Abstract
In the previous chapter we used Ashby’s cybernetic theory to discuss the “experimental arche” of organizations. This arche referred to a continuous and risky process of control, design and operational regulation with respect to organizational transformation processes. At the heart of our discussion of the experimental arche was Ashby’s regulatory logic, stating that, in order to regulate a particular concrete system, one has to: Select essential variables and desired values Identify parameters, disturbing the essential variables Design an infrastructure (a “mechanism”) by means of which: Disturbances are attenuated The system’s transformation processes can be realized Regulatory potential (regulatory parameters) becomes available And, given 1, 2, and 3: select values of regulatory parameters (= select regulatory actions) in the face of actual disturbances.
Moreover, in this Ashby-based notion of regulation, one needs a model of the behavior of the concrete system: a transformation. According to Ashby (1958), a good (conditional, single-valued) transformation relates the selected variables and parameters in such a way that predictions can be made about the behavior of the concrete system. To arrive at such a transformation, the black-box method was introduced – a method enabling a regulator to derive a transformation based only on the values of the variables and parameters that are chosen to describe the concrete system that should be regulated. Ashby’s black box method seems to suggest that we can “objectively” select variables and parameters, and derive a transformation connecting them based on trial and error, without, as Ashby puts it, “reference to prior knowledge”. If this is what regulating systems is about, one might say that it does not contain much risk. It is “just” a matter of selecting variables/parameters; observation and deduction. The risk attached to it may have to do with the mistakes we make in selecting variables/parameters or in deducing a conditional transformation from empirical observations; or it may have to do with time-constraints we face while regulating; or with the probabilities appearing in a transformation and governing the behavior of the system.
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Notes
- 1.
This is easy and straightforward with a limited number of input and output states. It quickly becomes tiresome, however, if the number of states increases. If the number of input-states is denoted by #X and the number of output-states by #Y, the total number of possible trivial machines is #Y#X. In the example, there are 4 possible trivial machines and the observer needs at most 3 trials to determine the right one. If the number of states only moderately increases, the number of possible machines increases rapidly (cf. von Foerster 1970).
- 2.
Beware: this table is different from the Ashby-based regulation-tables, for both the values of output states and the internal parameter co-determining the output are given in the table.
- 3.
Although most of the non-trivial machines we have to deal with have a large number of input and output states, Von Foerster’s argument even holds for non-trivial machines with few input-states and output-states (as the one from our example, which only has four input and four output states).
- 4.
To see the resemblance, it is important to note that what von Foerster treats as input for the operation is called “operand” by Ashby, and von Foerster’s output is Ashby’s transform.
- 5.
From standard algebra, one can learn that, for any function f, if a and λ exist such that f(a) = λf(a), then a is called the eigenvector and λ the eigenvalue. In von Foerster’s formalism, λ seems to be set to 1, and a is called the eigenvalue (e.g., Lipschitz 1987).
- 6.
In many formal representations of nerve-cells, such internal states are represented by threshold-functions.
- 7.
Note that only the index in Pt refers to a moment in time. The other indices indicate that both the eigenvalue and the motor output are based on Pt.
- 8.
“Ich habe meine Vermutungen über molekulare Rechenprozesse nur vorgelegt, um anzudeuten, dass es Perspektive gibt, die auf eine Mitwirkung der Moleküle an dem großen Drama des bewussten Denkens hindeuten […]” (von Foerster 1991, p. 93).
- 9.
“die Theorie des selbstreferentiellen, in sich geschlossen Erkennens erst jetzt die Form erwinnt in der […] die Unzugänglichkeit der Außenwelt ”an sich“[…] zum Ausdruck gebracht [werden kann]”.
- 10.
Of course, a large number of methods for divergence of ideas (e.g. tools for fostering creativity) exist (and are) used for supporting problem-solving. The main focus here is on more traditional decision aids e.g. system dynamics of multi-criteria analysis, that have a long tradition as management decision-aids.
- 11.
This is congruent with Aristotle’s ideas on responsibility – cf. Hughes (2001).
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Achterbergh, J., Vriens, D. (2009). The Experimental Arche Continued: Von Foerster on Observing Systems. In: Organizations. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-00110-9_3
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