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The Japan–Mexico FTA: A Cross-Regional Step in Japan's New Trade Regionalism

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Cross Regional Trade Agreements

Part of the book series: The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific ((PEAP))

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To most observers, Japan and Mexico seem distant economic partners, with only a modest volume of bilateral trade and foreign direct investment and a large geographical and cultural gulf between them. By this account, the Japanese decision to negotiate with Mexico is puzzling if not downright nonsensical. Why would Japan invest so much political capital in the negotiation of a complex free trade agreement (FTA) with a nation accounting for such a minuscule share of its international economic exchange?

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References

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of International Relations, University of Southern California, 3518 Trousdale Parkway, 90089, Los Angelos, CA, USA

    Professor Saori N. Katada

  2. School of International Service, American University, 4400 Massachussetts Ave, Washington, DC, USA

    Professor Mireya Solís

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  1. Professor Saori N. Katada
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Southern California, 3518 Trousdale Parkway, 90089, Los Angelos, CA, USA

    Saori N. Katada

  2. American University, 4400 Massachussetts Ave, Washington, DC, USA

    Mireya Solís

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Katada, S.N., Solís, M. (2008). The Japan–Mexico FTA: A Cross-Regional Step in Japan's New Trade Regionalism. In: Katada, S.N., Solís, M. (eds) Cross Regional Trade Agreements. The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79327-4_4

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