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The Colombian Peace Process and the Principle of Complementarity of the International Criminal Court pp 3–10Cite as

Preliminary Remarks

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Abstract

The so-called “Justice and Peace Law” (Ley de Justicia y Paz) of 25 July 2005 (hereinafter: “Law 975”), which entered into force on the same date (Art. 72), continues a policy of restorative justice which goes back to the 1980s and pursues the objective to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate irregular armed groups (“Grupos Armados Organizados al Margen de la Ley”, i.e. “groups operating outside the law”, hereinafter: “GAOML”). While the earlier peace processes only referred to “left-wing” insurgents, the Law 975 also or even predominantly covers “right-wing” paramilitary groups. The overall objective of the Colombian policy of restorative justice is, at least from an official perspective, to achieve a sustainable peace on the basis of concessions offered to irregular armed groups with a view to their definitive demobilization, disarmement and reintegration into society. Thus, this policy fits well into the general methodological framework of post-conflict Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (“DDR”) programs, at least in their narrow sense of “dismantling the machinery of war”. Yet, the problem with these programs has often been that they do not link the DDR process to transitional justice, in particular to the receiving communities and the victims. As a consequence they fall short of bringing about a real reintegration of the former combatants and a sustainable peace based on reconciliation and justice. This very problem may also arise in the Colombian case.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    It started in March 1981 with a conditional amnesty for political and related crimes for guerrilla groups (Ley 37 de 1981, Text: http://www.ideaspaz.org/secciones/publicaciones/download_boletines/boletinespaz_docs/05_ley_37_1981.doc last visited 18 November 2009); for a good summary in English see Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), Report demobilization (2004), at 53 et seq.; Laplante/Theidon (2006) 28 MichJIntL 49, at 59 et seq.; for a good summary of the complex roots and causes of the long lasting Colombian armed conflict see Saffon/Uprimny, in Bergsmo/Kalmanovitz (eds.) 2009, at 217, 218 et seq.; see also Saffon, in Bergsmo (ed.) 2009, 93, at 94 et seq.; Burbidge (2008) 8 ICLR 557, at 559 et seq.

  2. 2.

    Art. 1 Law 975 defines GAOML as guerrilla or self-defense (paramilitary) groups (“grupo de guerrilla o de autodefensas”). Interestingly however, Gómez Pardo, an official from the Colombian Foreign Ministry, writes that the Law “was born from the necessity to have a juridical frame to make the peace process with the AUC”, i.e. with the paramilitary “Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia”, see Gómez Pardo (2009) Revista Debate Interamericano 123, at 142.

  3. 3.

    See Faltas, in BICC (ed.) 2005, at 2.

  4. 4.

    See for a good discussion de Greiff, in Ambos/Large/Wierda (eds.) 2009, 321, at 322 et seq., 348 et seq.; with regard to Colombia see also Laplante/Theidon (2006) 28 MichJIntL 49, at 57 et seq.; Espinal et al., Desmovilización, desarme, reinserción (2007). For a practical guide see Douglas et al., Gender and disarmament (2004).

  5. 5.

    Art. without reference refer to Law 975. For the full text in English see Part III, 3.

  6. 6.

    The relevant provisions read as follows: Art. 37 (1) Penal Code: “La pena de prisión para los tipos penales tendrá una duración máxima de cincuenta (50) años, excepto en los casos de concurso”; Art. 31 (2) Penal Code: “En ningún caso, en los eventos de concurso, la pena privativa de la libertad podrá exceder de sesenta (60) años”.

  7. 7.

    Cf. Art. 3 Law 975: “contribución del beneficiario a la consecución de la paz nacional, la colaboración con la justicia, la reparación a las víctimas y su adecuada resocialización.” (see for English translation Part III, 3).

  8. 8.

