Conceptual Models

Abstract

This chapter examines the use of conceptual models in applied research. First, some general properties of these models are outlined against the background of various definitions. Any model is based on theoretical assumptions so it becomes relevant to understand what theory is and the role it plays in constructing a model in your research design. Armed with these generic insights we then look at the role and functions of a conceptual model in designing research as well as at how it can be used in the context of a closed and open research question. In the final paragraph suggestions are provided for the construction of a model within the context of your own research.

Appendices

Interlude I Conceptualising Methodology

“I think, this time … we really have a problem, don’t you?”

“Hm, yes, I think I must agree but … can’t we hire a consultant again … a good one this time?”

“You mean one that solves the problem and doesn’t just send bills?”

“Something like that.”

“Don’t know if it is that kind of problem.”

“Meaning ….?”

“Well, this time I think the problem is us. What we do. How we talk? How do we decide? How do we treat each other behind our backs? That kind of things”

“Well, if you are certain, then we really have a problem.”

3.1.1 Conceptualising Methodology

This first interlude focuses on the problematic nature of conceptualising a (organisational) problem with the help of methodology. It touches on a number of underlying issues, thus demonstrating the limits of any research design. As a whole it provides a critique of the measurability of organisational reality. The interlude is above all meant as ‘food for thought’- not for solving problems. So, if the previous three chapters have left you dazzled by the kaleidoscopic nature of assumptions, paradigms and, yes, methodologies, do not read this interlude. But, if you are asked to provide a critical justification of your research design you definitely should (see also Chap. 8). We think this interlude is helpful in understanding and appreciating the content of the next two chapters on qualitative and quantitative methodology.

3.1.1.1 The Social Origins of Problems

The essence of applied research is and will be the researcher investigating a particular problem in an organisation or company that only occurs there and is, thus, of a unique contextualised significance. Essential to the kind of problems we address is that that they always occur in a social situation, in contrast to a laboratory experiment for instance. A social situation can be categorised in the following research ‘areas’:

• The people involved (the actors or stakeholders); who form the focus of attention in this research?

• The actions themselves; which kind of activities or events does this research focus on – decisions, operations, R&D?

• The place where it all happens; does it revolve around activities that take place at the headquarters or in the business units? Does it concern the observation of all possible situations or the same situation, but at different locations?

• The time when things happen; to what extent will attention (need to) be paid to time or moment? Is it relevant to observe something over the years or will the focus fall on the distinction between day and night?

• The used ‘objects’ (and) (or) knowledge; does the problem revolve around the right use of certain rules, procedures, regulations at the proper moment and to what extent is this machine-related?

• The nature of the produced goods or services; to what extent might it be useful to make a distinction between tangible or intangible goods?

• The meaning and intentions of people’s actions at a certain place and at a certain moment.

Anyone reading this will again realise that applied research focusing on problems is by definition embedded in the social side of the enterprise. It is people that experience a situation as problematic and subsequently name and frame it. Given this social nature a number of fundamental questions surface when it comes to analysing problems. Most of them have been touched upon in the previous chapters. Here we wish to address and elaborate some of them again thus providing ‘food for thought’.

3.1.1.2 Instrumentality

It might be that your attitude when addressing problems – especially when doing research projects for the first time – is to accept a problem on face value. Something like: “… this is the problem as it is and this is where my analysis will start’. We previously outlined the idea that problems are human constructs. It is true that a certain reality can be problematic but it can also be the case that a specific reality is problematised with other purposes in mind, purposes that have nothing to do with the problem itself. Think of the person who protects his position by holding on to a (still to be solved but never will be) problem. Or the fact that as long as a problem is spoken about the person who possesses the problem receives attention. If that is the nature of the problem you will have to focus your research on the person since he or she might be a key part of the problem. Analysing this in a rational goal-oriented manner could possibly make the problem get even worse. In the end, the bottom-line message is quite simple: not all problems are constructed with the implicit desire to solve them. Some problems are created with totally different purposes in mind. Please be aware that your research is not about solving all kinds of problems in the world. You do not solve problems at random. Just addressing them in a scholarly manner is sometimes enough.

3.1.1.3 Intervention

The sheer act of announcing a research project is already an intervention in a specific reality. Even if you have done all your homework, the moment you announce that you are starting a research project in an organisation that organisation will change – albeit modestly and imperceptibly. Without necessarily pronouncing it people will have certain ideas, motives and expectations about the upcoming research event. ‘What will he do?’, ‘Can I use this to some extent?’, ‘Will he see me and what will he then ask?’, ‘What kind of influence will this research have on my function?’ or ‘This is once more a demonstration of our incapable management – I will refuse any cooperation when it comes to it.’ You can never be ahead of all these questions. The act of intervening through your research raises a real dilemma. And as with all dilemmas you are forced to make (difficult) choices – choices that are open to more then just one interpretation – that you then need to justify.

3.1.1.4 Measurability

The first two chapters have demonstrated the problematic nature of ‘reality’. Still no criticism was formulated about the measurability of that reality. The term ‘measurability’ can be interpreted in various ways. On the one hand there is the notion of ‘ability’. It refers to the level of professionalism of the researcher and his ability to carry out a decent piece of research. Is he capable of carrying out what he is planning to do in justifiable manner? On the other hand, there is the assumption that – if approached appropriately – reality is indeed measurable. It does no harm to question this second assumption. Indeed it is not complicated to measure the ‘natural’ conditions in a workplace: temperature, noise or humidity are all very measurable properties. What about notions such as the ‘smell of the place’, ‘a hostile atmosphere’ or even ‘insufficient communication’? In order to make these notions measurable, it is necessary to make theoretical constructs (models) based on an interpretation. Even done properly in terms of reliability and validity the question still remains how measurable such phenomena remain.

