Abstract
A close examination of the Italian criminal justice reveals that significant changes took place in the understanding of criminal proceedings over the last few decades. At the time of the enactment of the current code of criminal procedure (1988), criminal justice in Italy was still governed by the 1930 code, albeit largely amended. The so-called ‘Rocco-code’ maintained some of the main features of the original model, which left to private parties very limited room in criminal proceedings. In particular, the defence could give only indirect contribution to the taking of oral evidence in open court, since depending on the types of the proceedings, witnesses were examined by either the president of the trial court or by a district court judge (pretore). Furthermore, evidence-gathering was largely frustrated by the widespread use of information collected by law enforcement authorities in the pre-trial stages. In particular, the drafters of the fascist code had construed the intermediate stage (istruzione) as the procedural phase primarily aimed at the collection of criminal evidence. Most significantly, defendants were normally remanded into custody at the beginning of the judicial proceedings, being therefore deprived of the right to take part in criminal proceedings as free persons, with inevitable repercussions on their defence rights. Under the 1930 model, the intermediate phase should have been headed either by an investigating magistrate or the public prosecutor. However, the prosecutorial inquiry, though initially conceived as an exception to the ordinary judicial inquiry, soon gained ground in practice, thus also frustrating the accused’s right to be heard by an impartial body. This result was long tolerated on the ground that the public prosecutor, forming part of the judiciary, is under Italian law an independent body of justice (organo di giustizia). Yet nothing could justify the result of an independent inquiry being conducted by the same authority that charged defendants with a criminal offence, remanded them into custody, and collected incriminating evidence against them.
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Notes
- 1.
Art. 440of the 1930code.
- 2.
Siracusano (1973), p. 166 ff.
- 3.
The inclusion of the rules on both arrest and remand detention into the systematic structure of the 1930 code at the beginning of the Book concerned with the intermediate phase was clearly in line with the typically inquisitorial appreciation of pre-trial custody as the most appropriate means of forcefully achieving the collaboration (if not the confession) of the defendant, who was also viewed as an instrument for the success of the criminal inquiries rather than a right holder. Cf. Marzaduri (1994), p. 61.
- 4.
Investigative judges headed a formal inquiry (istruzione formale), whereas prosecutors an interim one (istruzione sommaria).
- 5.
Cordero (1966), p. 3 ff.
- 6.
Critical remarks on this concept were formulated by Chiavario (1971), p. 714 ff.
- 7.
Art. 1 Law 81/1987.
- 8.
See respectively Arts. 431 and 433 CCP. Despite the heading of the latter Article, the ‘prosecutorial file’ has never contained only the pieces of evidence gathered by the competent prosecutor but also the information collected by the police as well as the evidence taken in the intermediate phase by the competent judge. In the light of its comprehensive scope, it therefore constitutes a general file containing, as a rule, all the information taken in the pre-trial phase.
- 9.
Art. 514 CCP.
- 10.
Art. 487 CCP.
- 11.
Arts. 459 et seq. CCP.
- 12.
Carnelutti (1963), p. 14.
- 13.
Art. 210 CCP.
- 14.
Art. 498(4) CCP.
- 15.
Since in Italy prosecutors are part of the judiciary (magistratura), they are still empowered to order a number of coercive measures, such as, in particular, searches and inspections, as well as wiretaps in urgent cases.
- 16.
Law Decree 306/1992 converted into the Law 356/1992. In the sense indicated in the text cf. also Marzaduri (2004b), p. 223 ff.
- 17.
Law 66/1996.
- 18.
Art. 392 et seqq. CCP.
- 19.
Di Chiara (2002), p. 553.
- 20.
Chapter 8, F.II&III.
- 21.
Chapter 16, B.II&III.
- 22.
On this development see among others Conti (2013), p. 103 ff.
- 23.
Chapter 1, A.
- 24.
On the developments of individual rights after the fair trial constitutional reform see Marzaduri (2004a), p. 283 ff.
- 25.
Cordero (1958), p. 1025 ff.
- 26.
Art. 101 CPC. See Luiso (1981).
- 27.
Garlati (2010).
- 28.
- 29.
Art. 24 Const. See CConst, 46/1957. In the same sense, more recently, CConst, 117/2007.
- 30.
Art. 2 Const.
- 31.
Chiavario (1969), p.49 ff.
- 32.
CConst, 361/1998.
- 33.
- 34.
Art. 111(4) Const.
- 35.
Art. 111(3) Const.
- 36.
For instance, the constitutionalisation of the defendant’s consent to the use of untested evidence, as one of the exceptions to the principle of contradictoire in the evidence-gathering, was mainly aimed at giving a constitutional justification for alternative proceedings structured on a consensual basis. See Art. 111(5) Const.
- 37.
Art. 111(2) Const. Remarkably, a lively debate also divided the Italian criminal law scholarship in the interpretation of the principle of reasonable length of criminal proceedings, raising the question of whether it should be viewed as an individual right or an objective guarantee of a fair process. See Grevi (2000), p. 326 ff.
- 38.
Art. 111(2) Const.
- 39.
Marzaduri (2000), p. 767.
- 40.
The term ‘accused’ (accusato) is traditionally extraneous to Italian criminal procedural law, which usually relates to the person formally charged with a criminal offence as ‘defendant’ (imputato). Over recent years, however, the rising influence of international human rights law and EU law has led to the gradual spread of this new concept in Italian law. This poses delicate problems of compatibility with the national terminology, which in turn entails substantial implications on the scope of application of fundamental guarantees.
- 41.
Art. 111(3) Const.
- 42.
Ibid.
- 43.
Art. 111(4) Const.
- 44.
Conti (2000), p. 198 ff.
- 45.
Art. 111(5) Const. On these constitutional derogations from the principle of contradictoire cf. Di Chiara (2009).
- 46.
Chapter 8, F.II.
- 47.
It is apparent that the Constitution, as a rule, does not allow entrusting the examination to an investigative magistrate in favour of the defence, since judges cannot clearly hear people before themselves.
- 48.
Marzaduri (2000), p. 783.
- 49.
Ferrua (2013), p. 46 f.
- 50.
Marzaduri (2000), p. 785.
- 51.
- 52.
Marzaduri (2000), p. 800.
- 53.
- 54.
Marzaduri (2000), p. 800 fn. 252.
- 55.
Ibid., 783 f.
- 56.
Ibid., 784 ff.
- 57.
Arts. 326 and 358 CCP.
- 58.
Marzaduri (2000), p. 768 f.
- 59.
In this sense see Marzaduri (2000), p. 769.
- 60.
Nobili (2001), p. 5 ff. Notwithstanding that the heading of Law 63/2001 explicitly related to the implementation of the 1999 constitutional reform, this result was therefore due to both these legislative instruments.
- 61.
On this topic cf. Siracusano (2008), p. 500 ff.
- 62.
Art. 391-bis CCP.
- 63.
Art. 391-bis(10) CCP.
- 64.
