common Heritage of Mankind (CHM) is a relatively novel concept in international law and international relations. Payoyo who prefers the phrase “the common heritage of humanity” holds the view that the assertion by the LOSC that the Area and the resources therein are CHM marked “a genuine confluence of law, politics, history and nature”.1 This chapter would seek to explore the concept in relation to African States and the Area. It seeks to introduce a distinctive African flavour to the discourse of this interesting and rather complex concept that applies not only to the Area but also to other global commons.2

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Payoyo (1997), p. 2.

  2. 2.

    Such as the Moon, Outer Space and Antarctica. For excellent general discourse of the concept of the common heritage of mankind, see Baslar (1998) and Payoyo (1997).

  3. 3.

    See Mahmoudi (1987), pp. 85–168.

  4. 4.

    See Arrow (1981), p. 1 at 12–13. On res nullius generally see the Island of Palmas (United States v. Netherlands) Case, printed in (1928) 22 Am J Int Law, pp. 867–912; Clipperton Island (France v. Mexico) Case (1932) 6 R.G.D.I.P, pp. 129–132; Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway) Case P.C.I.J. Series A/B., No. 53, 1933 and Western Sahara Case, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Rep. 1975, p. 12.

  5. 5.

    Hurst (1923), p. 34 at 42.

  6. 6.

    See Mahmoudi (1987), pp. 87–103 and Van Dyke and Yuen (1982), p. 493 at 514–519.

  7. 7.

    14 ILM 51-65(1975). See Jackson (1976), pp. 170–186 and Frank and Jenett (1975), pp. 1237–1270.

  8. 8.

    See 14 ILM 66 (1975). See Burton (1977), p. 1135 at 1140–1159. However, see the British Foreign Office instructions to the British Embassy in Venezuela on the bed and subsoil of the Gulf of Paria where they wrote: “…in international law the bed of the sea beneath territorial waters and the subsoil beneath that bed are already considered as being in possession of the territorial State. The bed of the sea and accompanying subsoil beneath the high seas on the other hand is res nullius, but is capable of acquisition by effective occupation in the same manner as any unoccupied territory above the level of the sea”. Public Record office reference F.O. 371/19847, folio 429 quoted in Marston (1976–1977), pp. 329–330. This was, of course, before the development of the concept of the continental shelf.

  9. 9.

    See 14 ILM 67-68 and 795-796 (1975).

  10. 10.

    Article 1 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf states as follows: For the purpose of these articles, the term “continental shelf” is used as referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 m or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands.

  11. 11.

    See the exchange between Henkin and Finlay on this: Henkin (1969), pp. 504–517; Finlay (1970), pp. 42–61; Henkin (1970), pp. 62. Also see Young (1968), pp. 641–653, Ogley (1984), pp. 104–106 and Payoyo (1997), pp. 180–226.

  12. 12.

    Joyner (1986), pp. 190 at 193–194 and Fitzmaurice (1953), pp. 1 at 49–53.

  13. 13.

    See Mwenda (2000), http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v7n2/mwenda72.html explaining the position of the Group of 77. See also Churchill and Lowe (1999), p. 228.

  14. 14.

    Larschan and Brennan (1982–1983), p. 305 at 315–320. On the doctrinal basis for the common heritage for mankind in the seabed, see Dupuy (1983), pp. 199–208. Also see Wolfrum (1983), p. 312 at 315–324.

  15. 15.

    Ajomo (1973), p. 307.

  16. 16.

    See Letter dated 29 August 1980 from the Chairman of the Group of 77, E.K. Wapenyi of Uganda, to the President of the Conference, UNCLOS III, Official Record, Vol. 15, pp. 111–114. This letter was in response to the unilateral legislation by certain developed industrialised states and it articulated the Group of 77 views on the regime applicable to the deep seabed Area. However, various authors take divergent views on whether the General Assembly Resolutions on the Common Heritage of Mankind could be used as a basis to argue that the concept had become part of customary international law. See e.g. Brown (1992b), pp. 22–45; Arrow (1981), pp. 1–59 and compare with Biggs (1980), pp. 223–257; Mahmoudi (1987), pp. 124–149; Rembe (1980), pp. 46–57 and Wolfrum (1983), pp. 333–337.

  17. 17.

    Dupuy (1983), pp. 199–208 and Elias (1992) (2nd revised and edited by Ssekandi F), pp. 70–72.

