Abstract
Traditionally, secure cryptographic algorithms provide security against an adversary who has only black-box access to the secret information of honest parties. However, such models are not always adequate. In particular, the security of these algorithms may completely break under (feasible) attacks that tamper with the secret key.
In this paper we propose a theoretical framework to investigate the algorithmic aspects related to tamper-proof security. In particular, we define a model of security against an adversary who is allowed to apply arbitrary feasible functions f to the secret key sk, and obtain the result of the cryptographic algorithms using the new secret key f(sk).
We prove that in the most general setting it is impossible to achieve this strong notion of security. We then show minimal additions to the model, which are needed in order to obtain provable security.
We prove that these additions are necessary and also sufficient for most common cryptographic primitives, such as encryption and signature schemes.
We discuss the applications to portable devices protected by PINs and show how to integrate PIN security into the generic security design.
Finally we investigate restrictions of the model in which the tampering powers of the adversary are limited. These restrictions model realistic attacks (like differential fault analysis) that have been demonstrated in practice. In these settings we show security solutions that work even without the additions mentioned above.
Keywords
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
References
Agrawal, D., Archambeault, B., Rao, J.R., Rohatgi, P.: The EM side-channel(s). In: Kaliski Jr., B.S., Koç, Ç.K., Paar, C. (eds.) CHES 2002. LNCS, vol. 2523, pp. 29–45. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Anderson, R., Kuhn, M.: Tamper Resistance - a Cautionary Note. In: Proceedings of the Second Usenix Workshop on Electronic Commerce, November 1996, pp. 1–11 (1996)
Boneh, D., DeMillo, R.A., Lipton, R.J.: On the importance of eliminating errors in cryptographic computations. Journal of Cryptology 14(2), 101–119 (2001)
Biham, E., Shamir, A.: Differential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems. In: Kaliski Jr., B.S. (ed.) CRYPTO 1997. LNCS, vol. 1294, pp. 513–525. Springer, Heidelberg (1997)
Canetti, R., Goldreich, O., Goldwasser, S., Micali, S.: Resettable zero-knowledge (extended abstract). In: Proc. 32nd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pp. 235–244 (2000)
Cramer, R., Shoup, V.: Signature schemes based on the strong RSA assumption. In: Proc. 6th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, November 1999, pp. 46–52. ACM Press, New York (1999)
Fiat, A., Shamir, A.: How to prove yourself: Practical solutions to identification and signature problems. In: Odlyzko, A.M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1986. LNCS, vol. 263, pp. 186–194. Springer, Heidelberg (1987)
Gennaro, R., Halevi, S., Rabin, T.: Secure hash-and-sign signatures without the random oracle. In: Stern, J. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1999. LNCS, vol. 1592, pp. 123–139. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)
Goldwasser, S., Micali, S.: Probabilistic encryption. Journal of Computer and System Sciences 28(2), 270–299 (1984)
Goldwasser, S., Micali, S., Rivest, R.: A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks. SIAM Journal on Computing 17(2), 281–308 (1988)
Goldreich, O., Micali, S., Wigderson, A.: How to play any mental game or a completeness theorem for protocols with honest majority. In: Proc. 19th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pp. 218–229 (1987)
Goldreich, O.: Secure multi-party computation (1998) (manuscript), Available from: http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~oded/pp.html
Goldreich, O.: Foundations of Cryptography. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2001)
Guillou, L.C., Quisquater, J.-J.: A “Paradoxical” identity-based signature scheme resulting from zero-knowledge. In: Goldwasser, S. (ed.) CRYPTO 1988. LNCS, vol. 403, pp. 216–231. Springer, Heidelberg (1990)
Ishai, Y., Sahai, A., Wagner, D.: Private circuits: Securing hardware against probing attacks. In: Boneh, D. (ed.) CRYPTO 2003. LNCS, vol. 2729, pp. 463–481. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Kocher, P.C., Jaffe, J., Jun, B.: Differential power analysis. In: Wiener, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1999. LNCS, vol. 1666, pp. 388–397. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)
Micali, S., Reyzin, L.: Physically observable cryptography (2003), http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/120
Pedersen, T.P.: Non-interactive and information-theoretic secure verifiable secret sharing. In: Feigenbaum, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 1991. LNCS, vol. 576, pp. 129–140. Springer, Heidelberg (1992)
Quisquater, J.J., Samyde, D.: Electro magnetic analysis (EMA): Measures and countermeasures for smart cards. In: International Conference on Research in Smart Cards – Esmart. LNCS, vol. 435, pp. 200–210. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Skorobogatov, S.P., Anderson, R.J.: Optical fault induction attacks. In: Kaliski Jr., B.S., Koç, Ç.K., Paar, C. (eds.) CHES 2002. LNCS, vol. 2523, pp. 2–12. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Schnorr, C.P.: Efficient signature generation for smart cards. Journal of Cryptology 4(3), 239–252 (1991)
Yao, A.C.: Protocols for secure computations. In: Proc. 23rd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pp. 160–164 (1982)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Gennaro, R., Lysyanskaya, A., Malkin, T., Micali, S., Rabin, T. (2004). Algorithmic Tamper-Proof (ATP) Security: Theoretical Foundations for Security against Hardware Tampering. In: Naor, M. (eds) Theory of Cryptography. TCC 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2951. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24638-1_15
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24638-1_15
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-21000-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-24638-1
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive