Abstract
The use of auctions for distributing resources in competing environments has produced a large variety of auctions types and algorithms to treat them. However, auctions have some problems when faced with some real-world applications containing renewable and perishable resources. In this paper we present a mechanism to deal with such issues by dynamically configuring some of the auction parameters taking into account the past experience. The mechanism has been used to coordinate industrial discharges and a Waste Water Treatment Plant, so that the treatment thresholds of the plant are never exceeded. We have performed some simulations to evaluate the system, and the results show that with this mechanism the coordination between the industries improves the treatment of the water.
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Murillo, J., Muñoz, V., López, B., Busquets, D. (2007). Dynamic Configurable Auctions for Coordinating Industrial Waste Discharges. In: Petta, P., Müller, J.P., Klusch, M., Georgeff, M. (eds) Multiagent System Technologies. MATES 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 4687. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74949-3_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74949-3_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-74948-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-74949-3
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