Abstract
This chapter starts by describing two methods for elections when more than one candidate is to be elected: the generalized Hare method and approval voting. Then two methods of manipulating the vote are discussed. First is strategic voting, where voters might vote for their second favorite candidate to ensure that their least favorite candidate is not elected (called an insincere ballot); second is the introduction of amendments to change the final outcome. We close with an example of how different methods, even though they are fair, may give different results.
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© 2013 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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Wallis, W.D. (2013). More on Voting. In: Mathematics in the Real World. Birkhäuser, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-8529-2_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-8529-2_13
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Publisher Name: Birkhäuser, New York, NY
Print ISBN: 978-1-4614-8528-5
Online ISBN: 978-1-4614-8529-2
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