  18. 18.

    See for example, General Assembly Resolution 2340 (XXII) of 18 December 1967; General Assembly Resolution 2467A (XXIII) of 21 December 1968; General Assembly Resolution 2754 (XXIV) of 15 December 1969; General Assembly Resolution 2749(XXV) of 17 of December 1970; General Assembly Resolutions 3029 (XXVII) of 18 December 1972 and 3067 (XXVIII) of 16 November 1973. http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/gares1.htm.

  19. 19.

    Kronmiller (1980), pp. 369–418; Murphy (1979), p. 531 at 536–538; Burton (1977), pp. 1169–1180 and Brown (2001), pp. 14–22.

  20. 20.

    (1958) 52 Am J Int Law, pp. 842–851.

  21. 21.

    The ILC in its commentary on Art. 2 of the High Seas Convention said: “The list of freedoms of the high seas contained in this article is not restrictive; the Commission has merely specified four of the main freedoms. It is aware that there are other freedoms, such as freedom to explore or exploit the subsoil of the high seas and freedom to engage in scientific research therein”. See (1955) 2 Year Book of the International Law Commission, p. 21. Brown, for example, alluded to the ILC travaux preparatoires in his contention that seabed mining in the Area at one time was one of the freedoms of the high seas. See Brown (2001), pp. 21–22.

  22. 22.

    Van Dyke and Yuen (1982), pp. 501–514.

  23. 23.

    Van Dyke and Yuen (1982), pp. 512–513.

  24. 24.

    Briefing on the eighth Session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Hearing before the Subcomm. on International Policy and Trade and the Subcomm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 13(1979), quoted in Van Dyke and Yuen (1982), p. 498.

  25. 25.

    U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1906, of 1972, para. 42.

  26. 26.

    Mahmoudi (1987), pp. 103–115.

  27. 27.

    Mahmoudi (1987), p. 109.

  28. 28.

    Brown (2001), pp. 19–22. For contrary view to the proposition that a state could assert a claim in the absence of a rule under international law prohibiting such, see Fitzmaurice (1953), pp. 8–13.

  29. 29.

    Mahmoudi (1987), pp. 112–115.

  30. 30.

    Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 8 I.L.M (1969) 679.

  31. 31.

    See Asylum Case (Columbia v. Peru) I.C.J. Rep.,1950, p. 266; North Sea Continental Shelf Cases(Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands) I.C.J. Rep.,1969, p. 3 and Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), I.C.J. Rep.,1986, p. 14.

  32. 32.

    Article 2 of the High Seas Convention 1958.

  33. 33.

    See Goldie (1983), pp. 69–112.

  34. 34.

    Joyner (1986), pp. 191–192.

  35. 35.

    Joyner (1986), pp. 192–193.

  36. 36.

    Pinto (1979), p. 13 at 13–15.

  37. 37.

    Joyner (1986), p. 194–195.

  38. 38.

    See Gorove (1971–1972), pp. 390–403.

  39. 39.

    Mgbeoji (2003), p. 821 at 826.

  40. 40.

    See Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea Office(DOALOS), Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind, Legislative History of Articles 133 to 150 and 311(6) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (New York, United Nations, 1996), p. 14.

  41. 41.

    Culture may be defined as “…a dynamic value system of learned elements, with assumptions, conventions, beliefs and rules permitting members of a group to relate to each other and to the world, to communicate and to develop their creative potential. Culture, in this sense, refers to a value system or way of life. It is a broad, all-encompassing notion that includes such things as language, religion, politics, child-rearing practices and attire”. See Renteln (1998), p. 232 at 233.

  42. 42.

    See Renteln (1998), pp. 232–243.

  43. 43.

    See for example, the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights (Preamble 4: “Taking into consideration the virtues of their historical tradition and the values of African civilization which should inspire and characterize their reflection on the concept of human and peoples’ rights”); African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (Preamble 6 : “Taking into consideration the virtues of their cultural heritage, historical background and the values of African Civilization which should inspire and characterize their reflection on the concept of the rights and welfare of the child”). See Okere (1984), pp. 141–159; Nhlapo (1989), pp. 1–20 and wa Mutua (1994–1995), pp. 339–380.

  44. 44.

    African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (Preamble 3 : “Fully conscious of the ever-growing importance of natural resources from an economic, nutritional, scientific, educational, cultural and aesthetic point of view”).