Marzaduri (2000), p. 768.
- 65.
Art. 267(3).
- 66.
Art. 391-septies CCP.
- 67.
Marzaduri (2000), p. 770.
- 68.
Art. 391-decies CCP, enacted by the 2000 reform, submitted the use of defensive evidence to the ordinary rules regarding out-of-court untested evidence, rules that Law 63/2001 drastically amended pursuant to the requirements set by the 1999 constitutional reform. See Arts. 500 et seqq. CCP.
- 69.
Art. 391-bis(3) CCP.
- 70.
Art. 391-ter CCP. This is a very delicate issue with a view to a correct understanding of the institutional position and the responsibility of defence lawyers. The Joint Sections of the Supreme Court acknowledged that lawyers, despite being free to receive informal statements, must draw up complete documentation if they choose to minute up the statements obtained by informants, with the result that uncompleted documentation makes them liable for falsification in an official act. From this it follows that the responsibility of lawyers as public officials is dependent on their choice to draw up official records of the statements collected. Cf. CCass, S.L.
- 71.
Art. 391-octies CCP.
- 72.
Below, I.II.2.
- 73.
- 74.
Carrara (1875), p. 4 ff.
- 75.
For instance, the Royal Decree 368/1904 enabled the Prefect to institute criminal proceedings in case of infringement of the rules governing the draining of the marshes. For an overview of the cases of criminal prosecution by bodies other than the public prosecutor under the 1930 code see Marzaduri (1996), p. 4.
- 76.
Marzaduri (1996), p. 3.
- 77.
Art. 74(3) of the 1930 CCP (1930 version).
- 78.
Carnelutti (1947), p. 48.
- 79.
Royal Legislative Decree 288/1944.
- 80.
Art. 74(3) of the 1930 CCP.
- 81.
On this discussion see Ruggeri (2015a), p. 63 f.
- 82.
Presidential Decree 570/1956.
- 83.
Marzaduri (1996), p. 3.
- 84.
CConst. 61/1967.
- 85.
Chiavario (1975), p. 897 f.
- 86.
CConst. 84/1979 and 474/1993.
- 87.
Art. 60(1) CCP.
- 88.
Art. 231 RICCP.
- 89.
Marzaduri (1996), p. 4.
- 90.
Ibid., 5 f. Of a different opinion see Cordero (2012), p. 1098.
- 91.
Art. 21 et seqq. Legislative Decree 274/2000.
- 92.
- 93.
Art. 21(2)(i) Legislative Decree 274/2000.
- 94.
Art. 21(2)(f-h) Legislative Decree 274/2000.
- 95.
Art. 21(3) Legislative Decree 274/2000.
- 96.
Art. 24 Legislative Decree 274/2000.
- 97.
Art. 25 Legislative Decree 274/2000.
- 98.
Of a different opinion CConst, 381/2005. In this ruling, the Constitutional Court pointed out that the detailed contents of the ricorso enable the prosecutor to assess the merits of the private initiative. This conclusion cannot be sustained, since prosecutors have a very short period of time to assess the victim’s legal action.
- 99.
Art. 26 Legislative Decree 274/2000.
- 100.
Of course, the prosecutorial power of amending the facts stated in the victim’s ricorso has its limits and cannot lead to a distortion of the essential features of the offence indicated by the injured party. See Marzaduri (2016), p. 1124.
- 101.
CConst, 321/2008.
- 102.
CConst, 361/2005.
- 103.
For a critical approach to the legal solution of Article 409(5) CCP cf. Giostra (1994), p. 80.
- 104.
Marzaduri (2016), p. 1126.
- 105.
CConst, 361/2005.
- 106.
Art. 409(1) CCP.
- 107.
Art. 410(1) CCP.
- 108.
Art. 409(2) CCP.
- 109.
As possible alternatives, the competent judge can either order the termination of the proceedings or require the competent prosecutor to carry out further investigations or to bring the defendant to court. See Art. 409(4–5) CCP.
- 110.
Moreover, the court summons must be communicated to the General Prosecutor before the Court of Appeal. Cf. Art. 409(3) CCP.
- 111.
CCass, Mariottini.
- 112.
CConst, 418/1993.
- 113.
Legal scholarship advocates the need to summon also the victim’s counsel pursuant to the general rules of in camera hearings. See Caprioli (1994), p. 418 fn. 64. The case law does not share this opinion, however. Cf. CCass, Barlettelli. Of course, the question is relevant in the cases in which the victims have not yet appointed a counsel, since otherwise the summons will be notified at their legal domicile pursuant to Article 33 of the code’s implementing rules. See Campo (1993), p. 1497.
- 114.
CCass, P.o. in proc. Mercuri.
- 115.
Art. 409(6) CCP.
- 116.
Art. 408(2) CCP. More recently, the legislature, following the indications of the 2011 Council of Europe Convention of Istanbul on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, launched a reform—namely, Law 119/2013—aimed at enhancing the criminal law protection of women also by means of procedural tools. In this light, the 2013 reform on gender-based violence strengthened the information rights of the victims who must be notified of the prosecutorial application for discontinuance of the proceedings regardless of whether they requested to be informed. This innovation only applies, however, to the cases of gender-based violence. Outside these cases, the notice of the prosecutorial application for discontinuance of the proceedings is still dependent on the request of the injured parties who may however have not been informed in the course of the pre-trial inquiry about the consequences of their inaction.
- 117.
Art. 408(3) CCP.
- 118.
Art. 410 CCP.
- 119.
See, among others, Giostra (1994), p. 60; CCass, Noschese.
- 120.
See respectively CConst, 353/1991, and CCass, Testa (in relation to the case of unlawful declaration of inadmissibility of the victim’s objection) as well as CCass, Lo Mauro (in relation to the case of lack of assessment of the admissibility of the objection).
- 121.
In this sense Caprioli, who shared moreover the proposed extension to the case in which the judge failed to assess the victim’s objection. See Caprioli (1994), p. 430 f.
- 122.
Art. 177 CCP.
- 123.
In a different sense see Iasevoli (2007), p. 3.
- 124.
Art. 178(c) CCP. On the grounds for this approach see Tranchina (1989), p. 4 f.
- 125.
Art. 181 CCP.
- 126.
- 127.
Art. 27 Presidential Decree 448/1988.
- 128.
Di Chiara (2003), p. 258 ff.
- 129.
Art. 34 Legislative Decree 274/2000.
- 130.
The low severity of the deed must be assessed not only in light of the interests protected by statutory criminal law, the damages or dangers derived from the offence, the degree of guilt and the occasional character of the criminal action but also taking into consideration the potential damage that the institution of a criminal process would cause to personal interests such as work, family, health and so on.
- 131.
In this sense cf. Marzaduri (2016), p. 1137 f., who pointed out that, notwithstanding clear legal indications, the prosecutor who decides to apply for a termination of the proceedings for the low severity of the deed should previously hear the victim and verify his interest in the institution of a criminal process.
- 132.
