Abstract
Any definition of a concept is subject to various criteria for a good definition in the context at hand. Unless we are simply stipulating how we shall be using the word – and even then questions will arise about why we picked that word to use for this stipulation – there will be some, usually implicit, ideas of what makes for a good definition. In addition to trivial ones – such as consistency – there will be a set of problems that the definition will be used to clarify or, if possible, resolve. There will be a set of constraints – weak or strong – on how the word is currently being used. There will be a context – perhaps one of personal ethics or perhaps one of current law – in which the concept finds a place. There will be some conceptual or normative issues that will be used to assess the usefulness or correctness of the definition.
There are three concepts all of them vague. Imagine 3 solid pieces of stone. You pick them up, fit them together and now find they make a ball. What you’ve now got tells you something about the 3 shapes. Now consider you have 3 balls of, or lumps of soft mud or putty – formless. Now you put them together and mold out of them a ball.
(Wittgenstein, from Bouwsma, Wittgenstein: Conversations, 1949–1951)
The merit of any definition . . . depends upon the soundness of the theory that results; by itself, a definition cannot settle any fundamental question.
(Rawls, A Theory of Justice)
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- 1.
Shiffrin (2000).
- 2.
See Dworkin (1972). Condition one is the trickiest to capture. Clear cases include threatening, bodily compulsion, lying, withholding information that the person has a right to have, and imposing requirements or conditions. But what about the following case? A father, skeptical about the financial acumen of a child, instead of bequeathing the money directly, gives it to another child with instructions to use it in the best interests of the first child. The first child has no legal claim on the inheritance. There does not seem to be interference with the child’s liberty; nor on most conceptions the child’s autonomy. Or consider the case of a wife who hides her sleeping pills so that her potentially suicidal husband cannot use them. Her act may satisfy the second and third conditions but what about the first? Does her action limit the liberty or autonomy of her husband? The second condition is supposed to be read as distinct from acting against the consent of an agent. The agent may neither consent nor not consent. He may, for example, be unaware of what is being done to him. There is also the distinct issue of whether one acts not knowing about the consent of the person in question. Suppose the person in fact consents but this is not known to the paternalizer.
- 3.
Thaler and Sunstein (2003).
- 4.
Thaler and Sunstein (2003), 177.
- 5.
Sunstein (2002), 195.
- 6.
Clarke (2002).
- 7.
Kleinig (1983).
- 8.
Pope (2004).
- 9.
Gert and Culver (1979).
- 10.
de Marneffe (2006).
- 11.
Shiffrin (2000).
- 12.
Shiffrin (2000), 205.
- 13.
Shiffrin (2000), 207.
- 14.
For 2 and 3, “I agree with many of its opponents that paternalist doctrines and policies convey a special, generally impermissible, insult to autonomous agents” (Shiffrin 2000).
- 15.
It might be noted that in the debate as to whether or not Mill’s saying that we should not allow the enforcement of contracts for slavery was consistent with his absolutist prohibition of paternalism, some have argued that not enforcing such contracts was not for Mill paternalistic on just such grounds.
- 16.
I made a similar point many years ago in arguing that there is a good reason to impose some kind of bright clothing on hunters, not to protect them from being shot by other hunters, but to protect those who might shoot them from the damaging psychological consequences of killing another person.
- 17.
Shiffrin recognizes this: “I should note, though, that the defense of the unconscionability doctrine that I will pursue does not depend upon my particular characterization of paternalism; it could be deployed with many other characterizations in mind” (“Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation,” 212).
- 18.
This is, very roughly, the idea of when we should tolerate the burdensome, other-regarding conduct of our fellow citizens. One example would be not to discriminate between smokers and non-smokers in setting health care premiums.
- 19.
Shiffrin (2000), 212.
- 20.
Shiffrin (2000).
- 21.
Shiffrin (2000), 217.
- 22.
Shiffrin (2000). The example is an odd one because she starts by assuming the ranger has the power (right?) to refuse permission to take the path. But, then, in what sense is the decision within the hiker’s legitimate sphere of control? Shiffrin seems to think that the area of control that is being interfered with is how the hiker should treat his wife. But not every way of treating his wife is within his sphere or control. Whether he beats her, for example, is not. Maybe, how he acts to cause her great grief is also not. I elaborate on this below.
- 23.
Shiffrin (2000).
- 24.
Shiffrin (2000), 217–218. Italics mine.
- 25.
Of course, in these cases there is a descriptive core which is lacking in the case of paternalism. Paternalism does not specify means; it specifies motives plus some characterization of the effect of an action.
- 26.
These points are made in de Marneffe (2006).
- 27.
This article first appeared in Coons and Weber (2013), and is reprinted by kind permission of Cambridge University Press.
References
Clarke, S. 2002. A definition of paternalism. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 5: 81–91.
Coons, Christian, and Michael Weber (eds.). 2013. Paternalism: Theory and practice, 25–38. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
de Marneffe, P. 2006. Avoiding paternalism. Philosophy and Public Affairs 34: 68–94.
Dworkin, G. 1972. Paternalism. The Monist 56: 64–84.
Gert, B., and C.M. Culver. 1979. The justification of paternalism. Ethics 89: 199–210.
Kleinig, J. 1983. Paternalism. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Pope, T.M. 2004. Counting the Dragon’s teeth and claws: the definition of hard paternalism. Georgia State University Law Review 20: 659–722.
Shiffrin, S.V. 2000. Paternalism, unconscionability doctrine, and accommodation. Philosophy and Public Affairs 29: 205–250.
Sunstein, C.R. 2002. The laws of fear. Harvard Law Review 115: 1119–1168.
Thaler, R.H., and C.R. Sunstein. 2003. Libertarian paternalism. The American Economic Review 93: 175–179.
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Dworkin, G. (2015). Defining Paternalism. In: Schramme, T. (eds) New Perspectives on Paternalism and Health Care. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, vol 35. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17960-5_2
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