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Generalising NSL for Multi-party Authentication

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Part of the book series: Information Security and Cryptography ((ISC))

Abstract

We present a protocol for multi-party authentication for any number of parties, which generalises the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol. We show that the protocol satisfies injective synchronisation of the communicating parties and secrecy of the generated nonces.

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References

  1. L. Buttyán, A. Nagy, I. Vajda, Efficient multi-party challenge-response protocols for entity authentication. Period. Polytech. 45(1), 43–64 (2001)

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  3. J. Heather, G. Lowe, S. Schneider, How to prevent type flaw attacks on security protocols. J. Comput. Secur. 11(2), 217–244 (2003)

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© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Cremers, C., Mauw, S. (2012). Generalising NSL for Multi-party Authentication. In: Operational Semantics and Verification of Security Protocols. Information Security and Cryptography. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-78636-8_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-78636-8_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-78635-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-78636-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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