Abstract
This paper presents a (PKI-based) two-pass authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol that is secure in the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) security model. The security of the proposed protocol is proven without random oracles (under three assumptions), and relies on no implementation techniques such as a trick by LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin (so-called the NAXOS trick). Since an AKE protocol that is eCK-secure under a NAXOS-like implementation trick will be no more eCK-secure if some realistic information leakage occurs through side-channel attacks, it has been an important open problem how to realize an eCK-secure AKE protocol without using the NAXOS tricks (and without random oracles).
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Moriyama, D., Okamoto, T. (2009). An eCK-Secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol without Random Oracles. In: Pieprzyk, J., Zhang, F. (eds) Provable Security. ProvSec 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5848. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04642-1_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04642-1_14
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