Abstract
The concept of safety integrity levels is well established and for many safety critical systems SIL 4 is demanded by default. The problem with SIL 4 is that it is impossible to prove and the demand is often not justified. A devil’s advocate view is adopted and a number of questions related to demanding SIL 4 are asked and the problems to be addressed when answering them are discussed
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References
CENELEC (2003) Railway applications - Communication, signalling and processing systems Safety related electronic systems for signalling. EN 50129. CENELEC, Brussels, Belgium
IEC (1998) Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems. IEC 61508. International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva, Switzerland
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© 2012 Springer-Verlag London Limited
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Nordland, O. (2012). A Devil’s Advocate on SIL 4. In: Dale, C., Anderson, T. (eds) Achieving Systems Safety. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-2494-8_20
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-2494-8_20
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Publisher Name: Springer, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-4471-2493-1
Online ISBN: 978-1-4471-2494-8
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