Abstract
This chapter discusses the framework for ocean governance that emphasises coordination, cooperation and collaboration at the national, regional and international levels. This chapter underscores the importance of regional cooperation and maritime regimes for ocean governance in the Indian Ocean as a region.
Keywords
- Exclusive Economic Zone
- Integrate Coastal Zone Management
- Small Island Develop State
- Maritime Safety
- Maritime Security
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
This chapter discusses the framework for ocean governance that emphasises coordination, cooperation and collaboration at the national, regional and international levels. This chapter underscores the importance of regional cooperation and maritime regimes for ocean governance in the Indian Ocean as a region.
1 Emergence of the New Legal Regime for the Oceans
In the twenty-first century, the oceans remain significant to humanity and increasingly require separate consideration in international relations. The dramatic change over time of ocean usage has, however, altered the highly permissive “freedom of the high seas” regime to a new form of ocean governance centred on “control and regulation”. In a world that has become more interdependent, this new regime for the oceans is embodied in the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) adopted by the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982 and entered into force in 1994, possibly the most significant but least recognised legal instrument of the twentieth century.
The new legal regime for the oceans assumes that the problems of the ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole, where all nations will cooperate in the management of the oceans. LOSC in one stroke evolved into hard law from soft law.1 It consolidated all past treaties, codified customary law and put in place new law for new issues.2 It was a global agreement because for the first time even land-locked states were addressed in maritime affairs.3
Historically, in international relations, nation-states act in pursuit of national interests and seldom from collective international good. Territoriality reigns supreme. Looking through the national security lens, it is about what serves the essentially territorial nation-state best.
Primarily, national interest is to do with gaining political leadership, military supremacy and/or economic advantage in the international arena. Nation-states in pursuing their national interests act alone (national identity) in relation to other countries or in concert (group identity) in relation to other group of countries. To achieve ascendancy in their relations with one another, nation-states have even established societal boundaries that separate race, nations and regions.4
In the last two decades, the significant change in perception about the abundance and resilience of the environment introduced a new dimension in the study and practice of international relations. In stark contrast to any other dimension of international relations, the environment seeks nation-states to act at the international level for the collective good of all mankind.
Yet, in the oceans, for example, nation-states have acted more to protect individual interests than to protect the marine environment as the common heritage of mankind.
2 Regime Change in the Oceans
This section draws on Keohane and Nye’s work on the international regime change in the oceans.5 Keohane and Nye use theories other than traditional theories in international relations. In the current environment, interdependent relationships to deal with non-military dimensions of security now characterise international relations alongside the traditional maxim that nation-states interact in pursuit of their national interests.6 It is worth noting that interdependence does not automatically spell mutual benefits. Invariably, it will also involve costs and the terms of mutual dependence need not be evenly balanced.7
The reciprocal effects of interdependence revolves around the question of “who gets what” even in situations where nation-states recognise that they cannot act alone.8 Individual nation-state’s power to affect outcomes in interdependent relationships depends on their own sensitivity and even more on their own vulnerability in the event of policy change.9 In essence, there is a web of complex interdependence that depends on what gets securitised as the referent object, who is the securitising actor, and who are the functional actors.10
Contemporary ocean policy is illustrative of the three aspects that characterise complex interdependence.11 First, multiple channels connect nation-states. Second, there are multiple issues. These are closely interrelated at multiple levels across a multiplicity of stakeholders and lack coordination with no clear hierarchy among issues. Third, nation-states in a region are less inclined to use naval force against one another and are more willing to use collective naval forces to deal with issues that affect the interdependent relationship.
Over the past two decades, ocean politics has moved even closer to complex interdependence than when it was first studied by Keohane and Nye in the 1970s. True to Keohane and Nye’s assessment, the different conditions in international relations have increased the range of foreign policy choices available to nation-states.
More specifically, multiple channels of contact could provide effective policy coordination overcoming some inherent pitfalls of nongovernmental influence on policymakers. On a more general level, policy coordination for the future requires nation-states to act from “long foresight and a prescribed system” than from seeking short-term goals. On this last point, if major nation-states are willing to exercise “multiple leadership” and assume special obligations, then a way could be paved for regional orders.
A necessary condition for a successful international regime in the oceans is that the interests of domestic special groups within the major nation-states must be addressed as also the make-up of power among those nation-states.
3 Importance of Oceans
Oceans, regarded as the “last frontier” on earth, shall decisively influence world geopolitics, globalisation, socio-economic balance and life on earth. From a historical perspective the importance of the oceans has evolved, over the last 500 years.
Today, 82% of all nations border the world’s oceans or seas. Of these, some 40 nations (30%) are islands.12 The world’s oceans have afforded the human populace freedom to explore and acquire natural resources and wealth distributed over 29% of the land. With 70.92% of the earth’s surface covered by water, the oceans encompass not only two thirds of the world surface but could well impact the lives of three quarters of the world’s population by 2030.13
The ocean of “all” life on earth (oceans as the cornerstones of life) has remained a vast frontier whose mysterious depths, abundant life and influence on earth have yet to be fully explored and understood.14 The ocean space represents a unique socio-cultural entity that offers fresh air, natural light and breath-taking long-range views of landscapes and seascapes that have provided a distinct culture and way of life for centuries. Nearly 60% of the world population lives within 60 km of the coast at a density twice the global average.15
An insight into the traditional expanse of the high seas is useful in understanding the impact of the new legal regime in the use of ocean space. It is well established that the world’s largest expanse of common international spaces—the high seas—traditionally nearly encompassed the vast majority of the world ocean with the exception of a narrow coastal band of territorial sea (generally 3 nm). The history of the law of the sea, however, is a narration of the struggles for and against the doctrine of the freedom of the seas. J. Verzijl states, “historical research clearly proves that freedom has no static content a priori, but is subject to continuous, at times even violent, changes”.16 For example, Spain and Portugal through a series of papal bulls and the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494 went on to divide all of the oceans in the Southern Hemisphere.17
Until 1958, the high seas were viewed as all parts of the sea not included in the territorial sea or the internal waters of a state.18 In 1782, the Italian jurist Galiani suggested for the purposes of neutrality the breadth of territorial waters as a maritime belt coterminous with a “cannon shot”.19 In 1793, during the war between England and France, U.S. Secretary of State Jefferson equated the range of a cannon ball to one sea league or 3 nm.20 In the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act of 1878, Great Britain formalised measurement as a result of three decisions by Lord Stowell between 1800 and 1805.21 Ever since, various nations states have submitted proposals that have varied from 3 to 200 nm.22
LOSC marked a historically important shift in the balance between “control and regulation” and “freedom of the high seas”. Under Article 86 of LOSC, the high seas came to be defined as “all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a state, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic state”. The 200 nm EEZ now spatially under national jurisdiction of the coastal states amounts to nearly 41% of the world’s ocean space.23
The freedoms making up the “freedom of the high seas,” which by the end of nineteenth century had come to be established as a fundamental principle of international law, were now subjected to varying control and regulation.24 Although the fundamental high seas freedoms, especially the crucial navigational/communications related rights, were retained within EEZs, this was crucial to the balancing act achieved through LOSC. The new legal regime for the oceans had established zones of maritime jurisdiction and specified rights and responsibilities for all states including landlocked states.