Marzaduri (2016), p. 1137 f.
- 133.
Ibid., 1138.
- 134.
Art. 34 Legislative Decree 274/2000. In particular, judges can declare the offence extinguished if the defendants demonstrate that after the first appearance hearing, they took concrete measures to repair the damages caused by the offence committed, by means of restitution or compensation, and to eliminate the harmful or dangerous consequences of their act.
- 135.
Marzaduri (2016), p. 1138 f.
- 136.
Ibid.
- 137.
Arts. 168-bis et seqq. PC. The procedural arrangements are governed by Articles 464-bis et seqq. CCP. The procedural rules on the suspension of the proceedings for the purposes of a probation period were enacted into a new Title V-bis of the 6th Book of the code on alternative proceedings. Notwithstanding this systematic approach, it can be doubted whether this can be considered an ‘alternative proceeding’ in the sense attached to this notion by the 1988 code.
- 138.
Art. 28 Presidential Decree 488/1988.
- 139.
Art. 168-bis PC.
- 140.
Art. 168-ter PC.
- 141.
Art. 464-bis(2) CCP.
- 142.
Art. 464-ter CCP.
- 143.
Art. 464-quarter(1–2) CCP.
- 144.
Art. 464-quarter(3) CCP.
- 145.
See Arts. 28–29 Presidential Decree 488/1988.
- 146.
Art. 464-quarter(7) CCP.
- 147.
Art. 464-quinquies CCP.
- 148.
Art. 464-septies CCP.
- 149.
Art. 411 CCP, in relation to Art. 131-bis PC. See among others Caprioli (2015), p. 82 ff.
- 150.
Caprioli (2015), p. 99.
- 151.
Art. 411(1-bis) CCP.
- 152.
Ibid.
- 153.
Giuliani (2016), p. 560.
- 154.
Caprioli (2015), p. 100 f.
- 155.
Ibid., 101.
- 156.
Marzaduri (2000), p. 777.
- 157.
Ibid., 776.
- 158.
For an overview of the multiple applications of the notion of ‘charge’ to Italian procedural law see Ubertis (2009), p. 28 f.
- 159.
ECtHR, Foti et al. v. Italy, § 52. On this point see more extensively Chap. 8, D.II.2.
- 160.
Marzaduri (2000), p. 777.
- 161.
Below, E.II.1.
- 162.
Marzaduri (2000), p. 778.
- 163.
Ibid., 780 f.
- 164.
Ibid., 781 f.
- 165.
Chapter 8, D.III.
- 166.
Marzaduri (2000), p. 782.
- 167.
Ibid., 782.
- 168.
Art. 335(2) CCP.
- 169.
Art. 335(3) CCP (1988 version).
- 170.
Art. 335(3) CCP.
- 171.
Art. 335(3-bis) CCP.
- 172.
Art. 335(3) CCP.
- 173.
Marzaduri (2000), p. 779 fn. 110.
- 174.
Art. 369 CCP.
- 175.
Art. 304 of the 1930 CCP.
- 176.
Marzaduri (2000), p. 778.
- 177.
CConst, 10/1993. On the systematic importance of this decision see Chap. 16, B.I.2.
- 178.
Marzaduri (2000), p. 780.
- 179.
Law 60/2001.
- 180.
Art. 369-bis CCP.
- 181.
CCass, Mariano.
- 182.
CCass, Iuzzolini.
- 183.
Art. 365(1) CCP.
- 184.
CCass, Mariano.
- 185.
CCass, Zaccaria.
- 186.
Art. 409(2) CCP.
- 187.
Art. 409(1) CCP.
- 188.
On this discussion see Ruggeri (2015a), p. 65 ff.
- 189.
Art. 416 CCP, as reformed by the Law 234/1997. On this reform see Marzaduri (1997), p. 759.
- 190.
Art. 415-bis CCP.
- 191.
If suspects were not informed of the proceedings during the pre-trial inquiry, they need be notified pursuant to Article 157(1) CCP. However, this provision, despite starting with notification in person, provides for different forms of notification of defendants, which cannot ensure their knowledge of the proceedings. The lack of attention to the need to ensure effective information is even more evident in the provision requiring that the notification be renewed only where it is proved or probable that the defendant had no effective knowledge of the act of notification. Cf. Art. 157(5) CCP.
- 192.
Caprioli (2000), p. 276.
- 193.
Art. 416(1) CCP. A similar rule applies to the proceedings before single judges (tribunale in composizione monocratica). Cf. Art. 552(2) CCP.
- 194.
Art. 358 CCP.
- 195.
Art. 155 CCP.
- 196.
To be sure, Article 121 CCP enables all the parties to present statements at any stage of the proceedings. Yet this provision cannot be used for the purposes of assessment of the accusation, since it only regards statements presented to the judge.
- 197.
Bene (2004), p. 194.
- 198.
CConst, 203/2002. In the same sense CCass, Bardi, as well as Caprioli (2000), p. 274.
- 199.
- 200.
Art. 417(b) CCP.
- 201.
Art. 419 CCP.
- 202.
Art. 423 CCP. Precisely the legal basis of this jurisprudence has, however, given rise to several concerns among scholars, who have pointed out that the tools allowing for the prosecutor to amend the charge presuppose that the original indictment fulfilled all its requirements. In this sense see Lorusso (2008), p. 68.
- 203.
CCass, Battistella.
- 204.
Below, J.III.1.
- 205.
Art. 291(1) CCP.
- 206.
CCass, Capri. See Marzaduri (1998), p. 179.
- 207.
CCass, Sanna.
- 208.
The difference from the formulation used in the field of restrictions on freedom—namely, strong suspicion of guilt (gravi indizi di colpevolezza)—lies in the fact that the remand detention and the alternatives to custody presuppose that the criminal inquiry has already been directed against one or more individuals. Instead, there is no need that a suspect has been detected for the purposes of wiretapping, which can also be ordered against third parties. See CCass, Zita.
- 209.
Marzaduri (2008), p. 4848.
- 210.
Art. 268(5) CCP.
- 211.
Marzaduri (2008), p. 4848 f.
- 212.
Art. 15 Const.
- 213.
Caprioli (2000), p. 276.
- 214.
Art. 419(3) CCP.
- 215.
Art. 430 CCP.
- 216.
Art. 420(2) CCP (1988 version).
- 217.
Art. 485(1) CCP (1988 version).
- 218.
Art. 420(4) CCP (1988 version).
- 219.
Art. 420-bis(1) CCP.
- 220.
Art. 420-ter(1–2) CCP.
- 221.
See respectively Arts. 420-bis(2) and Art. 420-ter(2) CCP.
- 222.
Art. 420-quater CCP.
- 223.
Below, F.II.2.
- 224.
Art. 154(1) CCP.
- 225.
Art. 155(1) CCP.
- 226.
