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Cooperation between unrelated individuals – a game theoretic approach

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Animal Behaviour: Evolution and Mechanisms

Abstract

Cooperation between unrelated individuals has attracted a lot of research interest because the acts of mutual helping have to be reconciled with evolutionary theory and its focus on individual benefits. Various theoretical frameworks exist, and this chapter will focus specifically on the game theoretic approach. Game theory captures key ecological and life history features like longevity, mutual dependency or mobility in simple games in order to explore conditions that allow cooperative solutions. As behaviour is embedded into underlying strategies, game theory is particularly suited to investigate the conditionality of cooperative behaviour. A great variety of game theoretic concepts offer explanations why cooperation between two individuals may exist in nature. By providing selected examples and describing in detail a case study on marine cleaning mutualism I will argue that the variety of concepts is indeed necessary to capture the diversity of documented examples. In the next part of the chapter, concepts and evidence for cooperation in groups is presented. The focus is on the ‘tragedy of the commons’ and the conditions under which humans may solve the tragedy. At the end and in two boxes I highlight key topics of debate that warrant future research.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Eco-Ethologie Institut de Biologie, Université de Neuchâtel, Neuchâtel, Switzerland

    Redouan Bshary

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  1. Redouan Bshary
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  1. Dept. of Sociobiology/Anthropology & CRC Evolution of Social Behavior & German Primate Center, Behavioral Ecology & Sociobiology Unit, University of Göttingen, Kellnerweg 6, 37077, Göttingen, Germany

    Peter Kappeler

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Bshary, R. (2010). Cooperation between unrelated individuals – a game theoretic approach. In: Kappeler, P. (eds) Animal Behaviour: Evolution and Mechanisms. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02624-9_8

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