  45. 45.

    African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Preamble 3: “Reiterating the inherent African custom and tradition of hospitality by local host communities for persons in distress and support for such communities”).

  46. 46.

    Kiwanuka (1988), p. 80 at 82. See also Okere (1984), p. 148.

  47. 47.

    J.G.S (1985) 59 The Australian Law Journal, p. 735.

  48. 48.

    See Gorove (1971–1972), pp. 390–403 raising some problematic issues on the idea of ownership of Area by mankind.

  49. 49.

    See UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. 1, p. 186, para. 52.

  50. 50.

    See UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. 2, p. 33, para. 33. See also the view of the representative of Madagascar that the Area belongs to the international community as a whole. UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. 2, p. 59, para. 78. Contrast, however, with the view of the Libyan representative who appeared to be more focused on joint management rather than joint ownership and advocated that the Authority should exercise jurisdiction and not sovereignty over the Area and its resources. UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. 2, p. 43, para. 79.

  51. 51.

    UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. 17, p. 130, para. 195.

  52. 52.

    UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. 6, p. 76, para. 25.

  53. 53.

    Potekhin, writing in 1963, was of the view that communal land ownership applied in virtual all African States, with Egypt being the possible exception. See Potekhin (1963), p. 39 at 50.

  54. 54.

    Ollennu and Woodman (1985), p. 7.

  55. 55.

    Elias (1956), p. 162. Potekhin, writing in 1963, was of the view that communal land ownership applied in virtual all African States, with Egypt being the possible exception. See Potekhin (1963), p. 39 at 50.

  56. 56.

    [1921] 2 A.C. 399. The Privy Council in Sunmonu v. Disu Raphel [1927] A.C. 881 cited this case with approval again.

  57. 57.

    Supra at pp. 404–405.

  58. 58.

    Rembe (1980), p. 53.

  59. 59.

    Dunning (1990), p. 297 at 302.

  60. 60.

    Thankful, it is not always the case that western jurist disagree with the idea that the common heritage of mankind connotes communal ownership. For example, Thomas Franck writing on the common heritage of mankind said it “fundamentally altered Grotius’ concept of the sea as owned by none to the modern notion of the high seas and deep seabed as owned by all”. Franck (1995), p. 358. While it may be carrying it a bit far to say that the high seas is owned by all since it is still res communis, this author believes that Franck is spot on concerning the fact that the deep seabed is owned by all!

  61. 61.

    See Joyner (1986), pp. 191–192 and Lowe (1986), p. 1 at 9.

  62. 62.

    See e.g. letter dated 29 August 1980 from E.K. Wapenyi, Representative of Uganda to UNCLOS III and the Chairman of the Group of 77 to the President of the Conference on this. DOC. A/CONF.62/106. Also, see a commentary by an African member of the International Law Commission, which supported the view that the concept of the CHM of the Area and its resources is a norm of customary international law. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-Seventh Session, in [1985] 1 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, pp. 123–124, para. 20.

  63. 63.

    See e.g. Rembe (1980), pp. 49–57 and compare with Churchill & Lowe (1999), pp. 227–228 and Brown (2001), pp. 23–44. Also, on various possibilities in respect of the CHM of the Area being a norm of CIL see D'Amato (1983), pp. 281–285.

  64. 64.

    For a general reading on the generation of customary international law from treaty provisions, see Villiger (1985), pp. 183–205.

  65. 65.

    Treves (1983), p. 685.

  66. 66.

    Article 34 of the VCLT.

  67. 67.

    See generally Boczek (1982), pp. 34–44; Lenoble (1984), pp. 375–427, and Charney (1982), pp. 82–90.

  68. 68.

    The Senate of the United States of America is presently deliberating on whether to give its consent to United States accession to the LOSC and the Agreement. See Duff (2004), pp. 195–219 and Bederman (2008), pp. 21–27, http://www.harvardilj.org/online.

  69. 69.

    Article 317 (1) of LOSC.

  70. 70.

    Article 317(3) of the LOSC states: “The denunciation shall not in any way affect the duty of any State Party to fulfil any obligation embodied in this Convention to which it would be subject under international law independently of this Convention”.

  71. 71.

    See e.g. the withdrawal of the United States of America from the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty with the former Soviet Union. See Kirgis (2001), http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh70.htm and Mullerson (2001), pp. 509–539. Also the withdrawal of North Korea from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. See Winters (2005), pp. 1499–1529.

