Abstract
A family of authenticators based on static shared keys is identified and proven secure. The authenticators can be used in a variety of settings, including identity-based ones. Application of the authenticators to Diffie-Hellman variants in appropriate groups leads to authenticated key agreement protocols which have attractive properties in comparison with other proven-secure protocols. We explore two key agreement protocols that result.
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Boyd, C., Mao, W., Paterson, K.G. (2004). Key Agreement Using Statically Keyed Authenticators. In: Jakobsson, M., Yung, M., Zhou, J. (eds) Applied Cryptography and Network Security. ACNS 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3089. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24852-1_18
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24852-1_18
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