Abstract
In this paper, we present a generic asymmetric encryption conversion ROC, namely Redundancy Optimal Conversion, which has the optimal message redundancy for one-way trapdoor function in the random oracle model. To our best knowledge, it is the first generic conversion to achieve such an optimal redundancy result for both one-way trapdoor permutation and not length-preserving function.
To obtain IND-CCA security, the conversion only needs the weaker requirement of the one-wayness, than the partial-domain one-wayness, which succeeds to greatly extend the application area of the generic conversion. Further, plaintext awareness property of the encryption is not required any more, which also contributes to reduce the message redundancy and hence removes the re-encryption step of the decryption process, considerably reducing the computational burden. Finally, it has simple construction of two cryptographic hash functions and two bitwise XORs, as same as the widely used OAEP conversion, but more generally useful.
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Cui, Y., Kobara, K., Imai, H. (2005). A Generic Conversion with Optimal Redundancy. In: Menezes, A. (eds) Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2005. CT-RSA 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3376. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30574-3_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30574-3_9
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