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Strategic Aspects of Communication

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Evolution of Communication and Language in Embodied Agents

Abstract

Rarely do human behavioral scientists and scholars study language, music, and other forms of communication as strategies—a means to some end. Some even deny that communication is the primary function of these phenomena. Here we draw upon selections of our earlier work to briefly define the strategy concept and sketch how decision theory, developed to explain the behavior of rational actors, is applied to evolved agents. Communication can then be interpreted as a strategy that advances the “fitness interests” of such agents. When this perspective is applied to agents with conflicts of interest, deception emerges as an important aspect of communication. We briefly review costly signaling, one solution to the problem of honest communication among agents with conflicts of interest. We also explore the subversion of cooperative signals by parasites and by plants defending themselves against herbivores, and we touch on biases in human gossip. Experiments with artificial embodied and communicating agents confirm that when there are conflicts of interest among agents, deception readily evolves. Finally, we consider signaling among super-organisms and the possible implications for understanding human music and language.

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Correspondence to Peter Hammerstein .

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Hagen, E., Hammerstein, P., Hess, N. (2010). Strategic Aspects of Communication. In: Nolfi, S., Mirolli, M. (eds) Evolution of Communication and Language in Embodied Agents. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01250-1_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01250-1_4

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