Knowledge-Theoretic Properties of Strategic Voting

  • Samir Chopra
  • Eric Pacuit
  • Rohit Parikh
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-30227-8_5

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3229)
Cite this paper as:
Chopra S., Pacuit E., Parikh R. (2004) Knowledge-Theoretic Properties of Strategic Voting. In: Alferes J.J., Leite J. (eds) Logics in Artificial Intelligence. JELIA 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3229. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

Results in social choice theory such as the Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems constrain the existence of rational collective decision making procedures in groups of agents. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem says that no voting procedure is strategy-proof. That is, there will always be situations in which it is in a voter’s interest to misrepresent its true preferences i.e., vote strategically. We present some properties of strategic voting and then examine – via a bimodal logic utilizing epistemic and strategizing modalities – the knowledge-theoretic properties of voting situations and note that unless the voter knows that it should vote strategically, and how, i.e., knows what the other voters’ preferences are and which alternate preference P′ it should use, the voter will not strategize. Our results suggest that opinion polls in election situations effectively serve as the first n–1 stages in an n stage election.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Samir Chopra
    • 1
  • Eric Pacuit
    • 2
  • Rohit Parikh
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceBrooklyn College of CUNYBrooklyn
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceCUNY Graduate CenterNew YorkUSA
  3. 3.Departments of Computer Science, Mathematics and PhilosophyBrooklyn College and CUNY Graduate CenterNew YorkUSA

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