The maritime zones that define the oceanic realm cover a geographic area where both the land and the water interact through the dynamics of natural processes. The boundary of these maritime zones encloses a space, which extends from the ocean across the land–water interface to an inland limit. It is difficult defining such an all-embracing area in terms of physical or administrative boundaries. Figure 2.1 is illustrative of the possible limits to defining the geographic extent of the maritime zones. Ideally, the inland limit must encompass all activities that have a direct impact on the oceans. The concept of the Exclusive Economic Zone has transformed the status of the coastal waters out to the 200 nm limit, and ideally the seaward limit of national jurisdiction must extend up to 200 nm.25
The economic use of ocean space can be classified into a number of basic categories that reflect the fundamental human activities involved (Fig. 2.2). The ocean space is a region of simultaneous and continually increasing land and sea-based economic activity. With each activity competing for the same space, a typical conflict of interest exists among different economic user groups.26
The range of international agreements dealing with different aspects in the ocean realm has contributed to international norm-setting for ocean governance, but implementation at the national and regional levels continues to be a challenge. The problems include the following: legislation and policy have been sectorally based and uncoordinated; inappropriate and isolated sectoral planning decisions have often worked against long-term interests; rigid bureaucratic systems have limited local creativity and adaptability; local initiatives have lacked adequate resources and support from higher administrative levels; management has lacked vision and has been based on a very limited understanding of ocean processes; and scientific research and data have been isolated from end-users.27
Many of the marine scientific research and maritime safety and maritime security issues are beyond the capacity of individual states to tackle alone. Growing dependency on ocean use for food security has the potential for conflict among and within nation-states. In addition, growth in the intensity of ocean use is impinging on the carrying capacity of the marine environment.
4 Changing Maritime Dimensions
In this new “ocean regime” of interdependence the centre of political gravity has unendingly shifted from land to oceans, but knowledge and understanding of the oceans is fragmented and specialised. The triad of factors in geopolitics: end of the Cold War, globalisation and governance standards28; security: beyond individual states, empowerment of transnational actors, interdependence of security29; development: trade, aid, security30; maritime environment: new law of the sea, growing dependence on oceans, growth in sea denial capabilities31; balance: growth, efficiency, sustainability32; and Agenda 21: economic, social and environmental sustainable development, together provide an understanding of the need to look at issues from the ocean towards land rather than take a land-centric view of things.
First, from a security perspective the end of the Cold War has brought non-traditional maritime security challenges—environmental degradation, resource scarcity, transnational crime, piracy, drug trafficking, illegal immigration and terrorism—into greater prominence. It also eroded the bipolar model of international relations, bringing an increased opportunity to address global problems with a growing acceptance of a wider concept of peace and security.
Many of the issues are beyond the capacity of individual states to tackle alone, although tough, independent measures can be taken to reduce these states, vulnerability to certain threats. From 1984 to June 2002, 2,678 incidents of piracy and armed attack were reported to the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Two hundred and seventy-six incidents of migrant smuggling, involving 12,426 migrants, were reported to IMO from the end of 2000 to 30 April 2002.33
The empowerment of transnational non-state actors necessitates international cooperation to deny them access to sanctuaries, weaponry, finances and other resources. Consequently, despite the growth in sea denial capability of a number of nations there is increasing interdependence for maritime security.
Second, from an economic perspective the breaking down of economic boundaries, globalisation and aid for eliminating poverty has had a significant impact on governance and security. Trade, aid and security are mutually supportive in theory. Trade leading to growth in economic and social exchange between groups, combined with international standards of governance to preserve peace and balanced by transfer of payments, should lead to more harmonious and equitable societies.
The reality is that globalisation of weakly governed markets coupled with misuse of international development assistance and aggressive promotion of unbalanced trade is straining traditional international and national mechanisms for preserving peace.
Third, from a social perspective there is growing dependency on ocean use for resource and transit of goods by all nations leading to unplanned development and decline of traditional sectors. Uncontrolled development in the port and tourism or other sectors destroys the cultural heritage and dilutes the social fabric of the coastal population.
The carrying capacity of the coastal zone is increasingly being exceeded, thereby polluting and degrading the natural resources, destroying the landscapes and reducing the quality of life for the coastal populace.34 Ocean pollution is estimated to cause some 250 million cases of gastroenteritis and upper respiratory disease every year, costing societies worldwide about $1.6 billion a year.35 The consumption of uncooked sewage-contaminated shellfish causes some 2.5 million cases of infectious hepatitis each year, at a cost of approximately $10 billion annually.36 Added to that the decline of traditional sectors like inland fisheries, struggling to remain competitive, is leading to unemployment, emigration and social instability. The capacity to accommodate has steadily eroded and conflicts among competing uses have become common place.
Fourth, from a technological perspective accelerated growth in science and technology has led to the discovery of new uses and the potential to exploit them. For instance, new advances in technology have allowed humankind to go further offshore and deeper into the oceans. Life on the seabed, which was once thought of as existing only in the shallow waters of the continental shelf, has now been found at depths of more than 4,000 ft.37 At the same time, advances in science and technology has also added to the vulnerability of the oceans. For example, increasing trade is making demands for a more efficient cargo transport. The development of faster and larger ships with zero tolerance for negative environment impacts such as emissions, discharges of bilge water and tank washings and introduction of harmful alien species into new environments through ship ballast water is placing enormous pressure on the marine environment.
Fifth, from a legal perspective the new law of the sea has not only increased the demand for uses of the oceans but promises to alter radically the traditional freedom of access enjoyed by maritime powers in the past. Now, more than one third of the world’s oceans fall within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of coastal states. The 200 nm EEZ gives coastal states exclusive rights with respect to natural resources and other economic activities and the right to exercise jurisdiction over marine scientific research and environmental protection. The economic significance of EEZs is evident from the fact that 90% of the world fish stocks were within national jurisdictions.38 Further, the high seas, representing nearly 60% of the earth’s surface, are beyond national jurisdiction and the International Seabed Authority is now vested with the control of high seas seabed and resources.
Sixth, from an environmental perspective the balance between human life and the environment, which as assumed international dimensions since the 1970s, has come to be recognised as the one of the pillars of sustainable development. Growth in the intensity of ocean use is impinging on the carrying capacity and levels of sustainable use of the marine environment.
The ocean has served as humanity’s preferred dumping ground. This has involved the dumping of waste; disposal of industrial, space and military debris; flow of runoffs laden with toxic pollutants; and the pumping of dirty oil bilges.39 The ocean is now in a state of crisis and can no longer exist in isolation from activities on land. Land-based sources are responsible for 80% of the pollution while dumping of wastes and other matter account for 10% of pollutants affecting most of the productive areas in the marine environment.40
In addition, to the problems of large-scale urbanisation and overuse of pristine natural habitats are other negative impacts on coastal communities such as climate change and global warming. Changes in climatic conditions are perceived to be the reason behind the frequent devastating storms, cyclones and hurricanes as well as causing erratic hot and cold weather conditions and variations in monsoons.