Furthermore, notification at the court registry can also be ordered when a victim resident abroad failed to elect a legal domicile in Italy. Cf. Art. 154(1) CCP. As to the judicial service by means of public announcements, this solution can be the result of the number of the victims and the difficulty of reaching them by ordinary means. See Art. 155(1) CCP.
- 227.
The difference between victim and damaged party is particularly evident in the field of offences against the administration of justice, where the state is the victim, even though individuals suffered from damages from a criminal action. See Tranchina (1989), p. 1.
- 228.
Zumpano (2000), p. 347.
- 229.
See critically Scalfati (1999), p. 37.
- 230.
On the principle of contradictoire in the field of in camera proceedings see Di Chiara (1994).
- 231.
Below, F.III.2.
- 232.
Below, J.III.1.
- 233.
- 234.
ECtHR, Colozza v. Italy. See extensively Chap. 8, C.II.
- 235.
Article 179(1) CCP provides for the absolute nullity of criminal proceedings conducted without the participation of the defendants’ lawyers, where the law requires their involvement in procedural activities.
- 236.
Chapter 4, D.I.
- 237.
See respectively ECtHR, Somogyi v. Italy and ECtHR, Sejdovic v. Italy.
- 238.
Law Decree 17/2005, subsequently converted in Law 60/2005.
- 239.
Chapter 16, D.II.1.a.
- 240.
Negri (2005), p. 260 ff.
- 241.
Art. 488 CCP (1988 version).
- 242.
- 243.
See respectively Arts. 420-bis and 420-quinquies CCP.
- 244.
Art. 420-bis(2) CCP.
- 245.
Art. 420-bis(2) CCP.
- 246.
Here also, the code put together heterogeneous situations, i.e., (a) the fact that suspects chose their domicile in the pre-trial investigations; (b) their arrest or the adoption of pre-trial measures; (c) the decision to appoint a lawyer of their own choosing; and in general terms, (d) the circumstance that suspects were aware of the beginning of criminal inquiries against them or voluntarily avoided the information on the proceedings.
- 247.
Caprioli (2014), p. 664.
- 248.
Art. 420-bis(3) CCP.
- 249.
Art. 420-bis(4) CCP.
- 250.
Art. 489(2) CCP.
- 251.
Art. 625-ter CCP.
- 252.
Caprioli (2014), p. 667 f.
- 253.
Quattrocolo (2014), p. 10 f.
- 254.
See Article 159(3) CC, as amended by Article 12 of Law 67/2014.
- 255.
Below, I.III.
- 256.
See among others Bellavista (1952).
- 257.
Tranchina (1961), p. 516 ff.
- 258.
CConst, 46/1957.
- 259.
On close examination, the approach followed by the Constitutional Court mixes the justification elaborated by two outstanding scholars of civil procedural law during last century, namely Piero Calamandrei and Francesco Carnelutti. The former advocated the idea of subsequent involvement of the other parties, while the latter focused on the eventual nature of their participation. See respectively Calamandrei (1926), and Carnelutti (1924), p. 270 ff. The scholar who first imported Carnelutti’s doctrine to penal order procedures was Girolamo Bellavista. Cf. Bellavista (1952), p. 47.
- 260.
In 1988, the period was shorter than in normal cases (4 months) but further legislation enabled prosecutors to investigate up to 6 months.
- 261.
Caprioli (2004), p. 586 ff.
- 262.
Art. 460(4) CCP.
- 263.
Art. 460(3) CCP.
- 264.
Ruggeri (2008), pp. 104 and 159 f.
- 265.
CConst, 504/2000. In the same sense see CCass, Kusi Kwaben. Of a different opinion CCass, Gradi.
- 266.
- 267.
Art. 460(3) CCP.
- 268.
Ruggeri (2008), p. 156 ff.
- 269.
CCass, Huzuneanu.
- 270.
CConst, 317/2009.
- 271.
Under the 1988 regulation, these two proceedings shared several common features. On close examination, the drafters of the 1988 code aimed at introducing two negotiated proceedings, i.e. (a) an agreement on a financial penalty or a detention up to 2 years (patteggiamento) and (b) a procedural agreement (giudizio abbreviato). In both cases, the agreement only involved the accused and the prosecutor, and above all, the accused could benefit from a reduced sentence. There was however a big difference between the two procedures, in that the former necessarily led to a conviction, whereas the latter only aimed at a hearing in camera, which could lead either to the conviction or the acquittal of the accused. As will be explained in the text, the 1999 reform deeply alter the dynamics of the abbreviated proceedings, which are no longer a negotiated procedure.
- 272.
Art. 447 CCP.
- 273.
Art. 446(5) CCP.
- 274.
CCass, Di Costanzo.
- 275.
CCass, Morini.
- 276.
CConst, 443/1990.
- 277.
Arts. 80 et seqq. CCP.
- 278.
Art. 444(2) CCP.
- 279.
CCass, Bosio.
- 280.
Marzaduri (2004c), p. 245.
- 281.
Since the enactment of the code, the problem of fact-finding in plea bargaining has given rise to lively debates both in the case-law and the criminal law scholarship. For an in-depth analysis of this problem area see Gialuz (2008), p. 17 ff.
- 282.
Art. 441(4) CCP.
- 283.
Art. 75(3) CCP.
- 284.
See Art. 652(1) CCP, which moreover provides for the exception that either the civil law action was not transferred to the criminal proceedings or the damaged party initiated the civil proceedings where the possibility of lodging a civil-law complaint before a criminal court was no longer allowed, pursuant to Article 75(2) CCP.
- 285.
See respectively Arts. 651(2) and 652(2) CCP. There are, however, some differences between the cases of conviction and acquittal. Alongside the consent of the damaged party, civil or administrative courts must abide by the defendant’s conviction under the additional condition that the damaged party did not oppose the binding effects. This condition needs systematic interpretation, since the lack of opposition clearly presupposes that the damaged party was able to participate in the criminal proceedings. In this regard, see Scalfati (1999), p. 37. The fact that the requirement of consent presupposes the effective participation of the damaged party in the abbreviated proceedings leads to the result that any form of binding effects should also be ruled out if the damaged party was excluded from the criminal proceedings, pursuant to Article 80 CCP.
- 286.
See critically Scalfati (1999), p. 37.
- 287.
On close examination, the 1988 code neither specified the grounds for the prosecutorial dissent nor allowed for a judicial review in the subsequent trial phase. The Constitutional Court, sharing most of these arguments, declared the 1988 rules unconstitutional, while enabling the trial court to evaluate the reasons for the prosecutorial dissent and, if it was not justified, to apply the reduced sentence proposed by the accused. Cf. CConst, 81/1991. Furthermore, the code enabled prosecutors also to block the defendants’ request—frustrating their expectation to obtain a reduced sentence or anyway a judgment in camera—in case of investigations negligently performed or uncompleted results achieved during the pre-trial inquiry.
- 288.
Art. 441(5) CCP.
- 289.
See respectively Arts. 350 and 351, and Arts. 362 and 375 CCP.
- 290.
Art. 363 CCP.
- 291.
