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Automata-Based Confidentiality Monitoring

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 4435))

Abstract

Non-interference is typically used as a baseline security policy to formalize confidentiality of secret information manipulated by a program. In contrast to static checking of non-interference, this paper considers dynamic, automaton-based, monitoring of information flow for a single execution of a sequential program. The monitoring mechanism is based on a combination of dynamic and static analyses. During program execution, abstractions of program events are sent to the automaton, which uses the abstractions to track information flows and to control the execution by forbidding or editing dangerous actions. The mechanism proposed is proved to be sound, to preserve executions of well-typed programs (in the security type system of Volpano, Smith and Irvine), and to preserve some safe executions of ill-typed programs.

Banerjee and Le Guernic were partially supported by NSF grants CNS-0627748, CNS-0209205, CCF-0296182 and ITR-0326577. Schmidt was partially supported by NSF grants ITR-0326577 and ITR-0086154. Le Guernic was also partially supported by the PoTestAT project (ACI Sécurité).

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Mitsu Okada Ichiro Satoh

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Le Guernic, G., Banerjee, A., Jensen, T., Schmidt, D.A. (2007). Automata-Based Confidentiality Monitoring. In: Okada, M., Satoh, I. (eds) Advances in Computer Science - ASIAN 2006. Secure Software and Related Issues. ASIAN 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4435. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77505-8_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77505-8_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-77504-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-77505-8

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