The United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea (UN/DOALOS) 2002 report estimates that approximately 27% of coral reefs are at a high risk of degradation due to direct human impact and the effects of climate change.41 Scientific studies predict that a further 50–60% of the world’s coral reefs may be destroyed within the next 30 years unless urgent measures are taken.42
Another impact of climate change is the rise in sea levels, which threatens the very survival of some countries, such as some Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and low-lying coastal states. It is estimated that the average global sea level has risen 10–25 cm over the past 100 years. Different projections indicate that sea levels will rise another 15–95 cm by 2100 or at the minimum 18–59 cm.43
Seventh, from a resource perspective, the removal of millions of tons of wildlife has led to the collapse of dozens of species once thought of as inexhaustible populations of ocean life with implications for food security.44 Every year, almost 90 million tons of fish are captured globally, providing by far the largest source of wild protein for human consumption.45 According to the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) projections for 2010 world fisheries production is likely to range between 107 and 144 million tons.46
Finally, from a political perspective, effective forms of ocean governance have been rendered more complex by the increased number of nation-states and their differing interpretations of the Law of the Sea. The major maritime powers benefit from the current arrangements or from the absence of them. This is even more so when traditional negotiating blocks—such as disarmament, development, trade and investment—are much less in evidence in the case of the oceans.
Further, the economic ideology of nations is placing heavy reliance on the market and role of private enterprise, and therefore some nations are not receptive to regulatory mechanisms for the oceans. The absence of regulatory mechanisms has led to the abuse of oceans. Growing awareness of the problems of the oceans has not yet permeated to individual behaviour. Nations left to their own devices are unable to dispense answers to questions relating to peace, security, equity and the environment. As a consequence, the decision-making imposed by the complexity of the issue and the realisation that our “Knowledge” to effectively take account of the multidisciplinary and interdependent issues is still inadequate.
These changes in maritime dimension point towards increasing interdependence for addressing maritime issues where traditional international and national mechanisms are strained in implementing maritime regimes. The law of the sea promises to alter radically the traditional freedom of access, as individual nations are unable to cope with matters of ocean governance.
5 Regime for Ocean Governance “History in the Making”
By the 1970s, just when the world was beginning to fathom the significance of the ocean for survival of life on earth, the very nature of the ocean, which barely half a century ago was the “Sea of Eden,” began to dramatically change. It became evident that there was a need to overcome the plethora of claims by coastal states, preserve the freedom of navigation, conserve and optimally utilise the resources at sea, protect and preserve the marine environment and use the sea on a basis of “equitable apportionment” so as to take into account the interests of mankind as a whole.47 Table 2.1 summarises membership of the Indian Ocean states in various special interest groups and their common interests during negotiations on the new ocean governance regime.
The emergence of ocean governance had several catalysts. In 1967, Arvid Pardo, President of Malta, coined the phrase “Common Heritage of Mankind” in highlighting the inadequacies of the current international law on the oceans. There was growing recognition in developed nations of coastal degradation due to inappropriate development and poor planning. Globally, it had become evident that there was a need to conserve and optimally utilise the resources, protect and preserve the marine environment and coordinate activities within the United Nation (UN) system.48 The 1972 UN Stockholm conference on the human environment represented the first effort by the international community to deal with environmental problems on a comprehensive basis by creating the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP).49
The 1982 third UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provided a comprehensive framework for governance of the oceans. The 200 nm limit EEZ placed 41% of the oceans under national jurisdiction for conservation of the marine ecosystem and optimum utilisation of resources.50 This is consistent with the goals formulated in Garret Hardin’s “The Tragedy of Commons” because UNCLOS has been able to resolve some important jurisdictional questions by creating forms of enclosure as recommended by Hardin.51 The 1987 World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) report “Our Common Future” states “looking into the next century, the commission is convinced that sustainable development if not survival itself depends upon significant advances in the management of the oceans”.52 The 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development by underlying the need for interdependence and integration developed the basis for ocean governance.
The 1990s saw the emergence of international guidelines on the concepts through Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OCED) in 1991, World Bank and International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) in 1993, World Coast Conference report in 1994 and United Nation Environment Programme (UNEP) in 1995.
6 Defining Ocean Governance
Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 identifies ocean governance—sustainable development and integrated management—as one of the essential components of the global life-support system.
Cicin-Sain and Knecht summarise sustainable development to mean: economic development to improve the quality of life of people; environmentally appropriate development; and equitable development in terms of inter-societal, intergenerational and international equity.54 Integrated Management combines the land and adjoining water in a single-unified framework.55 According to Cicin-Sain and Knecht the variety of terms used internationally such as Integrated Coastal Management (ICM), Integrated Coastal Area Management (ICAM), Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) or even Integrated Marine and Coastal Area Management (IMCAM) all refer to the same concept.
The modern-day ocean space has been segregated into two realms: namely, coastal ocean subject to a variety national jurisdictional levels and open ocean subject to international jurisdiction. Moreover, the open ocean has been vertically subdivided into the water column having the status of “freedom of the high seas” and the seabed claimed as the common heritage of mankind.
In the management of coastal and open oceans, recent political science literature has tended to replace the word “management” with that of “governance” to focus on the ocean as a system that needs to be considered as a whole.56 Keohane and Nye define governance as “the processes and institutions, both formal and informal that guide and restrain the collective activities of a group”.57
In this book, ocean governance embodies the call made by Brundtland in Our Common Future: “We live in an era in the history of nations where there is greater need than ever for coordinated political action and responsibility”.58
A review of 142 case studies determined that nations have generally followed a similar process from concept to practice, beginning with an initial awareness stage and culminating in programme implementation and evaluation.59 However, the initiatives to manage human activities in this area show weaknesses: jurisdictional gaps and overlaps, lack of interagency communication and coordination, competition for scarce management resources, and inter-agency and intergovernmental conflicts.60 The priority should be to create a framework that has the mandate, human and financial resources and the political will to put into practice the concept of integrated management.61
There appears to be growing consensus on the outlines of a general model for ocean governance. Contributions in this regard all stress the dynamic nature of the ocean realm with an emphasis on integration.62 The EC Demonstration Programme summarises these works to define ocean governance as a dynamic, continuous and iterative process designed to promote sustainable development of the maritime zone. Sustainable development as seen over the long term is based on the inherent interdependent principle of economic well-being, social justice and environmental quality.
Based on these works, ocean governance can be said to take into account: spatial integration or the need to consider the challenges of the ocean space as a whole; temporal integration or coherence between long-term vision, medium-term targets and short-term action; stakeholder integration or promoting genuine collaboration among stakeholders at the national, regional, inter-regional and international levels so that there is a cooperative approach to problem-solving as the problems are too complex to be resolved by an one group acting alone; sectoral integration or developing horizontal linkages across sectors so that there is a coordinated approach to economic development; and institutional integration or hierarchical linkages so that there is a convergence in policy, development efforts and governance at national, regional, inter-regional and international levels.
7 Pressures of Ocean Governance
To achieve sustainability in the new millennium, the first step is to bring all users and uses in the ocean realm under some type of management.63 The management of the ocean realm is multidisciplinary in nature, balancing economic activity, social equity, environmental quality and maritime safety and security.
