Abstract
James Buchanan is best known for his work that established the foundations for the development of public choice. This characterization of his work is in one sense too broad and in another too narrow. Buchanan’s work consistently takes an institutional approach to economic activity, analyzing the institutional framework within which people interact, whether that interaction is through market exchange or through a collective decision-making process. Buchanan’s focus is on the process of exchange and the environment within which exchanges take place. His work in public choice has emphasized the constitutional framework within which collective action takes place, analyzing how institutions affect the results of collective action. Buchanan’s focus is considerably narrower than the broad body of work within the field of public choice. An examination of his work over his career suggests that he might be best characterized as an institutional economist who has focused on constitutional issues.
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Notes
- 1.
This statement is taken from www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1986, “the official Web site of the Nobel Prize.”
- 2.
The reference to Wicksell (1967) is Buchanan’s translation of Wicksell’s 1986 essay that originally appeared in German.
- 3.
- 4.
Along these lines, see Williamson (1990) who places public choice as one of the branches of institutional economics.
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Holcombe, R.G. (2013). Institutions and Constitutions: The Economic World of James M. Buchanan. In: Lee, D. (eds) Public Choice, Past and Present. Studies in Public Choice, vol 28. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5909-5_2
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