    Constitutional Court of Colombia (Corte Constitutional, hereinafter: “Constitutional Court”) [18 May 2006] Judgment C 370 of 2006, Judge Rapporteur (Magistrado Ponente, hereinafter “MP”) Manuel José Cepeda Espinoza et al., section 6.2.2.1.7.26. requiring that the confession (“versión libre”, article 17) must be “completa y veraz” (complete and truthful) and declaring unconstitutional (sect. 6.2.2.1.) the part of article 25 which allowed for the benefit of the “alternative sentence” despite the suspect’s omission to confess all crimes. For a good discussion of the improvements of Law 975 by this judgment see Uprimny/Saffon, in Uprimny (ed.) 2006, at 201 et seq. (215 et seq.).

  9. 9.

    Cf. Kalmanovitz, in Bergsmo/Kalmanovitz (eds.) 2009, 7, at 15 (“law of conditional reduced penalties”). See also infra n 68 in Chap. 2.

  10. 10.

    According to Art. 10 no. 5 a condition of the collective demobilization is that “the group was not organized for the purposes [no se haya organizado para] of drug trafficking or illicit enrichment”, according to Art. 11 no. 6 the individual demobilised’ activity must “not have had as its purpose [como finalidad] narcotics trafficking or illicit enrichment.”

  11. 11.

    The first conditional amnesty mentioned above (n 1) already excluded ordinary crimes such as kidnapping, extortion and killings hors de combat (see IACHR, Report demobilization, 2004, para. 54). The forerunner of Law 975, Law 782 (infra n 13), also excluded “atrocious acts of ferocity or barbarism, terrorism, kidnapping, genocide, murder committed outside combat o put the victim in a state of defenslessness” from its benefits (Art. 19 last para.: “actos atroces de ferocidad o barbarie, terrorismo, secuestro, genocidio, homicidio cometido fuera de combate o colocando a la víctima en estado de indefensión”).

  12. 12.

    For the first “impunity” proposal of the Uribe government see Uprimny/Saffon, in Uprimny (ed.) 2006, 201, at 203; Laplante/Theidon (2006) 28 MichJIntL 49, at 77; Kalmanovitz, in Bergsmo/Kalmanovitz (eds.) 2009, at 9. See also the Draft Law presented by the MPs Jesús Ignacio García, Barlahán Henao, Clara Pinillos, Carlos Arturo Piedrahita and Zamir Silva, reprinted in Fundación Social, Trámite de la ley de justicia y paz (2006), at 114–15.

  13. 13.

    Official source: Ley 782 de 2002 (diciembre 23), “por medio de la cual se prorroga la vigencia de la Ley 418 de 1997, prorrogada y modificada por la Ley 548 de 1999 y se modifican algunas de sus disposiciones.” Diario oficial (Law Gazette), year CXXXVIII, N. 45043, 23 December 2002, p. 1.

  14. 14.

    Art. 19 of Law 782 provides for the possibility of a pardon for political offences but does not define these offences. In any case, the concept has a constitutional underpinning and the Constitution itself allows for amnesty, pardon and other forms of exemption of prosecution and punishment (see Arts. 35, 150 (17), 179 (1), 201 (2), 232 and 299 of the Constitution). In practice, the concept has always been understood – despite the absence of a precise legal definition – as encompassing the offence of rebellion (“rebelión, sedición y asonada”) and related conduct (see for a good account Fundación Social/Asesoría de Derechos Humanos, Sobre la noción del delito político, available at: http://74.125.77.132/search?q=cache:5LMSfCdFt3YJ:www.derechoshumanosypaz.org/MATERIAL_DDHH/ANALISIS_COYUNTURAL/ALTERNATIVIDAD_PENAL/OBSERVATORIOS_2005/DELITOPOLTICOABRIL10.DOC+delito+politico+ley+782+de+2002&cd=3&hl=de&ct=clnk&gl=de, last visited 7 October 2009). On the other hand, Law 782 excludes core crimes from the exemption, see supra n 11.

  15. 15.

    See the fundamental work of Pérez, Tratado de Derecho Penal, vol. III (1978), at 111 et seq., in particular 135 et seq. referring to insurgent rebels.