Among the pressures are expanding economic activities such as renewable energy, coastal tourism, marine leisure, aquaculture, transportation, communication and fishing. This has resulted in social instability due to growing coastal population and loss of traditional employment alongside environmental concerns of increased pollution and habitat degradation. There are added pressures of disturbances in the sediment transport mechanisms causing coastal erosion and climate change causing natural disasters and sea-level rise. These pressures make the ocean realm a dynamic and complex system for management.64
The issues need to be resolved by concerted action of all stakeholders with an interest in maritime activities. Over the last two decades a body of work has emerged on the lessons learned and best practice guidelines. The challenges faced were similar in developed and developing nations.65
To begin with, the fundamental goals were similar in that they addressed the need to balance intensifying human activities with the changes that the activities bring in the quality of the maritime zone.66 Resource degradation, nature destruction and multiple use conflicts were invariably the precondition for consideration of ocean governance in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Greece, Australia, Sweden, Ecuador, Sri Lanka, Philippines and Thailand.67 Management programmes emphasised integration across scales of time and space, active participation of stakeholders and an incremental iterative approach to problem-solving. There appeared widespread inability to implement the strategy as an integrated whole.
8 Indicators of Ocean Governance
A case study of 22 nations by Cicin-Sain and Knecht suggests that the difference between developed and developing nations lies only in the prevailing economy and the resultant pace of system change.68
Taking the findings of Cicin-Sain and Knecht, and Olsen and Christie among the cross-section of developed and developing nations into consideration,69 the lessons learned from the EU Demonstration Programme 1997–1999 serve as good indicators for ocean governance initiatives at the national and regional level. Each of the indicators builds on the other indicators to repeatedly stress the importance for all levels to be involved in their own capacity and sphere of competence. A case in point is that local-level ocean governance activity will not be effective where there is a policy vacuum at higher national, regional and international levels.70 The EC programme based on 35 projects suggests that all successful initiatives require seven components:
-
1.
Taking a wide-ranging perspective. Both human and physical processes link the land and water components. At the same time, the administrative boundaries do not generally coincide with the natural and social system boundaries. Together, with the geographic scale and extent, the maritime zone represents a complex zone for governance. Significant interrelated influences necessitate concurrently considering the hydrological, geomorphological, socio-economic, administrative, institutional and cultural systems in their entirety.
-
2.
Building on an understanding of specific conditions in the area of interest. The initiative must be rooted in a thorough understanding of the local circumstances. Diverse conditions in the physical, social, cultural, economic and institutional characteristics of the area require adopting a site-specific context. Although a generic institutional framework can be developed at the regional and national levels, the characteristics outlined require developing an understanding of the area in question. This allows an appreciation of the pressures and driving forces that are influencing the dynamics of the maritime zone.
-
3.
Working with natural processes. Ocean governance initiatives should be based on an understanding of the natural processes and dynamics of coastal systems. By working with the processes, maritime activities can become more environmentally sustainable and more economically profitable thereby increasing long-term options.
-
4.
Ensuring decisions taken today do not foreclose options for the future. Ocean governance must explicitly acknowledge the uncertainty of future conditions that may arise from sea-level rise, climate change or coastal erosion and promote sufficiently flexible management. It is particularly important not to forget future generations and those who are not physically present in the target maritime zone.
-
5.
Using participatory planning to develop consensus. Participatory planning may be seen as the involvement and collaboration of the private sector, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), citizens groups and other non-institutional organisations or individuals interested in or affected by the process of ocean governance. It works to build the opinions and perspectives of all relevant stakeholders into the planning process through collaborative involvement reducing conflict and developing consensus.
-
6.
Ensuring the support and involvement of all administrative bodies. It is essential to engage local authorities from the start. Ocean governance is not effective if it is not supported by all levels and by all relevant sectors.
-
7.
Using a combination of instruments. Ocean governance can only succeed using multiple instruments that include a mix of law and economic instruments, voluntary agreements, information provision, technological solutions, research and education.
9 Objectives and Principles of Ocean Governance
A review of recent key initiatives diagnoses the need to facilitate universal logic or “reason” in the way of decision making by government officials, scientific experts and by the community.71
Effective governance is really a question of proper institutional design, finding the right balance between the different vertical levels of control in order to achieve the collective and sometimes conflicting goals of different programmes.72
The first priority should be to create a formalised institutional framework that has the mandate, the human and financial resources and the political will to put into practice the concept of ocean governance.73 In the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) initiative “institutional and organisational arrangements were imperative in carrying out the projects and programmes”.74 Lesson learned from the Netherlands experience “demonstrates the need for building an organisational structure for the relevant participants to communicate about problems and solutions”.75 The challenge lies in “developing practices and institutions that are consistent with the principles we recognise as right, but whose implementation is difficult”.76 Limitations in institutional capacities are the main barrier to improved resource planning and management.77
To summarise the works of Cicin-Sain and Knecht and the EC Demonstration Programme, the three core objectives of ocean governance are (1) economically efficient development to improve the quality of life, (2) environmentally sustainable development that preserves the quality of the environment and (3) socially equitable development that provides inter-society and intergeneration equity. Using the indicators from the EC Demonstration Programme and the Pan-European Biological and Landscape Diversity Strategy (PEBLDS),78 the eight core principles can be derived as the following:
-
1.
Principle of careful decision-making. Decisions as far as possible need to be made on the basis of the best available information adopting economically, environmentally and socially sound measures that act as incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of the maritime zone.
-
2.
Precautionary principle. Ocean governance needs to move from a standard procedure in which a science arrangement provides advice to a management body to a system where management options are based on the precautionary principle. Using Hey’s definition this principle dictates that comprehensive methods of environmental, social, cultural and economic assessment must be used in deciding on measures to enhance the quality of the maritime zone.79 The principle stresses the need to simulate further research, particularly, scientific and economic research that contributes to a better understanding of the long-term options available.
-
3.
User pays principle. Part of the costs of measures to prevent, control and reduce damage to the biological diversity and coastal landscapes and seascapes must be borne by the user. Prices charged for access to or use of ocean resources should reflect all short-term and long-term economic, environmental and social costs associated with the use of those resources.
-
4.
Principle of public participation. It is becoming increasingly, necessary to develop private–public partnerships to fully accomplish the development goals within the maritime zone. The users and the public must be involved at the earliest possible stage of an ocean governance strategy. The users have valuable insights regarding both the management needs and the economic opportunities that must be addressed. The support of the users for development and implementation of the ocean governance strategy is seen as crucial to its success.
-
5.
Principle of public access to information. An informed public allows two-way communications among government agencies, users groups and local communities to ensure the social acceptability that will enhance the successful implementation and enforcement of ocean governance decisions. There is a need to make available accurate, timely and documented official information on proposed ocean governance activities through media coverage and public fora, meetings and discussions, and information education campaigns in the local language.
-
6.
Principle of best available technology. Access to and transfer of technology is essential for attainment of the strategy. Scarcity of water demands that water-saving technologies be incorporated in all development designs. In addition, material used for coastal infrastructure should not include contaminants, which might enter the marine ecosystem.
-
7.
