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Handbook of the Sociology of Morality pp 315–330Cite as

The Trouble with Invisible Men

How Reputational Concerns Motivate Generosity

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Abstract

Traditionally, research on the causes of prosocial behavior – acts that benefit others, often at a cost to the self – has focused on the role of either material incentives or altruistic motivations in fostering generosity. Here, we review research on a third class of explanation based on reputation. In recent years, research on the interplay between prosocial behavior and reputation has drawn the attention of researchers from disciplines as diverse as economics, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and biology, along the way establishing complex, reciprocal links between reputational standing and generosity. Here, we review some promising strains of research in this area, focusing on the dynamics of reputational gain as a reward encouraging prosociality, how reputation systems are maintained in groups, and evolutionary models relating reputation and prosocial behavior. This review establishes that (1) individuals receive diverse social and material benefits for developing a reputation as a generous person, (2) these rewards for prosocial behavior influence decisions to behave prosocially in at least two theoretically distinct ways, (3) reputational differentiation, in terms of status, structures contributions to group efforts in ways that can make groups more productive, (4) reputations are critical to the maintenance of informal, social sanctioning systems, (5) reputation systems are maintained in part because individuals spontaneously share information on others’ past levels of prosocial behavior, and (6) reputational dynamics may have encouraged the evolution of prosociality via biological and/or cultural evolution.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Consistent with convention in the social sciences (Dovidio et al. 2006), we define “altruism” as the psychological motivation to increase another’s welfare, even at a cost to self, while “generosity” and “prosocial behavior” refer to actions that benefit others.

  2. 2.

    See Nowak (2006) for a review.

  3. 3.

    Klosterman observes for example, that throughout his novel, Wells “seems maniacally preoccupied with illustrating how the invisible man was an asshole” (2009).

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Acknowledgment

Robb Willer and Brent Simpson wish to acknowledge support from the National Science Foundation (SES 0647169).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA

    Robb Willer & Michael Schultz

  2. Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA

    Matthew Feinberg

  3. Department of Sociology, Baylor University, Waco, TX, USA

    Kyle Irwin

  4. Department of Sociology, University of South Carolina, Berkeley, CA, USA

    Brent Simpson

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  1. Robb Willer
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  2. Matthew Feinberg
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  3. Kyle Irwin
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  4. Michael Schultz
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Correspondence to Robb Willer .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. Sociology, University of Iowa, Seashore Hall W. 124, Iowa City, 52242-1401, Iowa, USA

    Steven Hitlin

  2. , Department of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley, Barrows Hall #1980 410, Berkeley, 94720, USA

    Stephen Vaisey

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Willer, R., Feinberg, M., Irwin, K., Schultz, M., Simpson, B. (2010). The Trouble with Invisible Men. In: Hitlin, S., Vaisey, S. (eds) Handbook of the Sociology of Morality. Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-6896-8_17

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