Art. 350(5–6) CCP.
- 292.
Art. 63(1) CCP.
- 293.
Ibid.
- 294.
Art. 63(2) CCP.
- 295.
Art. 348(1) CCP (1988 version).
- 296.
Art. 370(1) CCP (1988 version).
- 297.
Art. 374 CCP. Although suspects could also give spontaneous statements to the police, the evidence gathered could only be used at trial to assess the reliability of the information obtained in open court. Cf. Art. 350(7) CCP.
- 298.
Art. 348(1) CCP.
- 299.
Arts. 11 et seqq. Legislative Decree 275/2000.
- 300.
Art. 370 CCP.
- 301.
Art. 351(1-bis) CCP.
- 302.
Art. 197-bis CCP. On this topic see Conti (2003).
- 303.
See respectively Arts. 351(1) and 362(1) CCP.
- 304.
CCass, Papia et al.
- 305.
Art. 375(3) CCP. The only exception relates to the immediate proceedings. Here also, however, there is no mandatory provision requiring prosecutors to disclose all the investigations conducted.
- 306.
Art. 350(3) CCP.
- 307.
Art. 364(7) CCP.
- 308.
Art. 503(5) CCP.
- 309.
CConst, 262/1998.
- 310.
CConst, 63/2005.
- 311.
Directive 2011/36/EU.
- 312.
Art. 398(5-ter) CCP.
- 313.
Art. 362(1-bis) CCP, introduced by the Law 172/2012.
- 314.
Art. 351(1-ter) CCP.
- 315.
CCass, Barillà; CConst, 460/2002.
- 316.
Caprioli (2000), p. 275.
- 317.
Art. 127 CCP.
- 318.
Art. 127(3) CCP.
- 319.
Art. 406(3) CCP.
- 320.
Art. 406(4) CCP.
- 321.
Art. 406(5) CCP.
- 322.
Art. 210(4) CCP.
- 323.
Art. 198(2) CCP.
- 324.
Conti (2001b), p. 644.
- 325.
Art. 64 CCP.
- 326.
As a rule, pursuant to Article 197-bis(1) CCP, co-defendants can be summoned as witnesses only after their trial has finally been disposed of. This is the case for offences committed by several individuals either jointly or through independent actions [Art. 12(a) CCP], as well as for crimes committed to hide or execute other offences [Art. 12(c) CCP], and offences committed while other crimes were being perpetrated, or to ensure to the perpetrator the product, profit or price of another crime, or crimes several individuals perpetrated against each other, or when the proof of one crime depends upon the proof of another [Art. 371(2)(b) CCP]. Furthermore, in the two latter situations [Arts. 12(c) and 371(2)(b) CCP], co-defendants can also be summoned to be examined as special witnesses whille their proceedings are still ongoing, if they are available to give evidence in issues related to other individuals. It is worth observing, moreover, that the Constitutional Court declared Article 197-bis CCP unconstitutional it that it required legal assistance even when the co-accused was acquitted because the prosecuted offence did not exist or he did not commit it. See CConst, 381/2006 and 21/2017.
- 327.
Conti (2003), p. 234.
- 328.
Ibid., 229 ff.
- 329.
Gaeta (2001), p. 442.
- 330.
Nobili (2001), p. 6.
- 331.
Art. 371-bis CC. More recently, Law 277/2012 extended this criminal law provision to false information given or to information withheld to the Prosecutor before the International Criminal Court.
- 332.
Amodio (2001), p. 3596.
- 333.
A delicate question concerns the hearing of the accused in the intermediate phase. It has been noted that defendants, after being brought to court, can be examined only at their own request. Moreover, the drafters of the 1988 code structured the intermediate phase in such manner that further information could only be gathered in exceptional circumstances and oral evidence was taken only by the competent judge. Yet the 1999 reform entitled any party to request the cross-examination of the accused. From this it followed that, though defendants could still be heard only at their request, the initiative of any other party could expose them to the cross-examination by the prosecutor and the lawyers in a non-public hearing. See Arts. 421(2) and 422(4) CCP. For critical remarks cf. Scalfati (1999), p. 68, who considered it possible, however, to ensure the defendants’ right to request to be questioned by the competent judge. It should also be taken into account that as a consequence of this reform, the evidence that the accused will give in response to the cross-examination can be read out at trial and can be used as inculpatory evidence both against the person examined and other parties (in the latter case, however, provided only that the lawyers of the individuals concerned were present in the intermediate phase).
- 334.
CConst, 221/1991.
- 335.
Art. 490 CCP.
- 336.
Art. 513 CCP.
- 337.
Conti (2001a), p. 603.
- 338.
Art. 503(4) CCP.
- 339.
Before the 2001 reform, the case-law had adopted a rather broad interpretation of this provision, allowing that all the recorded evidence taken in the pre-trial phase—that is, not only the parts containing the statements contrasting with the evidence given in open court—be read out at trial. This interpretation could not be deemed in line with the constitutional acknowledgment of the principle of contradictoire. In the same sense see Conti (2001a), p. 603.
- 340.
Art. 513(1) CCP.
- 341.
Art. 498(4) CCP.
- 342.
CConst, 283/1997.
- 343.
Di Chiara (1997), p. 2575.
- 344.
Art. 498(4-bis) CCP, introduced by the Law 268/1998.
- 345.
Art. 498(4-ter) CCP.
- 346.
Art. 498(4-quater) CCP.
- 347.
3rd Book of the code.
- 348.
Art. 190(1) CCP. Under the 1988 code, this also applied to the exceptional evidence-gathering intermediate phase. Since the 1999 reform, the competent judges for the pre-trial inquiry can also gather information at their own initiative in the intermediate phase. Cf. 422 CCP. It is worth observing, moreover, that in this phase the competent judge can also take evidence requested by the parties. Neither the prosecutor nor private parties, however, are entitle to cross-examine the person being heard, who is questioned by the judge on the basis of eventual observations or requests of the parties. It is not an unremarkable difference, since the fact the parties have no direct access to the source of evidence can give rise to the risk that the defence’s contribution will be trivialised or even misunderstood. Relying on this difference in the method of evidence-gathering, as noted, the code still requires the evidence taken in the intermediate phase to be included in the prosecutorial file rather than in the trial file Cf. Art. 433 CCP.
- 349.
Art. 190(2) CCP.
- 350.
190(3) CCP.
- 351.
A significant exception concerned the proceedings before district judges who, upon agreement between the parties, could examine witnesses and private parties at trial, taking into account eventual questions and objections raised by the defence and the prosecutor. The 1999 reform, dropping district judges, maintained this solution for the new proceedings before single judges (tribunale monocratico). Cf. Art. 559(3) CCP.
- 352.
Art. 501 CCP.
- 353.
Art. 503(3) CCP.
- 354.
Art. 210(5) CCP.
- 355.
Art. 468 CCP.
- 356.
Art. 512 CCP.
- 357.
See Arts. 500 and 503 CCP.
- 358.
