Abstract
The standard approach to a rational action paradox in game theory (namely, the chain store paradox) has presupposed that the player’s beliefs are probabilities represented by functions with values between 0 and 1. However, a general solution must include the possibility that the subjective probabilities take only the values 1 and 0, requiring a non-Bayesian account of belief revision. In this paper, we propose a situation-theoretic diagnosis and solution to the paradox, based on the conception of Austinian propositions relativized to particular situations, as developed by Barwise and Etchemendy.
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Li, L., Koons, R.C., Zhang, J. (2009). From the Logical Point of View: The Chain Store Paradox Revisited. In: He, X., Horty, J., Pacuit, E. (eds) Logic, Rationality, and Interaction. LORI 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 5834. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04893-7_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04893-7_14
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-04892-0
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