3.1.1.5 Theory

We have proclaimed in the previous chapters that reality cannot be addressed without ‘a theory’ in mind. Theory shapes and directs our vision. In fact theory is the ‘instrument’ or carrier that allows us to see what we want to see and not always in the way we want to see it. Theory shapes and directs our vision. Implicitly, it means that we can articulate what is theoretical and what is worth being seen and, thus, emphasised. The relevant theory given a specific problem can be articulated in words. Just think for a moment about emotions, intuition or ‘gut feeling’. Or think also about a popular construct such as ‘emotional intelligence’. What we face here is a rational and often linear-causal approach to reality. Things can be identified, conceptualised in a logical construct and turned into measurable properties. Just imagine you would analyse the relationship with your partner in such a way and then present it to him or her. Do you think it would be a good idea? Not really.

3.1.1.6 Subjectivity

When designing research we make a selection (intuitively or consciously) out of an ongoing stream of events. The sheer fact of selecting certain events above others – the act of giving them additional attention – also called ‘bracketing’ (Weick 1979) puts an emphasis on them thus ‘enlarging’ them. Even if we respect the most stringent scholarliness bracketing remains something done by an actor based on his knowledge, experience and professionalism at the specific moment in time. Thus, it appears that by definition subjectivity in any research design is inescapable. If we accept this fundamental subjectivity of any research activity then justification becomes almost the only way to demonstrate the quality of a research design and subsequent process.

3.1.1.7 Ontology

We act in this world with limited knowledge. This largely accepted fact is also known as ‘bounded rationality’. Not only is it simply impossible to know everything about everything, we can’t even be sure we know what we know. What we know escapes our full understanding yet it is at the same time an unlimited source. This indirectly raises the issue of ontology: the overall conceptualisation of a field of knowledge not necessarily presented in a structured manner (see Glossary). In organisations we refer to this phenomenon as ‘knowledge management’. Ontology in general relates to the assumptions we hold about reality – whether it is external or a construct of our mind. Knowledge can be attributed in part to be in the possession of people and at the same time a result of interactions. Since people cannot really define what they know in a specific field or regarding a particular topic it is only in interactions that they demonstrate and create knowledge. This complex phenomenon describes the social construction of knowledge. We recognise again here the two fundamental – positivist and constructivist – traditions, both of which are present in any research.

3.1.1.8 Epistemology

Epistemology can be described as the philosophy of knowledge, especially with regard to its methods, validity, nature, sources, limits and scope. It concerns the investigation of what distinguishes justified belief from opinion. “Lucky guesses or ‘true’ beliefs resulting from wishful thinking are not knowledge.” (Craig 2005, p. 224). As such it is the ‘quality assurance’ of what we know. Still, specificity of what knowledge is remains a matter of controversy. “One view is that what distinguishes genuine knowledge from a lucky guess is justification; another is that the causation of the belief by facts verifies it.” (Bullock and Trombley 1999). Justification is a central element to any research design and its outcome. The nature of the facts – i.e. the nature of the data and how they have been acquired – forms the cornerstone in such a design. We stick to the view that the logic of the argument used to select certain means (methods and techniques) for producing data and knowledge has to be reliable.

3.1.1.9 Deontology

If we explore critically the definition of methodology it shows a certain degree of ‘mandatoriness’: as a rule, what seems to be required is shared conviction. Despite the earlier stipulated emptiness of methodology we face an intriguing issue here called deontology. Deontology concerns the study of the nature of duty and obligation of ‘what is necessary’. It is quite thought-provoking to consider the possible universe of methodologies for a moment as a collection of deontologies, each individual methodology specifying its own plan of action, the acts themselves and the consistent if not rational order in which actions have to be performed. The inevitable question is to what degree this deontological nature is free of normativity. Who decides on the appropriateness of the order of acts, their causality, their logic if not their appropriateness? We stumble upon a more philosophical discussion regarding the ontological nature of methodology. There is no need to elaborate any further here. Just be aware that any methodology is not ‘natural’ but driven by (historically) driven beliefs about acting. When finally defending your work this will be a key decisive factor – at least implicitly but almost certainly explicitly.

3.1.1.10 Finally: The Role of the Researcher

Given the reflections above it should be clear that conceptualising a problem is not only a craft it is also an art entailing the researcher to navigate between all kinds of theoretical, methodological, philosophical and other booby-traps and dilemmas. Any problem addressed in an organisation is a temporary valid construction of just a fraction of that specific reality. It is naïve and probably incorrect if the researcher is convinced he alone has the knowledge to clarify the nature and meaning of the problem at hand, be it at the start of the research or well underway. The researcher’s most valid contribution is to conduct careful research into the nature, size, impact and meaning of a particular problem by means of various methodological approaches. Any research therefore should be conducted departing from – if not focusing on – the situation and people that ‘create’ the situation. If we recognise and accept the nature of the question this in itself is already a compass. To proceed in either a quantitative or qualitative way or a combination of both is elaborated in the following two chapters and Interlude II.

References

Bonjour, L. (1985). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Blaikie, N. (1993). Approaches to social enquiry, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bullock, A., Trombley, S. (1999). The New Dictionary of Modern Thought, London: HarperCollins.

Chisholm, R. (1989). Theory of Knowledge, Cambrige: Harvard University Press.

Craig, E. (eds.) (2005). The Shorter Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London: Routledge.

Griseri, P. (2002). Management Knowledge: a critical view, New York: Palgrave.

Johnson, P., Duberley, J. (2000). Understanding management research: an introduction to epistemology, London: Sage.n.