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Malicious Adversaries

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Efficient Secure Two-Party Protocols

Part of the book series: Information Security and Cryptography ((ISC))

Abstract

In this chapter, we show how to securely compute any deterministic, singleoutput non-reactive functionality in the presence of malicious adversaries. As we have shown in Section 2.5, this suffices for obtaining secure computation of any two-party probabilistic reactive functionality, with almost the same complexity.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science and Applied Mathematics, Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science, Weizmann Institute, Rehovot, Israel

    Dr. Carmit Hazay

  2. Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya, 46150, Israel

    Dr. Carmit Hazay

  3. Department of Computer Science, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, 52900, Israel

    Professor Yehuda Lindell

Authors
  1. Dr. Carmit Hazay
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  2. Professor Yehuda Lindell
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Correspondence to Carmit Hazay .

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© 2010 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Hazay, C., Lindell, Y. (2010). Malicious Adversaries. In: Efficient Secure Two-Party Protocols. Information Security and Cryptography. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14303-8_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14303-8_4

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-14302-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-14303-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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