Stronger Security of Authenticated Key Exchange

  • Brian LaMacchia
  • Kristin Lauter
  • Anton Mityagin
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-75670-5_1

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4784)
Cite this paper as:
LaMacchia B., Lauter K., Mityagin A. (2007) Stronger Security of Authenticated Key Exchange. In: Susilo W., Liu J.K., Mu Y. (eds) Provable Security. ProvSec 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4784. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

Recent work by Krawczyk [12] and Menezes [16] has highlighted the importance of understanding well the guarantees and limitations of formal security models when using them to prove the security of protocols. In this paper we focus on security models for authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols. We observe that there are several classes of attacks on AKE protocols that lie outside the scope of the Canetti-Krawczyk model. Some of these additional attacks have already been considered by Krawczyk [12]. In an attempt to bring these attacks within the scope of the security model we extend the Canetti-Krawczyk model for AKE security by providing significantly greater powers to the adversary. Our contribution is a more compact, integrated, and comprehensive formulation of the security model. We then introduce a new AKE protocol called NAXOS and prove that it is secure against these stronger adversaries.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Brian LaMacchia
    • 1
  • Kristin Lauter
    • 2
  • Anton Mityagin
    • 3
  1. 1.Microsoft Corporation, 1 Microsoft Way, Redmond, WA 
  2. 2.Microsoft Research, 1 Microsoft Way, Redmond, WA 
  3. 3.Microsoft Live Labs, 1 Microsoft Way, Redmond, WA 

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