Diversity Within the Rijndael Design Principles for Resistance to Differential Power Analysis

Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-48965-0_5

Volume 10052 of the book series Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)
Cite this paper as:
Spain M., Varia M. (2016) Diversity Within the Rijndael Design Principles for Resistance to Differential Power Analysis. In: Foresti S., Persiano G. (eds) Cryptology and Network Security. CANS 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 10052. Springer, Cham

Abstract

The winner of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) competition, Rijndael, strongly resists mathematical cryptanalysis. However, side channel attacks such as differential power analysis and template attacks break many AES implementations.

We propose a cheap and effective countermeasure that exploits the diversity of algorithms consistent with Rijndael’s general design philosophy. The secrecy of the algorithm settings acts as a second key that the adversary must learn to mount popular side channel attacks. Furthermore, because they satisfy Rijndael’s security arguments, these algorithms resist cryptanalytic attacks.

Concretely, we design a 72-bit space of SubBytes variants and a 36-bit space of ShiftRows variants. We investigate the mathematical strength provided by these variants, generate them in SageMath, and study their impact on differential power analysis and template attacks against field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) by analyzing power traces from the DPA Contest v2 public dataset.

Keywords

Side channel attack Side channel countermeasure Guessing entropy Differential power analysis Template attack Hamming weight Advanced Encryption Standard Rijndael FPGA 

Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.MIT Lincoln LaboratoryLexingtonUSA
  2. 2.Boston UniversityBostonUSA