Principle of best environmental practice. Environmental Impact Assessment of a project needs to be strengthened by Strategic Impact Assessment (SIA) to take account of the cumulative impacts of a development. This will allow the promulgation of non-development zones and protected areas with a view to controlling the scale of activities in relation to the natural, cultural and physical characteristics of the surrounding area. It will enable the preservation of the local cultural heritage by relocating development not dependent on the coastal and marine area, phasing out ongoing harmful activities and reserving potential development sites for future developments.
-
8.
Principle of ecological integrity. Outstanding natural features as well as important flora and fauna habitats should be afforded strict conservation status. The maintenance and enhancement of natural processes can increase the resilience of the coastline against coastal erosion and accelerated sea-level rise. Mitigation of adverse effects of developments that cannot be avoided by restoration of the habitat is a compensatory mechanism that is to be used as a last resort.
10 Initiatives for Ocean Governance
Together with the three core objectives and the eight core principles, 13 core initiatives are drawn from the 22 nation case study by Cicin-Sain and Knecht and the lessons learned from the 35 projects of the EC Demonstration Programme. These are as follows:
-
Taking a long-term view. Unfortunately in most nation-states the ocean governance strategy is in the form of disjointed projects with time frames of 5 years or a decade at most rather than distinct elements of a coherent, overarching strategy. The ocean governance cycle is a process needing continual updating and amendments that requires 8–15 years for completion.80
-
Adopting a process of adaptive management. Given the geographic scale, the process of achieving effective ocean governance will have to be an incremental process. Further, ocean governance decisions are often made in the face of important unknowns and conflicting opinions regarding the right course of action. This requires a sustained effort of learning by doing that could extend over decades, for sustainable development of the maritime zone to become visible. At its most fundamental level adaptive management means a cyclic process that is based on a sound governance process rooted in the principles of participatory democracy, and reliable knowledge that applies the best available science to the issues that the governance initiative is working to address.81
-
Organising around an integrated approach. There is a need to ensure the vertical and horizontal cooperation and coordination in policy development with those local individuals and organisations that have a voice in any higher level decisions that will have a significant impact on them. Given the significant number of perceived conflicts “first, last and always, horizontal and vertical integrated planning and management are necessary if practitioners are to effectively and efficiently plan and manage coastal systems”.82
-
Promoting participation and a collaborative culture. It is important that the different and often conflicting sectors are able to collaborate with each other. Ensuring the involvement of all stakeholders in an ocean governance initiative is essential. Effective participation can help achieve commitment, ownership and shared responsibility. Stakeholder ownership of the policies and projects will lead to commitment to the governance process. Input of local knowledge into the process is vital to ensure identification of the real issues and resolution of the issues by those who are actually affected. Further, better awareness of the project will lead to greater understanding of the issues, which in turn will lead to governance that is more effective. Finally, working together can achieve more than working singularly.
-
Establishing coastal forums. This provides a mechanism to empower people to make decisions essential to achieving the objectives. Public participation is particularly important to ensure that the ocean governance initiative addresses issues related to quality of life, cultural and social heritage, and leisure time pursuits. It also helps ensure implementation of any recommendations or plans that the governance initiative produces.
-
Developing understanding through multidisciplinary training. Most planners and managers are single discipline specialists while ocean governance requires multidisciplinary understanding of the activities in the maritime zone. Developing human capacity at all levels is as important as the need to demonstrate that effective resource management is possible and sustainable. While a short-term solution is to undertake capacity-building of existing planners and managers, a long-term approach is to build multidisciplinary perspective into the education system.
-
Highlighting best practice guidelines. Mahatma Gandhi once said “We must be the change we wish to see in the world”. For stakeholders to change in how they relate to the maritime zone there is a need to highlight best practice guidelines covering every possible area of economic, environmental and social activity. This encourages the change we wish to see in every possible individual, interest group, community group, local authority, national authority and regional community and international body.
-
Determining indicators to measure the objectives. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defined indicators as “a parameter, or a value derived from parameters, which points to, provides information about, describes the state of a phenomenon/environment/area, with a significance extending beyond that directly associated with a parameter value”.83 In relation to the economic, environmental and social objectives indicators measure the extent to which any action is sustainable and consequently, the effect of any change in that action. It is essential to identify the indicators that objectively tell the progress towards sustainable development in the maritime zone. Such an assessment will help to improve the ocean governance process.
-
Establishing conflict resolution mechanisms. The economic and ecological interests of the different stakeholders create conflict between development and environment in terms of short-term private economic interests and long-term public interest of sustainable resource use.84 Effective conflict resolution requires a conception of public policymaking in which all stakeholders have an opportunity to negotiate.
-
Undertaking Strategic Impact Assessment (SIA). There is a need for a better understanding of the interactions and interdependencies between the land and water components. To overcome the procedural, planning, policy and institutional weaknesses of ocean governance will require a formalised systematic and comprehensive assessment that includes the environmental, social, cultural and economic impacts of a policy, plan or programme and its alternatives. A policy is defined as an inspiration and guidance for action, a plan as a set of coordinated and timed objectives for the implementation of the policy and a programme as a set of projects in a particular area.85
-
Conducting interdisciplinary research. The justifications for interdisciplinary research lie in the nature of coastal and open ocean systems, which are complex, interrelated and influenced by humans. The problem faced is that each discipline has its own objectives and scientific language to communicate within the discipline.86 Yet, interdisciplinary research is essential to evaluate the environment in its entirety. This is the foundation on which cross-sectoral planning and management is possible.
-
Establishing a Geographic Information System. A need assessment is imperative to organise and integrate data with reference to spatial location. Useful information not only depends upon raw data but also on its correct analysis and transformation into something that planners and decision-makers can understand and use. This requires the use of Geographic Information System for data management and analysis.
-
Providing an information technology network. A failure in knowledge diffusion is one of the key reasons for continuing destruction of coastal landscapes, seascapes and resources. Many of the problems of the coastal and marine area can be traced to the fact that the required information or understanding has never reached the correct audience. The diffusion of information, knowledge and understanding of the natural processes can help planners, decision-makers and the general public to realise the consequences of any particular action, and provide the basis for developing more sustainable policy and management actions in the coastal and marine area.
11 Strategy for Ocean Governance
Undoubtedly, national prosperity requires sustained economic growth and resource development to increase productivity and national income. However, alongside national economic growth, the higher regional level issues: social—intersociety and intergenerational equity; environmental—resource conservation and protection; and safety and security—good order at sea also require consideration in ocean governance. These issues when not addressed accumulate over time and have consequences that do not show up in the shorter time-horizon typical of economic policymaking. To quote Van Dyke:
The precautionary principles, the polluter-pays principle, the duties to notify, consult, and cooperate, and the duty to assess the environmental consequences of new initiatives are not mere idealistic mantras, but are important and practical principles that the world must embrace if its people are to have enough food to eat.87
Despite the 30-year history ocean management, there are few examples of a successful ocean governance practice beyond a local level or problem-specific scale. The challenge lies in developing the political will to improve the process of planning for and implementing ocean governance. According to Arild Underdal, to integrate in ocean governance would mean to unify—to put parts together into a whole. To qualify as integrated the ocean governance strategy must achieve concept comprehensiveness, process aggregation and consistent practice.88 The process as visualised by the author is depicted in Fig. 2.3.