Cordero (2012), p. 891.
- 359.
Tonini (2001), p. 272.
- 360.
See Article 360(5) in conjunction with Article 431 CCP.
- 361.
To be sure, the 1988 rules already provided for an important case of evidence-gathering unconnected from urgent reasons. Pursuant to Article 392(2) CCP, complex expert evidence should, as a rule, be taken in the pre-trial stage to avoid excessive congestion of the trial phase.
- 362.
Art. 401(5) CCP.
- 363.
Art. 401(6) CCP.
- 364.
Art. 403 CCP.
- 365.
Art. 431(1)(e) CCP.
- 366.
CConst, 74/1991.
- 367.
Law 267/1997.
- 368.
Art. 398(3) CCP.
- 369.
CConst, 77/1994.
- 370.
Art. 392(1)(c-d) CCP, as reformed by the Law 267/1997.
- 371.
Bargis (1996), p. 504.
- 372.
Art. 498(4-ter) CCP.
- 373.
Art. 498(4-quater) CCP, as amended by Legislative Decree 212/2015. See Chap. 16, D.V.1.a.
- 374.
Art. 147-bis RICCP.
- 375.
Art. 147-bis(1-bis) RICCP, introduced by Law 136/2010, enacting an extraordinary anti-mafia programme.
- 376.
Art. 497(2-bis) CCP, introduced by Law 136/2010 and further enhanced by the anti-terrorism reform of Law 43/2015.
- 377.
Art. 508 CCP.
- 378.
Pursuant to Article 507 CCP, additional evidence can be gathered at the initiative of the trial judges only if necessary for the rendering of a verdict and after all the information requested by the parties has been collected.
- 379.
Art. 502 CCP.
- 380.
Art. 225(1) CCP.
- 381.
Art. 230 CCP.
- 382.
Art. 225(2) CCP.
- 383.
Kostoris (1993), p. 337.
- 384.
CCass, Ferrara.
- 385.
Art. 391-decies(3) CCP.
- 386.
Art. 391-decies(4) CCP.
- 387.
Art. 392(1)(f) CCP.
- 388.
Art. 392(2) CCP.
- 389.
Art. 224-bis CCP.
- 390.
Marzaduri (2000), p. 790 f.
- 391.
Orlandi (2010), p. 52 f.
- 392.
Art. 495(3) CCP.
- 393.
Art. 238 CCP (1988 version).
- 394.
Art. 238(4) (1992 version).
- 395.
Art. 238(2-bis) CCP.
- 396.
- 397.
The case must be finally disposed of and the decision can only admitted if relevant for the fact-finding in the proceedings of destination. Moreover, it can be assessed as evidence of the matters under prosecution, provided that corroborating evidence exists.
- 398.
Art. 238-bis CCP.
- 399.
Marzaduri (2009), p. 189 ff.
- 400.
Ibid., 197.
- 401.
Di Bitonto (2004).
- 402.
Art. 238(4) CCP.
- 403.
Marzaduri (2009), p. 208.
- 404.
By contrast, no problem arises in relation to other private parties who are always represented in court by their lawyers. Cf. Art. 100(1) CCP.
- 405.
See Arts. 431(2), Art. 493(3) and 500(7) CCP.
- 406.
In the same sense cf. Marzaduri (2009), p. 215 f., who moreover considered an intervention of the Constitutional Court unnecessary to enable the defendant to personally consent to the use of untested evidence.
- 407.
CConst, 182/2001.
- 408.
For in-depth analysis of this issue see Marzaduri (2009), p. 217 ff. Besides, the role of the judiciary is quite different depending on whether the evidentiary agreement is reached at the end of the pre-trial inquiry or of the intermediate phase, or during the trial inquiry. The main difference is that, whereas in the intermediate phase the competent judge has full access to all the evidence gathered by the investigative bodies, the knowledge of the trial court is limited to the contents of the trial file.
- 409.
Art. 507(1-bis) CCP.
- 410.
- 411.
Art. 511 CCP.
- 412.
Grifantini (2007), p. 179 ff.
- 413.
The first scholar who clearly analysed this phenomenon after the enactment of the 1988 code was Massimo Nobili. Cf. Nobili (1998), p. 10 ff.
- 414.
In 2000, the Join Sections of the Supreme Court shared the distinction between ‘pathological’ and ‘physiological’ non-usability of evidence. See CCass, Tammaro.
- 415.
- 416.
This requirement was enacted into the new Swiss code of criminal procedure. Cf. Art. 197(1)(b) CCP-Switzerland. See Pieth (2012), p. 118.
- 417.
In this context see the detailed analysis of Negri (2004), p. 52 ff., who used the German doctrine of Sachgestaltungsvoraussetzungen, which highlights the procedural projection of the criminal offence for purposes other than those of the decision on the merits. In the German literature see Volk (1978), p. 147 f.
- 418.
Negri (2004), p. 166.
- 419.
Ibid., 133 ff.
- 420.
For an in-depth reflection in Italy on the co-existence of different evidentiary methods in criminal proceedings see already Orlandi (1992), pp. 50 and 221.
- 421.
Negri (2004), p. 133 ff.
- 422.
Art. 187 CCP.
- 423.
On the assessment of procedural issues see Catalano (2002), p. 521 ff. Italian courts may seem to support this distinction, e.g. by ruling out that the unpredictability of the event which rendered certain information unavailable at trial can only be proved on the basis of the evidence gathered in open court or anyway contained in the trial file. See CCass, XY. Pursuant to this approach, the procedural nature of an assessment should justify the use of all the information available, no matter who gathered it and with which methods it was gathered. However, one should not overlook the implications that this approach can have on the defendant’s fundamental rights, e.g. negatively affecting the right to confrontation. Further consequences can be observed in relation to other individuals (for instance, the right of the accused’s next of kin, who claim their right not to testify at trial).
- 424.
Below, J.I.
- 425.
Art. 512 CCP.
- 426.
Art. 195 CCP.
- 427.
Art. 500 CC8pP.
- 428.
Spencer (2014), p. 5 f.
- 429.
Art. 402 CCP.
- 430.
The only exception concerns the case of suspicion of guilt arisen only after the end of the pre-trial procedure, if the evidence collected has already become unavailable. Cf. Art. 403(1-bis) CCP. On the problems concerned with this case see Cordero (2012), p. 877.
- 431.
Galantini (1992), p. 68 f.
- 432.
Art. 512 CCP (1988 version).
- 433.
Art. 238(3) CPP.
- 434.
CConst, 179/1994.
- 435.
CConst, 440/2000.
- 436.
Art. 195(2) CCP.
- 437.
Art. 195(3) CCP.
- 438.
CCass, Scardaccione.
- 439.
CCass, Muscas.
- 440.
CConst, 24/1992.
- 441.
Arts. 351 and 357(2)(a-b) CCP.
- 442.
Art. 195(4) CCP, as amended by Law 63/2001.
- 443.
Caprioli (2002), p. 83.
