Abstract
Norms for behaviour are a well-known instrument for coordinating economic interaction. The literature on this topic indicates that economics and ethics are strongly intertwined. The chapter starts by observing that the ethics concerning the relationships between individuals and between citizens and the government are changing. One part of the citizenry becomes increasingly keen on claiming its ‘rights’. However, this undermines the cooperative attitude of the other part of the citizenry. Since the claimants’ lifestyle produces negative external effects, a coordination problem between socio-economic groups in society is likely to result. Will the civil society remain? In this chapter, we present a game theoretic model which illustrates the behaviour of both groups. Intragroup interaction and cultural transmission provide mechanisms by which an evolutionary development of behavioural strategies can take place. The model shows that the civil society is an equilibrium outcome, but its stability hinges upon the attractiveness of cooperation and the degree of segmentation of the population.
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© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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van de Klundert, T., van der Lecq, F. (2001). The Civil Society: Can It Last?. In: Kuper, G.H., Sterken, E., Wester, E. (eds) Coordination and Growth. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-1549-4_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-1549-4_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
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