  72. 72.

    I.C.J. Rep. 1969, p. 3. See also Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua/United States), (Merits) ICJ Rep. 1986, p. 14;76 ILR, p. 349.

  73. 73.

    North Sea Continental Shelf cases, I.C.J. Rep. 1969 at pp. 41–44.

  74. 74.

    According to the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case(Merits) I.C.J. Rep.,1986, at p. 98; 76 ILR at 432: “In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of states should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of state conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule”.

  75. 75.

    In the majority decision in the North Sea continental Shelf Cases, I.C.J. Rep. 1969 at p. 42, it was said that “the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law”.

  76. 76.

    D'Amato (1983) at pp. 282–283.

  77. 77.

    Article 141 of LOSC.

  78. 78.

    Article 137 of LOSC.

  79. 79.

    Article 140 of LOSC.

  80. 80.

    Joyner (1986), p. 199; See also Wolfrum (1983), p. 314; Van Dyke and Yuen (1982), p. 537 and generally D'Amato (1983), p. 281–285.

  81. 81.

    See Brown (2001), p. 59.

  82. 82.

    Frakes (2003), pp. 409 at 411.

  83. 83.

    See Nicaragua Case, Merits, I.C.J. Rep.,1986, para. 176.

  84. 84.

    See e.g. Murphy (2005), pp. 699–748.

  85. 85.

    See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, I.C.J. Rep. 1969, Nicaragua Case, I.C.J. Rep.,1986, and Thirlway (2006), pp. 115 at 121–127.

  86. 86.

    See Art. 140 of LOSC. For African states that are non-states parties see Table 1.1 in Chapter 1.

  87. 87.

    For jus cogens generally see Orakhelashvili (2006) and Danilenko (1991), pp. 42–65.

  88. 88.

    Article 53.

  89. 89.

    Article 64.

  90. 90.

    Article 71(1).

  91. 91.

    See e.g. the Nicaragua Case (Merits), I.C.J. Rep.,1986 at p. 100. In this case the Court pointed out that the norm prohibiting the use of force had the character of jus cogens.

  92. 92.

    Danilenko (1991) at p. 43 and 45–46.

  93. 93.

    UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. 17, p. 243.

  94. 94.

    See the letter dated 29 August 1980 from the then Chairman of the Group of 77, E.K. Wapenyi of Uganda, to the President of the UNCLOS III, UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. 17, pp. 111–114.

  95. 95.

    See e.g. the statements of the representatives of Burundi and Niger at UNCLOS III, UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. 6, para. 42, p. 78 and para. 6, p. 75.

  96. 96.

    See the Chilean representative’s proposal in Platzoder (1987) at p. 302.

  97. 97.

    For contrary views to this see Danilenko (1991) and Schrijver (1998) at pp. 221–222.

  98. 98.

    See Egede (2007), p. 249 at 260 and wa Mutua (1994–1995).

  99. 99.

    See Arts. 2–14; Arts. 19–24 and Arts. 15–17, respectively. See Egede (2007), p. 249 at 260.

  100. 100.

    See also Art. 10 of the AU African Youth Charter.

  101. 101.

    Bondzie-Simpson, for instance, describes this right, along with some other solidarity rights under the African Charter as “lofty ideals and laudable aspirations rather than enforceable rights”. See Bondzie-Simpson (1988), p. 643 at 657. Also see Alston (1982), p. 307 at 308.

  102. 102.

    Ouguergouz (2003), p. 332. Also see Art. 140 of LOSC. The representative of Burundi at UNCLOS III stated that: “Access to the benefits of the common heritage of mankind represented by the immense resources of the seas and oceans was a sancrosant right which no one was authorized to impugn”. UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. 6, p. 78, para. 42.

  103. 103.

    Gorove (1971–1972), p. 390 at 393.

  104. 104.

    Oxman (1998), p. 399 at 405.

  105. 105.

    Oxman (1998) at pp. 404–407.

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  1. Department of Politics, Cardiff University, Park Place 65-68, CF10 3AS, Cardiff, United Kingdom

    Dr. Edwin Egede (Lecturer in international law & international relations)

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Egede, E. (2011). The Legal Status of the Area: Common Heritage of Mankind and African States. In: Africa and the Deep Seabed Regime: Politics and International Law of the Common Heritage of Mankind. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17662-3_3

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