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The Commodity and its Exchange

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Market-Based Fisheries Management

Part of the book series: MARE Publication Series ((MARE,volume 16))

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Abstract

This chapter examines fishing quota as a commodity in both a conceptual perspective and through ethnographic examples. Inspired by Marx’s ideas of the commodity, use-value, exchange-value, and ground rent, the chapter combines a theoretical approach with ethnographic material. The different aspects and the value of the quota are examined through the concrete exchange of fishing rights, and it is explained why quota trade can give rise to speculation and monopolies. In the final part of the chapter, it is argued that the value of transferable fishing quotas rely on a social relation between owners and nonowners of quota, as a form of monopoly rent.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Today the money commodity most often serves the purpose of measuring value and mediating trade; but, for example, in Iceland there is the phenomenon of the cod equivalent, used to measure fishing rights against each other. Also, states such as Denmark and Norway swap quota between each other without the mediating use of money.

  2. 2.

    “The use-values of commodities provide the material for a special branch of knowledge, namely, the commercial knowledge of commodities.” (Marx 1976, p. 126)

  3. 3.

    All the names in this chapter have been altered.

  4. 4.

    Comparing two 7 year loans of 1,000,000 DKR at 2 % and 12 % interest result in annual payments of 153,000 DKR and 210,000 DKR, respectively. In total, the financial cost of the 12 % loan is in total more than 400,000 DKR higher.

  5. 5.

    http://fiskerforum.dk/debatforum/debatforum.asp?mode=viewmsg&Id=3854&ForumID = 10&Showsub = 3859 (Accessed September 15, 2012)

  6. 6.

    http://fiskerforum.dk/debatforum/debatforum.asp?mode = viewmsg&Id = 3854&ForumID = 10&Showsub = 3859 (Accessed September 15, 2012)

  7. 7.

    http://fiskerforum.dk/debatforum/debatforum.asp?mode = viewmsg&Id = 3854&ForumID = 10&Showsub = 3859 (Accessed September 15, 2012)

  8. 8.

    A few months into the new system there was an agreement between the owner and labor organizations that the lease costs could be subtracted in advance, in the same way as oil and other costs of production. In this way it is not paid as a part of the boat share like the vessel and gear.

  9. 9.

    To find the value of VQS as capital we can use the equation: leasing price/average rate of profit  = value of VQS.

References

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Correspondence to Jeppe Høst .

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Høst, J. (2015). The Commodity and its Exchange. In: Market-Based Fisheries Management. MARE Publication Series, vol 16. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16432-8_4

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