In Chapter 2, I have discussed various circumstances restricting arbitrariness of moral reasoning.
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A moral statement can often be presented as a logically correct conclusion of a set of premises. One can also inquire whether these premises are (a) linguistically correct and (b) logically consistent.
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One can also inquire whether the premises are sufficiently coherent.
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Finally, different individuals can discuss moral questions in an impartial and otherwise objective way.
These demands of rationality thus restrict arbitrariness of moral reasoning, but they do not entirely eliminate it. Mutually incompatible moral statements can, simultaneously, to a high degree fulfil the rationality requirements. This fact explains the need of legal reasoning, more predictable than the moral one.
The law is more stable, so to say more “fixed” than morality. Legal decisions are more predictable than purely moral ones. This is the case because legal reasoning is supported by a more extensive set of reasonable premises than a pure moral reasoning. This support includes numerous statements about statutes, other socially established sources of the law and some traditional reasoning norms.
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(2009). Rationality of Legal Reasoning. In: On Law and Reason. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 8. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8730-1_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8730-1_3
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