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International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security

FC 2007: Financial Cryptography and Data Security pp 72–87Cite as

K-Anonymous Multi-party Secret Handshakes

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 4886))

Abstract

Anonymity-protection techniques are crucial for various commercial and financial transactions, where participants are worried about their privacy. On the other hand, authentication methods are also crucial for such interactions. Secret handshake is a relatively recent mechanism that facilitates privacy-preserving mutual authentication between communicating peers. In recent years, researchers have proposed a set of secret handshake schemes based on different assumptions about the credentials used: from one-time credentials to the more general PKI-like credentials. In this paper, we concentrate on k-anonymous secret handshake schemes based on PKI-like infrastructures. More specifically, we deal with the k-anonymous m-party (m > 2) secret handshake problem, which is significantly more involved than its two-party counterpart due to the following: When an honest user hand-shakes with m − 1 parties, it must be assured that these parties are distinct; otherwise, under the mask of anonymity a dishonest participant may clone itself in a single handshake session (i.e., assuming multiple personalities).

The original version of this chapter was revised: The copyright line was incorrect. This has been corrected. The Erratum to this chapter is available at DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-77366-5_37

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA

    Shouhuai Xu

  2. RSA Labs, EMC Corp. and Department of Computer Science, Columbia University, USA

    Moti Yung

Authors
  1. Shouhuai Xu
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  2. Moti Yung
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, 4500 Fifth Avenue, 15213, Pittsburgh, PA, USA

    Sven Dietrich

  2. CRCS DEAS, Harvard University, Maxwell Dworkin 110, 33 Oxford Street, 02138, Cambridge, MA, USA

    Rachna Dhamija

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Xu, S., Yung, M. (2007). K-Anonymous Multi-party Secret Handshakes. In: Dietrich, S., Dhamija, R. (eds) Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4886. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77366-5_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77366-5_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-77365-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-77366-5

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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