Abstract
Three broad positions on the Psychology–religion relationship were in place by the early 1960s.
-
1.
The validity of religious beliefs and the meanings of religious experiences are, as such, beyond Psychology’s remit. Psychology’s role is empirically to explore the ‘psychological laws’ which determine (perhaps too strong a word) the likelihood of a person becoming religious, the varieties of types of religious belief and their relationships to personality and motivation, the growth of religious belief in the child and the effects of variables such as age and social class on religious belief, and religious pathologies. Such explorations are of equal potential value to both believers and sceptics. The opening chapter, ‘Psychology and Religion’ of Michael Argyle’s Religious Behaviour (1958) is an excellent example of this. The key feature of this position, as I see it, is that religion is not held to be about psychological matters but about the nature of the universe and humanity’s place within and relationship to it. The psychological aspects of religion are thus akin to that of the perceptual process in relation to the external world—the psychologist of perception makes no claims at expertise regarding that world itself, only about the psychological processes by which it is known. Argyle’s position is, in effect, a slightly more sophisticated version of the ‘facts’ versus ‘values’ distinction widely invoked during the 1920s and 1930s to facilitate peaceful co-existence between the camps.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
See for example, E. Becker (1975), D. D. Browning (1986), H. Fingarette (1962), S. Hiltner (1972), P. Homans (ed.) (1968), and P. W. Pruyser (1968, 1974).
- 2.
See Chapters 5 (on Macmurray) and 6 (on Brown).
- 3.
As does ‘Personalism’, which, while a philosophical position, has been strongly espoused by man religious thinkers (see Chapter 8).
- 4.
Confronting and dealing with death (Tillich’s first ‘anxiety’, as we saw in Chapter 5) is the point at which the mythos function becomes most intense, it is interesting therefore that H. Vande Kemp (1999) found that ‘95% or more of the literature came from medical/nursing or pastoral/theological sources, and psychology had virtually nothing to say’ (H.Vande Kemp, pers.comm.).
- 5.
And I spot that the Franciscan order held a symposium of essays published as: Claude L. Vogel (ed.) (1932) Psychology and the Franciscan School: A Symposium of Essays (P & E 26).
- 6.
Pers.comm.
- 7.
Richards (1995) ‘“To know our fellow men to do them good”: American Psychology’s continuing moral project’.
- 8.
I only became aware of Fuller’s work (which includes a number of related uncited publications) too late in the day to fully assimilate into the bulk of the present work. His focus is naturally restricted to the North American scene, but on the face of it, we do appear to be on much the same wavelength.
- 9.
This is related to, but distinct from, the now standard Critical Psychology mantra that western Psychology is premised on a culturally specific notion of the autonomous ahistorical individual as the discipline’s ‘natural’ subject. While sympathetic, I feel that this has become something of a cliché which itself requires some critical attention. Whatever, the present point implies that ‘individualism’ is only part of the problem, being underlain by more longstanding religious-based cultural assumptions.
- 10.
The Wikipedia entry says this is about the crucifixion of Jesus, but this is a quite unwarranted projection without any internal evidence. If anything, it is about his own crucifixion.
- 11.
Definitely ‘influenzy’, not, as one on-line version has ‘influenza’.
- 12.
1959 BBC Face to Face interview with John Freeman; I am quoting from memory. The interview was published in The Listener, March 19th 1959.
- 13.
I am tempted here into a digression, relating back to the Blind Willie Johnson case, on the genuinely profound nature of traditional African–American evangelical Christianity. I have to resist, other than to insist that, far from the patronising white (especially European) stereotypical image of it being the happy, simple, emotional exuberance of uneducated ‘Negroes’ with lovely voices and a good sense of rhythm, it embodies the very essence of ‘religion’ as being described here, of which Johnson may be seen as the epicentre. It supplied the resources for African American collective and individual survival and, later, for their cultural and political energisation in the Civil Rights campaign and beyond. It is our intuitive sense of this profundity (whatever our ethnicity) which has given its musical expressions such universal appeal. Nor is it incidental that when the Christian light failed for them, radical urban African Americans turned to Islam. A full, insider’s, examination of the historical and psychological roles of religion for African Americans is urgently needed.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2011 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Richards, G. (2011). Conclusions, Hypotheses, Suggestions and a Stab at a Personal ‘Position Statement’. In: Psychology, Religion, and the Nature of the Soul. Library of the History of Psychological Theories. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-7173-9_13
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-7173-9_13
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY
Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-7172-2
Online ISBN: 978-1-4419-7173-9
eBook Packages: Behavioral ScienceBehavioral Science and Psychology (R0)