Concept comprehensiveness is measured along four dimensions; namely, time, space, actors and issues. In time, sustainable development means taking a long-term view. From a spatial perspective, the concept refers to intergovernmental, inter-agency, inter-sector, inter-discipline and the land–sea interface. Along the actor dimension the level ranges from international to site within a given activity system. Finally, along the issue dimension the guidelines reflect the interdependency between an international declaration and a site-specific project.
Process aggregation is reflected in the strategy being evaluated from an overall perspective. It necessitates weighing interests and setting priorities at each level. For example, failure to do so at the national level may be attributed as the cause of failure of the strategy in practice.
Consistent practice can be said to have a vertical and horizontal dimension. The vertical aspect refers to the accord between the different strategy levels international–regional–national–local. Along the horizontal dimension for any given issue, only one level (international, national, regional, local) is being pursued at any given time by relevant agencies, provided accord across all levels is achieved. In consistent practice, specific types of implementation measures conform to the more general guidelines, whereas the techniques and resultant activation conform to the strategic goal for each vertical level and horizontal dimension.
The ocean governance strategy is integrated to the extent that the concept recognises its consequences as decision premises; the process aggregates them into an overall evaluation; and in practice penetrates all levels and all agencies involved in its execution.89 Underdal outlines two generic ways of achieving integration, direct method or “top–down” approach and indirect method or a “top–down and bottom–up” approach or co-management approach.90
The direct method seeks to achieve integration by defining national policy goals derived from global principles that are to be followed by all government agencies involved in the management of the coastal and marine area. However, the direct method will often have to be supported by the indirect method to find sufficiently precise integrating goals and to secure government agencies’ participation given the different patterns of participation, interaction and influence.91 The indirect method involves an intellectual strategy and an institutional strategy.92 The intellectual strategy seeks integration through initiating research, training and socialisation aimed at developing a more comprehensive and holistic perspective on the part of decision-makers.
The institutional strategy involves some type of organisational change that facilitates moving issues upward from the site to the national level and transferring issues from a narrow single sector to a broader multiple sector perspective. In fact, the institutional strategy will encompass the intellectual strategy to be truly representative of all the stakeholders.
What then do we mean by strategy? Michael Porter’s seminal work pioneers strategy to be a plan, a ploy, a pattern, a position and a perspective that has been described by Henry Mintzberg as the 5 Ps of strategy.93 It can be argued that ocean governance is a question of strategic management that broadly encompasses the areas of strategy formulation, implementation and control.94
In essence, ocean governance integrates various functions, is oriented towards organisation-wide goals, considers a broad range of stakeholders, entails multiple time horizons and is concerned with both efficiency and effectiveness. An attempt has been made in relating ocean governance to principles of strategic management in Table 2.2.
12 Regulation and Control at Sea
Although the international law of the sea has evolved over five centuries, the present body of rules, agreements, treaties, law and institutions has developed in the last five decades in a global attempt to provide a system of ocean governance. The increased focus on the oceans is due to the strategic, political, legal, environmental, economic, social and technological changes in the maritime realm.
The change in the maritime environment, indicative of increasing coastal state influence, began to evolve in early twentieth century with the discovery of offshore oil and a growing realisation of the potential to exploit ocean resources, such as minerals and fish. The speed of change accelerated over the past three decades due to a perceptible shift in mindset from one of “apparent abundance” to “growing scarcity” of ocean resources and due to the increasing ocean uses from “accommodation” to “conflict”. These changes in the basic condition of ocean use have been responsible for raising questions regarding the legal status of oceans from one of “freedom of the high seas” to that of “control and regulation”.95
This is even more evident after the September 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York. The perceived threat of maritime terrorism has brought swift and unprecedented legislation by the international community for the security of shipping and ports. A number of incidents in the Indian Ocean suggest that the threat is longer perceived and could become even deadlier.96 The timeline of events that lays emphasis on “regulation and control” is shown in Table 2.3.
Broadly, fished and navigated for millennia, the “use of the sea” now involves free passage of trade and access to the ocean wealth, protecting the marine ecosystem from environmental damage and safeguarding the sovereign and territorial integrity of the bordering nations.
Principle 25 of the Rio Declaration concluded on 13 June 1992 upholds that security, economic development and environmental protection are interdependent and indivisible. Thus, ocean governance can be conceived as a trinity of ocean policy spheres: economic development, environmental protection and maritime security. And these spheres derive their growing integration from the new ocean regime of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982.
The new ocean regime has altered nations’ “use of power” at sea from Alfred Mahan’s97 purely military concept of “command of the sea” to having the “power to govern the sea”.98 The focus is now on nations’ “use of power” to safeguard national and in turn international “use of the sea” within the coastal ocean and beyond on the open high seas.
This means two things. First, the military concept of sea power and the high seas regime of “freedom of the seas” has to be balanced with “control and regulation” in performing good-order tasks. Second, all maritime nations, including great powers and medium powers, need to individually and/or in concert possess the capacity to exert the power to govern the sea within the coastal ocean and the maritime commons of the open ocean beyond. The new ocean regime is one of a “shared ocean, shared future”99 that calls for global ocean governance.
13 Attributes of the Power to Govern the Sea
Geoffrey Till describes sea power in the twenty-first century, as the use of both military and civil maritime capabilities by a nation in the conduct of naval and commercial operations.100 Therefore, sea power depends on a nation’s outlook towards “use of the sea (ocean)” and the “use of (military) power” at sea.
For the future, it is the individual nation’s power to govern the sea as opposed to the military concept of sea power that holds the key to sustaining economic growth, providing protective security and ensuring clean oceans for the benefit of not just its own people but all mankind. If nations do not develop the power to govern the sea, they not only undermine their own national interests but also global security, and nations will be unable to position themselves as partners in global ocean governance.
There are four attributes that a nation must possess to develop its power to govern the sea. The first attribute is having the political will to be able to act or function at sea in a manner of governing or control. The second attribute is having to constitute a law, rule, standard or principle for the nation at sea. This requires articulating a national maritime vision. The third attribute is being able to constitutionally conduct the maritime policy, actions and affairs of the nation at sea. To do this, a nation must build on its financial resources, technological capability and industrial capacity. The fourth attribute is being in military command of the sea and regulating proceedings at sea when required by national interests. This requires commitment to developing military strength for combat and good-order tasks.
The power to govern the sea flows from a nation’s concept of “maritime power”. Maritime power for the future is defined as the “maritime resource of a nation’s power” or the nation’s use of the sea.101 In other words the “maritime resource of a nation’s power” depends on the political outlook; level of international and regional cooperation; naval power; strength of mercantile marine; level of port infrastructure, presence of coastal communities; management of living and nonliving resources, ship design, building, repair and maintenance capacity; extent of coastal shipping and inland waterways; oceanographic science and technological capacity; and sustainability of marine biodiversity. All these factors governed by a national legal regime for oceans would arguably constitute a nation’s maritime power. Figure 2.4 summarises the cyclic process in the “use of the sea” and “use of power” at sea across six constituents that follow on from the attributes of the power to govern the sea.
The use of the sea for free passage of trade and also regulated by the EEZ regime characterises a nation’s right to sustainable development of its ocean wealth: from oil to gas, diamonds to gravel, metals to fish and nodules to sulphur.