  16. 16.

    Supreme Court of Justice – Criminal Chamber (Corte Suprema de Justicia – Sala de Casación Penal, hereinafter: “Supreme Court”) [11 July 2007] Rad. 26945, MP Yesid Ramirez Bastidas and Julio Enrique Socha Salamanca. See for an earlier discussion Ambos, Justicia de transición (2008), 195 et seq.; see also Burbidge (2008) 8 ICLR 557, at 564.

  17. 17.

    See e.g. the statement of President Uribe on 18 Oct. 2007 (“Palabras del Presidente Uribe en el encuentro de la Jurisdicción Ordinaria”, 18.10.2007, available at: http://web.presidencia.gov.co/sp/2007/octubre/18/15182007.html, last visited 18 November 2009): “Y he dicho, desde el punto de vista sociológico ¿qué diferencia hay entre el campesino que pertenece al grupo paramilitar, y el campesino que pertenece al grupo guerrillero? Y he insistido en una tesis: desde el punto de vista del padecimiento de la víctima, ¿qué diferencia hay entre el delito del uno y el delito del otro? Y desde el punto de vista rigurosamente jurídico -y permítanme asomar esta reiteración ante ustedes, lo hago con todo respeto- creo que violan por igual el ordenamiento jurídico, que es el Estado, quienes quieren suplantarlo, para establecer un gobierno guerrillero, o quienes lo desconocen, so pretexto de atacar a la guerrilla y de defender el orden socioeconómico. Los dos, finalmente, están por fuera y en contra de ese ordenamiento jurídico y del Estado. Yo no participo de la tesis de que los paramilitares están a favor del Estado. Su accionar viola el ordenamiento jurídico, lo desafía, que es finalmente el Estado”. – On this difficult and polemical issue see also Gutiérrez, in Bergsmo/Kalmanovitz (eds.) 2009, 99, at 116 acknowledging on the one hand that “the moral identification of insurgents and counterinsurgents is a given of the Colombian public opinión” but on the other referring to the “type of conflict”, i.e., the fact that the insurgents fought against the state while the paramilitaries fought to defend it which ultimately turns the peace process with them into a “bargain between amigos” (at 118).

  18. 18.

    On the so called “postulation” in the administrative phase of the Justice and Peace procedure see infra Sect. 2.1.

  19. 19.

    Art. 69 of Law 975 refers to Law 782 and declares it applicable for the mentioned simple conspiracy (Art. 340(1) Criminal Code, Law 599 of 2000, hereinafter “CC”) as well as for the illegal use of uniforms and insignia, the instigation to commit crimes in the sense of Art. 348 CC and manufacturing, trafficking and wearing arms and munitions.

  20. 20.

    This qualification (Supreme Court, n 16) is based on Art. 340(2) second alternative CP, i.e., (aggravated) conspiracy to promote armed groups (concierto “para organizer, promover, armar o financiar grupos armados al margen de la ley”) which must be distinguished from the first alternative, i.e., (aggravated) conspiracy to commit grave crimes (concierto “para cometer delitos de genocidio, desaparición forzada de personas, tortura, desplazamiento forzado, homicidio, terrorismo, narcotráfico, secuestro extorsivo, extorsión”).

  21. 21.

    Supreme Court (n 16).

  22. 22.

    Law 1312 of 2009 (9 July) Diario Oficial No. 47.405.

  23. 23.

    According to Art. 324 no. 17 CCP, as introduced by Art. 2 of Law 1312 (n 22), the opportunity principle is applied (and the investigation/prosecution terminated, Art. 323 CCP) if the respective group member “haya manifestado con actos inequívocos su propósito de reintegrarse a la sociedad, siempre que no haya sido postulado por el Gobierno Nacional al procedimiento y beneficios establecidos en la LJP y no cursen en su contra investigaciones por delitos cometidos antes o después de su desmovilización con excepción de la pertenencia a la organización criminal, que para efectos de esta Ley incluye la utilización ilegal de uniformes e insignias y el porte ilegal de armas y municiones”.

