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Introduction to Game Theory

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Book cover Linear Programming and Generalizations

Part of the book series: International Series in Operations Research & Management Science ((ISOR,volume 149))

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Abstract

Prior chapters of this book have been focused on the search by a single decision maker (individual or firm) for a strategy whose net benefit is largest, equivalently, whose net cost is smallest.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This usage of “stable” is not uniformly agreed upon. Some writers have used “strong equilibrium” instead, but that usage never caught on. Other writers describe a set of outcomes (rather than strategies) as stable if no group of participants can all get outcomes they prefer by changing their strategies simultaneously.

  2. 2.

    In the literature on economics, what we are calling an equilibrium is sometimes referred to as a Nash equilibrium; this distinguishes it from a general equilibrium, this being a Nash equilibrium in which the “market clears.”

  3. 3.

    Vickery, William, “Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders,” Journal of Finance, V. 16, pp 8-37, 1961.

  4. 4.

    D. Gale and L. Shapley, “College admissions and the stability of marriage,” American Mathematical Monthly, V. 69, pp 9-15, 1962.

  5. 5.

    Roth, Alvin E. and Oliveira Sotomayor, Two-sided matching: a study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, 1990.

  6. 6.

    George B. Dantzig, “Linear Programming,” Operations Research

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Correspondence to Eric V. Denardo .

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© 2011 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC

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Denardo, E.V. (2011). Introduction to Game Theory. In: Linear Programming and Generalizations. International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, vol 149. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-6491-5_14

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