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Fundamental Problems in Computing pp 375–406Cite as

A Richer Understanding of the Complexity of Election Systems

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Abstract

We provide an overview of some recent progress on the complexity of election systems. The issues studied include the complexity of the winner, manipulation, bribery, and control problems.

Supported in part by DFG grant RO-1202/9-3, NSF grants CCR-0311021 and CCF-0426761, and the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation’s TransCoop program.

URL: home.agh.edu.pl/~faliszew. Current affiliation: AGH University of Science and Technology, Kraków, Poland.

URL: www.cs.rit.edu/~eh.

URL: www.cs.rochester.edu/u/lane.

URL: ccc.cs.uni-duesseldorf.de/~rothe. Work done in part while visiting the University of Rochester.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, 14627, USA

    Piotr Faliszewski

  2. Department of Computer Science, Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, NY, 14623, USA

    Edith Hemaspaandra

  3. Department of Computer Science, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, 14627, USA

    Lane A. Hemaspaandra

  4. Institut für Informatik, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, 40225, Düsseldorf, Germany

    Jörg Rothe

Authors
  1. Piotr Faliszewski
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  2. Edith Hemaspaandra
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  3. Lane A. Hemaspaandra
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  4. Jörg Rothe
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, University at Albany—SUNY, 1400 Washington Avenue, Albany, NY, 12222, USA

    S. S. Ravi

  2. Bradley Dept. Electrical and Computer Engineering, Virginia Tech, 302 Whittemore (0111), Blacksburg, VA, 24061, USA

    Sandeep K. Shukla

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Faliszewski, P., Hemaspaandra, E., Hemaspaandra, L.A., Rothe, J. (2009). A Richer Understanding of the Complexity of Election Systems. In: Ravi, S.S., Shukla, S.K. (eds) Fundamental Problems in Computing. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9688-4_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9688-4_14

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  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4020-9688-4

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