  24. 24.

    Art. 324 no. 17 inc. 4 CCP requires the beneficiary to declare “no haber cometido un delito diferente a los establecidos en esta causal” and inc. 1 refers – as the offence covered – to “pertenencia a la organización criminal, que para efectos de esta ley incluye la utilización ilegal de uniformes e insignias y el porte ilegal de armas y municiones.”, i.e., to the offences covered by Art. 69 of Law 975 (n 14 at the end).

  25. 25.

    Art. 324 no. 17 inc. 4 CCP: “… so pena de perder el beneficio …”.

  26. 26.

    Art. 324 no. 17 para. 3 CCP (“No se podrá aplicar el principio de oportunidad en investigaciones o acusaciones por hechos constitutivos de graves infracciones al Derecho Internacional Humanitario, delitos de lesa humanidad, crímenes de guerra o genocidio, ni cuando tratándose de conductas dolosas la víctima sea un menor de dieciocho (18) años”).

  27. 27.

    Laplante/Theidon (2006) 28 MichJIntL 49, at 79.

  28. 28.

    “… por hechos delictivos cometidos durante y con ocasión de la pertenencia del desmovilizado a un grupo armado organizado al margen de la ley.” See also Supreme Court [27 August 2007] Rad. 27873, MP Julio Enrique Socha Salamanca, section 2.1. (“Naturaleza jurídica y estructura del trámite previsto por la ley 975 de 2005”): “De adelantarse el trámite, las investigaciones cursadas por las conductas punibles realizadas por el postulado durante y con ocasión de su pertenencia al grupo armado ilegal, o por la organización delincuencial que puedan comprometer su responsabilidad deberán ser acumuladas a la investigación, así mismo, se adicionarán jurídicamente las penas impuestas en otros procesos por esa misma clase de delitos a la que se le llegue a imponer, sin que la pena alternativa pueda superar el término legal, de ser ella impuesta.” (emphasis added).

  29. 29.

    See Supreme Court [25 September 2007] Rad. 28250, MP María del Rosario González de Lemos, Consideraciones de la Corte.

  30. 30.

    According to Art. 31 CP, in case of various offences, the gravest sentence will be increased but must not exceed 60 years. See for the applicability of these rules Art. 460 of Law 906 of 2004 (current CCP), Art. 470 of Law 600 of 2000 (former CCP). See also on the requirements of an “accumulation of sentences” Supreme Court [19 November 2002] Rad. 7026, MP Yesid Ramírez Bastidas, Sobre la acumulación de penas.: “… la acumulación jurídica de penas procede cuando se cumplan las siguientes exigencias: a) Que contra una misma persona se hayan proferido sentencias condenatorias en diferentes procesos y las mismas estén ejecutoriadas. b) Que las penas a acumular sean de igual naturaleza. c) Que los delitos no se hayan cometido con posterioridad al proferimiento de sentencia de primera o única instancia en cualquiera de los procesos. d) Que las penas no hayan sido impuestas por razón de delitos cometidos por la persona cuando se encontraba privada de la libertad. e) Que las penas no estén ejecutadas y no se encuentren suspendidas.”

  31. 31.

    The Constitutional Court (n 8), section 6.2.1.6.4 has declared the last part of para. 2 of art. 20 (“… but in no case may the alternative sentence be greater than that provided for in this law”) unconstitutional; see also the following fn.

  32. 32.

    Constitutional Court (n 8), section 6.2.1.6.4.: “… si el desmovilizado condenado con anterioridad, por hechos delictivos cometidos durante y con ocasión de su pertenencia al grupo armado organizado al margen de la ley, se acoge a la Ley 975 de 2005, y cumple los requisitos correspondientes, dicha condena previa se acumulará jurídicamente a la nueva condena que se llegare a imponer como resultado de su versión libre y de las investigaciones adelantadas por la Fiscalía. Después de efectuada dicha acumulación jurídica, el juez fijará la condena ordinaria (pena principal y accesorias), cuya ejecución se suspenderá y se concederá el beneficio de la pena alternativa.” See for the first concrete application Tribunal Superior de Bogotá [19 March 2009], Sala de Justicia y Paz, MP Eduardo Castellanos Roso, Aprobada Acta No. 08, Rad. 11001600253200680526, Wilson Salazar Carrascal (“El Loro”), para. 164–166.

