Skip to main content

How Organization Explains

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:

Part of the book series: The European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings ((EPSP,volume 2))

Abstract

Constitutive mechanistic explanations explain a property of a whole with the properties of its parts and their organization. Carl Craver’s mutual manipulability criterion for constitutive relevance only captures the explanatory relevance of causal properties of parts and leaves the organization side of mechanistic explanation unaccounted for. We use the contrastive counterfactual theory of explanation and an account of the dimensions of organization to build a typology of organizational dependence. We analyse organizational explanations in terms of such dependencies and emphasize the importance of modular organizational motifs. We apply this framework to two cases from social science and systems biology, both fields in which organization plays a crucial explanatory role: agent-based simulations of residential segregation and the recent work on network motifs in transcription regulation networks.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

References

  • Alon, U. (2007). Network motifs: Theory and experimental approaches. Nature Reviews Genetics, 8(6), 450–461.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Aydinonat, E. (2008). The invisible hand in economics: How economists explain unintended social consequences. London: Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Benard, S., & Willer, R. (2007). A wealth and status-based model of residential segregation. The Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 31(2), 149–174.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Clark, W. A. V., & Fossett, M. (2008). Understanding the social context of the Schelling segregation model. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 105(11), 4109.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Craver, C. (2007). Explaining the brain: Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience. New York/Oxford: Clarendon.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Fossett, M. (2006). Ethnic preferences, social distance dynamics, and residential segregation: Theoretical explorations using simulation analysis. The Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 30(3–4), 185–273.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fossett, M., & Warren, W. (2005). Overlooked implications of ethnic preferences for residential segregation in agent-based models. Urban Studies, 42, 1893–1917.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Glennan, S. (2002). Rethinking mechanistic explanation. Philosophy of Science, 69, S342–S353.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hedström, P., & Ylikoski, P. (2010). Causal mechanisms in the social sciences. Annual Review of Sociology, 36, 49–67.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Keil, F. C. (2003). Folkscience: Coarse interpretations of a complex reality. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7, 368–373.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mangan, S., & Alon, U. (2003). Structure and function of the feed-forward loop network motif. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 100(21), 11980–11985.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schelling, T. C. (1971). Dynamic models of segregation. Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 1, 143–186.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schelling, T. C. (1978). Micromotives and macrobehavior. London/New York: W. W. Norton.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vinković, D., & Kirman, A. (2006). A physical analogue of the Schelling model. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 103(51), 19261–19265.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Watts, D. J. (2004). The “new” science of networks. Annual Review of Sociology, 30(1), 243–270.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wimsatt, W. (2007). Re-engineering philosophy for limited beings: Piecewise approximations to reality. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Woodward, J. (2003). Making things happen: A theory of causal explanation. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ylikoski, P. (2009). The illusion of depth of understanding in science. In H. De Regt, S. Leonelli, & K. Eigner (Eds.), Scientific understanding: Philosophical perspectives (pp.100–119). Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ylikoski, P., & Kuorikoski, J. (2010). Dissecting explanatory power. Philosophical Studies, 148, 201–219.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgement

We thank Caterina Marchionni and the audience at EPSA 2011 for their valuable comments. This research has been financially supported by the Academy of Finland.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jaakko Kuorikoski .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2013 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this paper

Cite this paper

Kuorikoski, J., Ylikoski, P. (2013). How Organization Explains. In: Karakostas, V., Dieks, D. (eds) EPSA11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science. The European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings, vol 2. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01306-0_6

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics