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Equilibrium Concepts for Rational Multiparty Computation

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Book cover Decision and Game Theory for Security (GameSec 2013)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 8252))

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Abstract

In this work, we build upon previous results to strengthen the equilibrium concept for rational multiparty computation. We consider only rational players, acting to maximize their utility functions. We consider extensive form dynamic games of imperfect information, using a computational variant of perfect Bayesian equilibrium as the solution concept. We argue that the perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a more appropriate solution concept for multiparty computation, as in cryptographic protocols information is often imperfect by design. Further, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept is able to address dynamic games, where players move sequentially rather than simultaneously. By considering players that move sequentially, we are able to remove the assumption of a broadcast channel. Finally, we give novel definitions of privacy, correctness and fairness solely in terms of game theoretic constructs.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Computer Science, Purdue University, USA

    John Ross Wallrabenstein & Chris Clifton

Authors
  1. John Ross Wallrabenstein
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  2. Chris Clifton
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, Missouri University of Science and Technology, 500 West 15th Street, 325B Computer Science Building, 65409, Rolla, MO, USA

    Sajal K. Das

  2. Department of Computer Science, Purdue University, LWSN 2142J, 305 N. University Street, 47907, West Lafayette, IN, USA

    Cristina Nita-Rotaru

  3. Data Seurity and Privacs Lab, University of Texas at Dallas, 800 W. Campbell Road, MS EC31, 75080, Richardson, TX, USA

    Murat Kantarcioglu

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Wallrabenstein, J.R., Clifton, C. (2013). Equilibrium Concepts for Rational Multiparty Computation. In: Das, S.K., Nita-Rotaru, C., Kantarcioglu, M. (eds) Decision and Game Theory for Security. GameSec 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8252. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-02786-9_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-02786-9_14

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-02785-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-02786-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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