Is There a Place for Epistemic Virtues in Theory Choice?
- Milena IvanovaAffiliated withDepartment of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Sydney Email author
This paper challenges the appeal to theory virtues in theory choice as well as the appeal to the intellectual and moral virtues of an agent as determining unique choices between empirically equivalent theories. After arguing that theoretical virtues do not determine the choice of one theory at the expense of another theory, I argue that nor does the appeal to intellectual and moral virtues single out one agent, who defends a particular theory, and exclude another agent defending an alternative theory. I analyse Duhem’s concept of good sense and its recent interpretation in terms of virtue epistemology. I argue that the virtue epistemological interpretation does not show how good sense leads to conclusive choices and scientific progress.
- Is There a Place for Epistemic Virtues in Theory Choice?
- Book Title
- Virtue Epistemology Naturalized
- Book Subtitle
- Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science
- Book Part
- Part III
- pp 207-226
- Print ISBN
- Online ISBN
- Series Title
- Synthese Library
- Series Volume
- Series Subtitle
- Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science
- Springer International Publishing
- Copyright Holder
- Springer International Publishing Switzerland
- Additional Links
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