The new ocean regime loop explains that growing maritime interests in the use of the sea has altered the scope of a nation’s maritime power with new maritime challenges that are “closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole”102 at the national, regional and international levels.
The national vision loop envisions maritime resources needed in meeting emerging maritime challenges. The actual extent of a maritime resource would depend on the maritime outlook and economic strength of a nation.
The industrial capacity loop visualises the nature of maritime interests that determine the size of a nation’s maritime industry. What is needed is a robust national maritime policy that acts as a stimulus for innovative technology in developing the industrial capacity of the nation.
The use of power in protecting the national and international use of the sea would depend the political will and foreign policy of a nation to build maritime forces to secure the maritime domain.
The military strength loop explains that the type of maritime strategy, when acting alone and in concert, would determine maritime force structures for the conduct of maritime operations.
The financial resources loop envisions adopting a maritime strategy based on both the military and civil maritime capabilities of a nation. The financial resources available to build maritime capabilities that shape the operating environment of maritime forces will depend the economic strength of the nation.
The technological capability loop visualises a maritime doctrine that promotes innovative technology to sharpen the technological capability needed for the conduct of maritime operations. The advancements made by a nation in maritime technology determine the conduct of maritime operations in support of national interests and global security.
In determining the power to govern the sea, there has to be recognition that every maritime nation has rights and responsibilities in conduct of maritime activities occurring within legitimately claimed maritime zones. All nations require a range of potential responses—diplomatic, operational, political, legal and nongovernmental—to manage the multiple activities and must at the very least exert power to govern the sea within their maritime zones by maintaining or having access to capabilities for surveillance, monitoring and control.
Through improved coordination, cooperation and collaboration at the national, regional and international levels, nations could better secure national interests within their delimited maritime zones and achieve greater global security.
The power to govern the sea is clearly more complex than a simple “command of the sea”. It is no longer concerned with winning the war against a would-be adversary and deterring future aggression. The old image of sea power—war fighting, deterrence and power projection—increasingly has to adapt to the power to govern the sea in the execution of good-order tasks that require interdependence and integration.
The matrix of cause and consequence between economic development, environmental protection and maritime security is, however, a complex one. For example, economic development driving environmental degradation can result in actual or possible conflict between and within countries over the resultant scarcity of resources. Even inequitable distribution of resources and environmental degradation due to infrastructure development can create a space for sub-state actors to further their cause by increasing social tensions and political instabilities through the propagation of conflict.
Decline in fish stocks and the desire to gain access to marine resources, particularly in ocean areas where sovereignty claims overlap or when in doubt, can lead to conflict. Moreover, growing energy demands and uncertainty over energy supplies can be motive for controlling the sources of energy, thus leading to conflict.
Interdependence between nation-states is vital to enhancing management of ocean resources, maritime safety and security, as well as protecting the marine environment and preparing for disaster management.
The example of maritime safety and security may serve to illustrate the importance of interdependence between nation-states. The Proliferation Security Initiative, Container Security Initiative, port state control, Suppression of Unlawful Acts Convention and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code are some disparate arrangements that reflect the interdependence in strengthening the maritime safety and security regime at national, regional and international levels.
In the implementation of these arrangements, integration of maritime resources within nation-states is fundamental to the (1) development of an integrated air, surface and subsurface picture; (2) optimising of resources to maintain 24/7 forces and (3) the speed of execution in the conduct of maritime operations. The US concept of a “national fleet” commits to a shared purpose and common effort focussed on tailored operation integration of platforms, infrastructure and personnel.103
Such is the complexity of transnational threats to global security that no individual nation can do all in protecting its maritime borders. Maintaining security of the maritime commons is inherent to protecting national maritime borders. It will take interdependence between international navies and integration of national maritime forces to build a “1,000-ship navy to secure the seas”.104
A 1,000-ship navy as the cornerstone of a global maritime network is a Pax Americana vision to increase security of the United States’ maritime domain. Nevertheless, it is in all nations’ interest to integrate maritime forces internationally and in a regional context to work interdependently in dealing with global threats to national and regional maritime safety and security.
Maritime safety as the first step towards broader maritime security is one area of ocean governance with regional connotations that is considered as vital to the development and prosperity of the Indian Ocean Region. The second area of significance with regional connotations is marine scientific research vital to informing fisheries management, environmental and disaster management and climate change. We will examine both of these areas in more detail later in the book.
Haward and Vince make the case on how the scope of ocean law in the development of regimes governing oceans has broadened over the last three decades.105 In their discussion, the authors point out that governance is a matter for government, market and community where government remains an important actor even if governance occurs without government.106 According to the authors, the developments of ecosystem management approaches as opposed to sovereign rights in the treatment of ocean space remain controversial. This is not to say that regional initiatives are not important. On the contrary, the authors point to the scale, scope and diversity of regional management initiatives as a tool for effective ocean governance.
14 Conclusion
The modern-day ocean usage has grown manifold. The potential for conflict among competing uses continues as long as while our knowledge and understanding of the oceans remains fragmented and specialised. A new form of ocean governance centred on “control and regulation” assumes that the problems of the ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole, where all nations will cooperate in the management of the oceans.
The management of the ocean realm is multidisciplinary in nature, balancing economic activity, social equity, environmental quality and maritime safety and security. Ocean governance conceived as a trinity of economic development, environmental protection and maritime security has altered nations’ “use of power” at sea from purely a military concept of “command of the sea” to having the “power to govern the sea”.
What is more is that interdependent relationships to deal with issue of ocean governance now characterise international relations. Despite a range of international agreements that have contributed to international norm-setting for ocean governance, implementation at both national and regional levels remains a challenge. Many of the marine scientific research and maritime safety and maritime security issues are beyond the capacity of individual states to tackle alone.
As a result, nations in pursuit of ocean governance can ill afford a policy vacuum at the regional level between the national and international levels. The higher regional level issues: social—intersociety and intergenerational equity; environmental—resource conservation and protection; and safety and security—good order at sea, all require consideration in ocean governance.
The next chapter considers what constitutes the regional dimension for Indian Ocean countries in pursuit of ocean governance.
15 Notes
-
1.
Brown (1994).
-
2.
Brown (1994).
-
3.
Ibid.
-
4.
Agnew et al. (1996, p. 25).
-
5.
Keohane and Nye (1977) Little, Brown.
-
6.
Ibid, p. 8.
-
7.
For benefits and costs, see Ibid, p. 10.
-
8.
For effects of interdependence see Ibid, pp. 8–10.
-
9.
For an explanation on sensitivity and vulnerability, see Ibid, pp. 12–18.
-
10.
Buzan et al. (1998, p. 36).
-
11.
For ocean policy as an example and characteristics of complex interdependence, see Keohane (1977, pp. 24, 36).
-
12.
Borgese (1998).
-
13.
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), “A Sea of Troubles,” Press Release No 2001-129, viewed on 2 August 2008, http://www.unesco.org/bpi/eng/unescopress/2001/01-129e.shtml.
-
14.
For “Oceans as the Cornerstones of Life,” see Prager and Earle (2000).
-
15.
Post and Ludin (1996).
-
16.
Verzijl, “International Law in Historical Perspective, Part IV,” cited in Anand (1983, p. 225).