- 444.
CCass, Torcasio.
- 445.
CConst, 305/2008.
- 446.
CCass, Torcasio.
- 447.
Art. 62 CCP.
- 448.
Criticisms were also raised by Balsamo and Lo Piparo (2004), p. 226.
- 449.
Art. 500(3) CCP (1988 version).
- 450.
See Cordero (1966), p. 189 ff. Moreover, an important reform draft of a new code of criminal procedure, elaborated by Carnelutti in the 1960s (known as ‘Carnelutti draft’), had already provided for the possibility of pre-trial statements being produced at trial to assess the reliability of witnesses or defendants. This proposal was, however, dropped in the amended reform draft. Cf. Carnelutti (1963), respectively 76 and 155.
- 451.
In England and Wales, the 1865 Criminal Procedure Act already allowed the use of out-of-court inconsistent testimonial statements to undermine the witnesses’ reliability.
- 452.
- 453.
CConst, 255/1992. This ruling was strongly criticised by many scholars. See Ferrua (1992), p. 1455 ff.
- 454.
Art. 500(4) CCP (1992 version).
- 455.
Art. 500(2-bis) CCP (1992 version).
- 456.
Art. 500(6) CCP (1992 version).
- 457.
Art. 500(5) CCP (1992 version).
- 458.
Rivello (1993), p. 100.
- 459.
S. 119 CJA 2003. See Spencer (2014), p. 221 ff.
- 460.
S. 116(2) CJA 2003.
- 461.
This risk had been foreseen by Cordero (1992), p. 236.
- 462.
CConst, 361/1998.
- 463.
Art. 500(4) CCP.
- 464.
Art. 500(5) CCP. On this topic see Busetto (2009).
- 465.
CConst, 32/2002 and 36/2002.
- 466.
In this sense see instead Ferrua (2012), p. 135 ff.
- 467.
Ibid., 136 f. Of a different opinion Grevi (2000), p. XVIII.
- 468.
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
- 469.
Ashworth and Redmayne (2010), p. 365.
- 470.
Thus, in Davis v. Washington the US Supreme Court considered emergency calls made to the police office admissible at trial. Cf. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
- 471.
Art. 111(6) Const.
- 472.
- 473.
Carcano and Manzione (2001), p. 57. The Supreme Court has largely shared this approach. Cf. CCass, Capozza. Of a different opinion Ubertis (2013), p. 159, who considered the use of pre-trial testimonial statements against all the defendants unlawful if only one of them or even a third person unlawfully led the witnesses to change their version or not to testify.
- 474.
Exceptionally, this result can also be achieved at trial. The 1988 code provided for one single exception, that is, when the defendant—after being brought to court through the so-called ‘direct proceedings’ (procedimento direttissimo)—requests to be tried by means of the abbreviated proceedings. In this case, the direct proceedings are converted into abbreviate proceedings, with the result that the trial court must abide by rules governing the abbreviate proceedings, rules that allow, inter alia, the use of the evidence gathered through police and prosecutorial investigations for the purposes of the decision-making. Cf. Art. 452(2) CCP. The Constitutional Court introduced a similar result by means of the ruling 333/2009, which enabled defendants to re-present at trial the request for the abbreviate proceedings rejected in the intermediate phase, if the indictment was exceptionally amended.
- 475.
On this topic see Ruggeri (2009), p. 133 ff.
- 476.
Ibid., 150 ff.
- 477.
Cf., among others, CConst, 8/2003.
- 478.
CConst, 8/2003.
- 479.
CConst, 323/2007.
- 480.
CConst, 317/2009.
- 481.
CConst, 23/2015. For some criticisms see Ruggeri (2015b).
- 482.
Under the 1930 code, the decision to join a civil law action to the criminal proceedings precluded the recourse to the penal order procedure. See Cordero (1987), p. 757.
- 483.
Art. 459(1) CCP, as amended by the Law 479/1999. The 1988 code did not allow for the recourse to the penal order procedure in relation to such offences.
- 484.
Art. 442(1-bis) CCP.
- 485.
Art. 442(1) CCP.
- 486.
Marzaduri (1990), p. 730.
- 487.
Cass, Cardoni.
- 488.
For an overlook of this problem see Gialuz (2008), p. 13 ff. It is noteworthy, moreover, that even Marzaduri, who pointed out the need that the bargaining decision be supported by enough inculpatory evidence, excluded the application of the trial rules on the decision-making, which require defendants to be acquitted not only in cases of lack of evidence against them but also in cases of incomplete or contradictory evidence. Cf. Marzaduri (1990), p. 730.
- 489.
- 490.
Under the current rules, prosecutors can request evidence in rebuttal if the accused requested supplementary information. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court extended this power to cases in which the defence, despite not requesting further evidence, produces the results of investigations previously carried out. See CConst, 184/2009.
- 491.
As noted, moreover, the 1999 reform enhanced the power of the competent judges for the pre-trial phases by enabling them also to take information at the intermediate stage at their own initiative. This power can only be exercised, however, in case of exculpatory evidence manifestly aimed at the termination of the proceedings in the intermediate phase.
- 492.
To be sure, the code’s provision is quite ambiguous and has led to the case-law following different interpretations. Unlike the old investigating magistrates, the competent judge for the abbreviated proceedings must abide by the charges preferred by the prosecutor and can neither amend the prosecutorial charge nor elaborate different investigative strategies to prove the offence under prosecution. In this sense see Illuminati (2003), p. 82. Nevertheless, as noted, these judges can gather evidence at their own initiative when they consider that the state of the proceedings is not fit for judgment. This gives them unprecedented powers in the collection of evidence, which certainly go beyond their ordinary functions both in the pre-trial inquiry and in the intermediate phase. On close examination, the fact that the state of the proceedings is not fit for judgment is by definition a referential parameter that can be understood in very different fashions. If any judicial intervention is excluded in cases of complete information (in this sense see Fiorio 2008, p. 90), the need for integrative evidence can emerge either from the arguments brought about in the hearing in camera or from the evidence requested by the defence together with the request for abbreviate proceedings.
- 493.
It should be taken into account that under Italian law, control measures (e.g., suspension of the exercise of parental authority, the exercise of a public office or service or a certain business or occupation) are subject to the same general conditions laid down for remand detention and the alternatives to pre-trial custody.
- 494.
In some cases, the assessment of sentence thresholds is limited to statutory provisions. For instance, if remand detention is needed because of the risk of the suspect committing other offences of the same type as that under investigation, the competent judge must verify whether the other crimes are punishable with imprisonment of a maximum of at least 5 years. In this sense cf. Article 274(c) CCP, as amended by a recent reform on pre-trial measures—namely Law 47/2015—which raised the amount of sentence required to remand suspects in custody. In other cases, instead, the assessment of sentence thresholds entails concrete forecasts. For instance, under Article 274(b) CCP, the risk of absconding can only hold relevance for the purposes of the application of both control and coercive measures if a sentence is likely to be imposed of at least 2 years of imprisonment. This imposes on the competent judge the difficult task of determining, on the basis of the information available, the severity of the sentence pursuant to the general requirements set forth by Article 133 et seqq. CC.
