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The Palestinian Right of Return and the Justice of Zionism

  • Conference paper
Book cover Israel and the Palestinian Refugees

Part of the book series: Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht ((BEITRÄGE,volume 189))

Abstract

Supporters of a Palestinian right of return assume that Israeli Jews bear responsibility for both the past and present suffering of the Palestinian refugees. Accordingly, the Palestinian claim for return is a demand to realise this responsibility (inter alia) by way of the return of the refugees to their places of origin or to uninhabited regions in the Land of Israel/Palestine. The purpose of this article is to examine the responsibility of the Israeli Jews for the Palestinian suffering and whether this responsibility ought to be realised by way of return of the refugees in light of the question of the justice of Zionism. Part I of the article presents various approaches rejecting or affirming Zionism. The subsequent parts investigate the implications of the disparities between these approaches rejecting/affirming Zionism and Zionism’s actual history as it unfolded in terms of Jewish responsibility for the Palestinian plight and the question of Palestinian return. I argue that some of the approaches to Zionism are irrelevant to the dispute over the Palestinian right of return as it is understood within the framework of Israeli internal discourse and the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. However, my main point is that those approaches rejecting/affirming Zionism that are relevant, though they may vary in their implications for the scope of Jewish responsibility for Palestinian suffering, nevertheless lead to very similar conclusions with respect to discharging that responsibility by way of Palestinian repatriation.

I am grateful to Eyal Benvenisti, David Enoch and Andrei Marmor for their many important comments on an earlier draft of this article.

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References

  1. See C. Gans, The Limits of Nationalism, 2003, ch. 1.

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  2. Idem.

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  3. Idem.

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  4. See, e.g. B. Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism, 2001.

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  5. Regarding the socialist rejection, see Nimni’s discussion relating to Marx and Engels in E. Nimni, Marxism and Nationalism, 1991, especially chs. 1, 3; for the cosmopolitan liberal’s rejection, see J. Waldron, “Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative”, U.Mich.J.L. Reform 25 (1991–1992), 751 et seq.

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  6. This matter is discussed in Gans, see note 2, ch. 4.

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  7. These questions are discussed in W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, 1995; Gans, see note 2, 160–165.

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  8. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Gans, see note 2, chs. 4, 5.

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  9. Regarding philosophical characterisations of nationalism that is right of liberalism, see I. Berlin, “Nationalism: Past Neglect and Present Power”, in: I. Berlin, Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas, H. Hardy (ed.), 1980, 333–355; Barry, see note 6. For characterisations of historians, see P. Alter, Nationalism, 1994, 2nd ed., ch. 2. Philosophers refer to these forms of nationalism as romantic; historians often call them integral.

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  10. Obviously, liberal nationalists could acknowledge that their liberal stances could be exploited and manipulated by, for example, nationalist movements such as Zionism that create on-the-ground facts with normative significance, facts that liberals will have to recognise. If these liberals are consequentialists, they can, in principle, recognise the legitimacy of supposedly non-liberal steps that might, in the long run, maximise the realisation of liberalism. Problems of this kind cast a shadow also on such legal institutions as statutes of limitations. Yet I believe that ultimately these institutions are justified and more plausible from a liberal standpoint. For a convincing argument, see J. Waldron, “Settlement, Return, and the Supersession Thesis”, Theoretical Inquiries 5 (2004), LXXX.

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  11. It should be stressed that this claim does not imply that the right of the Jews to return to the Land of Israel is justified by considerations of corrective justice, i.e., that the persecution of Jews primarily in Europe justifies the compensation of the Jewish People by allowing them to establish their self-determination in the Land of Israel. Many hold this view, but its foundations are rather shaky given that the Arabs were not a party to the persecution of the Jews, so there is no reason why they should have to pay the price. The claim is an a-historical distributive justice claim based on the general principle that every nation is entitled to self-determination in its historical homeland, even if this means that the other nations in that homeland must content themselves with less than statehood (see Gans, see note 2, ch. 4). It should also be stressed that this principle need not be interpreted as asserting a right to nation-statehood. It can also be interpreted as referring to a right to sub-statist self-determination (see the Australian and Canadian decisions regarding indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination: Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 175 CLR1; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1997) 153 DLR (4th) 193 (SCC)). This principle can be further qualified: Nations that were uprooted from their homeland and persecuted are entitled to return to their places of origin even if not entirely vacant. In the Jewish-Palestinian case, this would mean that the Palestinians are paying the primary price of this principle of distributive justice and that they are doing so not as a result of their own culpability but due to simple bad luck (their homeland is also the homeland of others). This fact lays the basis for international responsibility to solve the Palestinian refugee problem, with particular responsibility borne by the European nations who persecuted the Jews, which led to the applicability of the a-historical distributive justice principle in this context.

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  12. See Gans, see note 2, ch. 4.

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  13. Idem.

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  14. See A. Marmor, “Entitlement to Land and the Right of Return: An Embarrassing Challenge for Liberal Zionism”, in: L.H. Meyer (ed.), Justice in Time: Responding to Historical Injustice, 2004.

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  15. Marmor, see note 25.

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Authors

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Eyal Benvenisti Chaim Gans Sari Hanafi

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© 2007 Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften e.V.

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Gans, C. (2007). The Palestinian Right of Return and the Justice of Zionism. In: Benvenisti, E., Gans, C., Hanafi, S. (eds) Israel and the Palestinian Refugees. Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht, vol 189. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68161-8_9

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