Abstract
We propose a generic modelling technique that can be used to extend existing frameworks for theoretical security analysis in order to capture the use of timestamps. We apply this technique to two of the most popular models adopted in literature (Bellare-Rogaway and Canetti-Krawczyk). We analyse previous results obtained using these models in light of the proposed extensions, and demonstrate their application to a new class of protocols. In the timed CK model we concentrate on modular design and analysis of protocols, and propose a more efficient timed authenticator relying on timestamps. The structure of this new authenticator implies that an authentication mechanism standardised in ISO-9798 is secure. Finally, we use our timed extension to the BR model to establish the security of an efficient ISO protocol for key transport and unilateral entity authentication.
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Barbosa, M., Farshim, P. (2009). Security Analysis of Standard Authentication and Key Agreement Protocols Utilising Timestamps. In: Preneel, B. (eds) Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2009. AFRICACRYPT 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5580. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02384-2_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02384-2_15
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