- 495.
At the beginning of the 1980s, two important reforms largely amended the rules on remand detention. See Law 532/1982 and Law 398/1984. Shortly before the enactment of the new code, Law 330/1988 brought about further important innovations.
- 496.
Negri (2004), p. 27 ff.
- 497.
- 498.
German scholars traditionally distinguish the proof of Tatbestand from that of Tatverdacht. The latter takes on particular characters in the field of interim decisions (Tatverdachtsurteile) not only due to the incompleteness of the information available but also because of the prognostic features of the fact-finding. On the Tatverdachtsurteile see Paeffgen (1986), p. 192. For an in-depth reflection on this topic see Negri (2004), p. 70 ff.
- 499.
In the light of the aforementioned criticisms on the gathering of evidence by co-defendants in the pre-trial inquiry, it is clear that not requiring corroborating evidence entails a further departure from the rules on the trial fact-finding, since suspects have no right to be present at the questioning of the co-accused.
- 500.
Art. 273(1-bis) CCP.
- 501.
- 502.
For an in-depth analysis of this problem area in the light of principle of proportionality see Negri (2004), p. 150 ff. and 236 ff.
- 503.
The 1992 legislation provided for a very controversial regulation with regard to mafia-related crimes (mafia-type association, crimes committed using the typical conditions of mafia-type association and crimes of mafia abetting). Over more than two decades, this regulation has been largely amended. Recently, the legislature extended the scope of Article 275(3) CCP to the area of sexual offences and other serious crimes. This reform was largely countered by the Constitutional Court, which further narrowed the application of this exceptional mechanism. Cf. Di Chiara (2002), p. 133. Following the approach of the constitutional case-law, Law 47/2015 distinguished the special rules on remand detention according to two groups of serious crimes. In the case of the offences under Articles 270, 270-bis and 416-bis CC (subversive association, criminal association aimed at national and international terrorism and at subverting democratic order, and mafia-related criminal association), remand detention is applied if suspicion of guilt arises, unless it was proven that no risk exists to the ongoing inquiry. In the case of other serious crimes (murder, sexual crimes, etc.), the same mechanism applies, with the difference, however, that alternatives to custody can also be applied in cases of attenuated risks to the proceedings.
At first glance, it appears that Italian law provides for proper balance among conflicting interests, allowing for the application of remand detention on the basis of a rebuttable presumption of dangerousness of defendants charged with these crimes. However, the code exonerates the judicial authority from assessing the real existence of any concrete risk to the ongoing inquiry. Thus evidence in rebuttal must, as a rule, be produced by the defendant. Furthermore, the possibility of overturning the presumption of dangerousness depends on very exigent proof on the part of the defence. From the perspective of the present discussion, the fact that the assessment of suspicion of guilt provides the sole justification of remand detention appears to be highly problematic especially in the cases of mafia-related criminal association and of sexual crimes, in which one can observe the widespread tendency of proving fumus delicti on the basis of dangerous inferences and presumptions. On the fact-finding in the field of mafia-typed crimes see the comprehensive analysis of Maggio (2010), p. 491 ff.
- 504.
In particular, the accused must be previously examined when a coercive measure is to be applied in the hearing aimed at validating arrest and when a new period of detention is needed after a previous pre-trial detention has expired because of the failure to bring the accused to the judicial authority. Cf. respectively Arts. 294(1) and 302 CCP.
- 505.
For instance, German Basic Law grants the individuals concerned the right to be informed of the grounds for arrest, a fundamental right that, moreover, entails the duty of the competent authority to hear them and allow them to raise objections and complaints against the arrest order. Cf. Art. 104(3) Basic Law. Remarkably, these guarantees also apply when the judicial authority orders pre-trial detention. This highlights that Germany enshrined at the constitutional level the right of detained individuals to obtain an independent assessment of the lawfulness of detention on the basis of their allegations and claims. Cf. Gusy (2010), p. 1091; Müller-Franken (2010), p. 103.
- 506.
Art. 294(4) CCP.
- 507.
Art. 294(6) CCP.
- 508.
CConst, 384/1996.
- 509.
Art. 294(4) CCP.
- 510.
Legislative Decree 101/2014. See Chap. 16, D.VI.1.b.
- 511.
Art. 104(3) CCP.
- 512.
In these cases, the hearing is void only if the postponement of the interview with the lawyer was unlawfully ordered. Cf. Montagna (2010), p. 3156.
- 513.
Art. 294(1) CCP.
- 514.
The negative effects of the postponement are reduced in case of house arrest, further coercive means and control measures, since the hearing must here take place within 10 days.
- 515.
Art. 294(1-ter) CCP.
- 516.
Legislative Decree 101/2014. See Chap. 16, D.VI.3.
- 517.
Italian courts rule out, however, that the hearing conducted by a different judge is void. Cf. CCass, Caruso.
- 518.
Originally, this provision was enacted into the paragraph 2 of Article 111 of the Constitution. By means of the 1999 constitutional fair trial reform, this provision was shifted to paragraph 7 of the same Article.
- 519.
Marzaduri (1986), p. 773.
- 520.
Chapter 8, G.III.
- 521.
EComHR, Bonazzi v. Italy.
- 522.
- 523.
Art. 263-bis of the 1930 CCP.
- 524.
Control measures fall outside the scope of this judicial review.
- 525.
Art. 311(2) CCP.
- 526.
Art. 309 CCP.
- 527.
Art. 309(6) CCP. The 2015 reform enabled the defendant who requested judicial review to state new reasons before the hearing.
- 528.
Art. 309(3-bis) CCP.
- 529.
Art. 309(8-bis) CCP. The 2015 reform also enabled the public prosecutor who requested the coercive measure to appear in court instead of the prosecutor before tribunale della libertà.
- 530.
Art. 309(10) CCP.
- 531.
Art. 309(3-bis) CCP.
- 532.
Art. 309(10) CCP. Even though the competent court must give reasons of these ‘exceptional grounds’, the vague formulation enacted leaves a great margin of discretion.
- 533.
Art. 309(5) CCP.
- 534.
CCass, Plaku.
- 535.
Art. 309(10) CCP.
- 536.
Art. 310 CCP.
- 537.
Art. 310(2) CCP.
- 538.
Art. 299 CCP.
- 539.
Art. 299(3-ter) CCP.
- 540.
For criticisms against the so-called ‘ne bis in idem cautelare’ see Ruggeri (2010).
- 541.
Chapter 8, G.II.
References
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Ashworth A, Redmayne M (2010) The criminal process, 4th edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford
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Ruggeri, S. (2017). Participatory Rights in Italian Criminal Justice and the Developments Towards a contradictoire-Based Model of Criminal Proceedings. In: Audi Alteram Partem in Criminal Proceedings. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54573-8_2
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