  33. 33.

    According to Executive Decree 4760 of 2005, Art. 26, this temporal limitation also applies to continuous or permanent offences, e.g., the forced disappearance of persons, i.e., Law 975 only applies to these offences if their execution commenced before its entry into force, the violation of the legal interest protected ceased to exist at the moment of demobilization and the beneficiary actively cooperates in order to ascertain the victims’ rights.

  34. 34.

    Supreme Court [24 February 2009] Rad. 30999, MP Gomez Quintero, para. 7.

  35. 35.

    Available at: www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/web/noticias/2009/marzo/documentos/PROYECTO%20DE%20LEY-VIGENCIA.pdf (last visited 7 October 2009).

  36. 36.

    See also Supreme Court (n 30) para. 5, 7.

  37. 37.

    While only 12 paramilitary groups demobilized between November 2003 and June 2005, 22 groups demobilized within one year after the entry into force of Law 975 in July 2005, see Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, Proceso de Paz (without date). Two groups (the Cacique Pipinta block and the Autodefensas Campesinas del Casanare block) refrained from demobilizing.

  38. 38.

    According to Law 1106 of 2006, see Supreme Court (n 34) Consideraciones de la Sala.

  39. 39.

    See for example: CCJ, Ley de Justicia y Paz (2007); Fundacíon Social, Ley de alternatividad penal (2007) 68; Fundacíon Social, Observatorio (2003); Gaitán, Esclarecimiento de la verdad (2006); Huber, Ley de justicia y paz (2007), at 463; Mora Sarasti (2005) Revista Colombiana de Derecho Internacional 119–157; Procuraduría General, Desmovilización y reinserción (2008), 2 Vol.; Zuluaga Lopéz (2007) Divergencia, at 10–13; from the perspective of the judiciary Gómez Quintero, in Almqvist/Espósito (eds.) 2009, at 157 et seq.

  40. 40.

    Burbidge (2008) 8 ICLR 557, at 589 et seq.; Díaz, in Ambos/Large/Wierda (eds.) 2009, 469–501; Easterday (2009) 26 Ariz. J. Int´l & Comp. L. 49; Laplante/Theidon (2006) 28 MichJIntL 49; Saffon, in Bergsmo (ed.) 2009, 93 et seq.; Uprimny/Saffon, Transitional Justice (2005); Saffon/Uprimny, in Bergsmo/Kalmanovitz (eds.) 2009, 217 et seq.; Kalmanovitz, in Bergsmo/Kalmanovitz (eds.) 2009, 7 et seq.; (too short) Valiñas, in Stahn/van den Herik (eds.) 2010, at 278–79.

  41. 41.

    Bastidas, in FDCL e.V. & Kolumbienkampagne Berlin (ed.) 2007, at 22–29; Beck, Demobilisierungsprozess (2008); Figari Layus/Kintzel (2008) 13(2) MenschenRechtsMagazin, 39 et seq.

  42. 42.

    There are brief overviews though in some of the papers quoted in n 40, e.g. Kalmanovitz, in Bergsmo/Kalmanovitz (eds.) 2009, at 15.

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  1. University of Göttingen, Platz der Göttinger Sieben 5, 37073, Göttingen, Germany

    Professor Dr. jur. Kai Ambos (Head Department for Foreign and International Criminal Law Chair for Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, Comparative Law and International Criminal Law Judge at the Provincial Court (Landgericht) Göttingen)

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Ambos, K. (2010). Preliminary Remarks. In: The Colombian Peace Process and the Principle of Complementarity of the International Criminal Court. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11273-7_1

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