-
17.
Cuyvers (1984).
-
18.
Brown (1994).
-
19.
Anand (1983).
-
20.
Ibid.
-
21.
O’Connell (1982).
-
22.
Vogler (1995).
-
23.
Forbes (1995).
-
24.
Churchill and Lowe (1988).
-
25.
Dronkers and de Vries (1999).
-
26.
Ibid.
-
27.
EU Demonstration Programme on Integrated Management in Coastal Zones 1997–1999, Lessons from European Commission’s demonstration programme on Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM), updated on 8 May 2008, viewed on 15 Mar 2009, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/iczm/pdf/vol2.pdf.
-
28.
Thakur and Newman (2000).
-
29.
Kennedy (1987).
-
30.
Halle et al. (2002).
-
31.
Cottrell et al. (1981).
-
32.
Sveiby “Measuring Intangibles and Intellectual Capital—An Emerging First Standard,” 5 August 1998, viewed on 17 February 2009, http://www.sveiby.com/portals/0/articles/emergingstandard.html.
-
33.
United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (UN/DOALOS), “Oceans: The Source of Life,” United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, 20th Anniversary 1982–2002, viewed on 15 March 2009, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_20years/oceanssourceoflife.pdf.
-
34.
Report of the post-International Decade for Ocean Exploration (IDOE) (1979).
-
35.
UN/DOALOS, “Oceans: The Source of Life”.
-
36.
Ibid.
-
37.
Ibid.
-
38.
Ibid.
-
39.
Prager and Earle (2000, p. 296).
-
40.
UN/DOALOS, “Oceans: The Source of Life”.
-
41.
Ibid.
-
42.
Ibid.
-
43.
Ibid, IPCC (2007).
-
44.
Prager and Earle (2000, pp. 276–277).
-
45.
UN/DOALOS, “Oceans: The Source of Life”.
-
46.
Ibid.
-
47.
Anand (1983).
-
48.
Cicin-Sain and Knecht (1998).
-
49.
Cicin-Sain and Knecht (1998).
-
50.
Comment on draft by Clive Schofield, 31 March 2009.
-
51.
Hardin (1968).
-
52.
World Commission on Environment and Development (1987, p. 264).
-
53.
Miles (1998).
-
54.
Cicin-Sain and Knecht (1998).
-
55.
Clark (1998).
-
56.
Vallega (1998).
-
57.
Keohane and Nye (2000, p. 12).
-
58.
WCED (1987). The world commission included Indian Ocean region memers from Sudan (Vice Chair), India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and Zimbabwe.
-
59.
Sorensen (1993).
-
60.
Lowry (1993).
-
61.
Olsen et al.(1997).
-
62.
See Kay and Alder (1999), Cicin-Sain and Knecht (1998), Clark (1998), Kenchington (1993), Lowry (1993), Miles (1999), Smith (2000), Thia-Eng et al. (1997).
-
63.
Friedheim (1999).
-
64.
Olsen et al. (1997).
-
65.
Olsen and Christie (2000).
-
66.
Ibid.
-
67.
Sorensen (1993).
-
68.
Cicin-Sain and Knecht (1998).
-
69.
Olsen and Christie (2000).
-
70.
EU Demonstration Programme, “Lessons from European Commission Demonstration Programme”.
-
71.
Visser (1999).
-
72.
Imperial (1999).
-
73.
Olsen et al. (1997).
-
74.
Thia-Eng (1993).
-
75.
van Alphen (1995).
-
76.
Friedheim (1999).
-
77.
Noble (2000).
-
78.
Committee for the activities of the council of Europe in the field of Biological and Landscape Diversity (CO-DBP), “European Code of Conduct for Coastal Zones” 19 April 1999, viewed on 15 March 2009, http://www.coastalguide.org/code/cc.pdf.
-
79.
McIntyre and Mosedale (1997).
-
80.
Olsen et al. (1997).
-
81.
Olsen and Christie (2000).
-
82.
Sorensen (1997).
-
83.
Linster, “OECD Work on Environmental Indicators,” viewed on 18 April 2009, to http://inece.org/indicators/proceedings/04_oecd.pdf.
-
84.
Visser (1999).
-
85.
Glasson et al. (1999).
-
86.
Dronkers and de Vries (1999).
-
87.
See Van Dyke, “Sharing Ocean Resources—In a Time of Scarcity and Selfishness”.
-
88.
Underdal (1980).
-
89.
Cicin Sain and Knecht (1998).
-
90.
Underdal (1980)
-
91.
Ibid.
-
92.
Ibid.
-
93.
Mintzberg and Quinn (1996).
-
94.
Miller (1998).
-
95.
Van Dyke makes the case where nations have a duty to protect and preserve the marine environment embodied in the Law of the Sea Convention. See Van Dyke, “Sharing Ocean Resources—In a Time of Scarcity and Selfishness”.
-
96.
On USS Cole bombing in 2000 see Ratnesar, Times Magazine CNN, “Sneak Attack,” 15 October 2000, viewed on 16 April 2009, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,57755-1,00.html; On Limburg tanker blast in 2002 see BBC News, “Yemen says tanker blast was terrorism,” 16 October 2002, viewed on 16 April 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2334865.stm; Terrorist enter Mumbai from the sea in 2008, see Swami, The Hindu online edition, “Pointed intelligence warnings preceded attacks,” 30 November 2008, viewed on 16 April 2009, http://www.hinduonnet.com/2008/11/30/stories/2008113055981500.htm.
-
97.
Mahan (1890).
-
98.
Gupta (2005).
-
99.
U.S. Department of State (2004).
-
100.
Till (2004).
-
101.
Gupta (2005).
-
102.
UN/DOALOS, Preamble to the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea.
-
103.
United States Navy, “Navy-Coast Guard National Fleet Policy Updated,” Navy Newsstand, 3 March 2006, viewed on 21 March 2006, http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=22645 and “National Fleet: A Joint Navy/Coast Guard Policy Statement,” viewed on 21 March 2006, http://www.navy.mil/palib/cno/2006_national_fleet_policy.pdf.
-
104.
Morgan and Martoglio (2005).
-
105.
Haward and Vince (2008).
-
106.
Later in Chapter 4 regime theory links the three elements to power-based, interest-based and knowledge-based actors.
References
Agnew, John A., David N. Livingstone and Alisdair Rogers. 1996. Human geography. An essential anthology. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers.
Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. 1977. Power and interdependence: World politics in transition. Boston: Little Brown.
Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Security: A new framework for analysis. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Cottrell, Alvin J. and associates. 1981. Sea power and strategy in the Indian Ocean. California: Sage Publications.
Glasson, John, Riki Therivel and Andrew Chadwick. 1999. Introduction to environmental impact assessment: Principles and procedures. Process, practice, and prospects. London: University College London Press.
Halle, Mark, Jason Switzer and Sebastian Winkler. 2002. Trade, aid and security: Elements of a positive paradigm. Washington DC: IUCN.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2010 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Gupta, M. (2010). The New Regime for Ocean Governance. In: Indian Ocean Region. The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5989-8_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5989-8_2
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY
Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-5988-1
Online ISBN: 978-1-4419-5989-8
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)