Charron's Academic Sceptical Wisdom

Is sceptical wisdom, wisdom based on suspension of judgment (epoché), possible? A quick look at the history of philosophy seems to exclude this possibility since not only possession of knowledge, but certain possession of knowledge, appears to be an essential part of the concept.

One of the remarkable original aspects of Pierre Charron's De la Sagesse is his proposal of a consistent and fully developed sceptical wisdom.1 The uniqueness of the project can be evaluated if we look both backwards and forwards in the history of scepticism. As far as I know, scepticism in the Renaissance was usually instrumental for scholarly, philosophical, or religious ends alien to scepticism itself.2 Looking forward in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, that is, until Descartes's doubt took over completely the sceptical scene, the tremendous success of Charron's Wisdom was largely due to its proposal of a clear and systematic sceptical wisdom.3 Indeed, for those thinkers opposed to dogmatism — and there were many at a time of crisis in Aristotelian scholasticism — Charron's view that scepticism is not only a viable mode of life but the wise mode of life could not but appear attractive.