Political theorizing throughout the modern era uses the term “coercion” and its cognates (compulsion, force) in so many ways that one may despair of finding neat conceptual boundaries for it. Historically, as now, “coercion” appears to be a catch-all term, rather than one that clearly demarcates, say, acts of domination from acts of badgering or arm-twisting. Typically, however, it is used to capture a way that agents with considerable power can constrain the wills, actions, opportunities, bodies, and lives of others. Throughout this literature, coercion generally refers to the sort of power that states possess against their inhabitants, war victors hold over the vanquished, or even a church hierarchy holds over priests and laity, and husbands have sometimes wielded over their wives. These uses suggest a sort of irresistible power, which can operate through various mechanisms, including physical force and violence, threats, positional authority, and social pressure. Until relatively recently, few theorists paused to give a careful analysis of its meaning or conditions; more typically, they have taken for granted that the term is understood, and that the sort of power it invokes is evident when in use.
There is an interesting story to be told about how the concept of coercion became a philosophical topic of its own. However, I will focus here on the slightly different, later story, of how in the course of philosophical investigation, theorists came to find and distinguish two kinds of coercion, and then to attend to one to the virtual exclusion of the other. In the process, I will offer some reasons for thinking that the bifurcation of this topic is significant, and in some ways problematic. After elaborating the distinction between the two kinds of coercion, I will show that the recognition of a categorical distinction in kinds of coercion is historically locatable. I will consider some of what can be said for and against the distinction, but I will be principally interested to trace how it entered, virtually unnoticed, into theorizing about coercion. I conclude by highlighting a few of the difficulties that arise if one does not attend to this history
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References
Robert Nozick, “Coercion”, in Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel, Sidney Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes, and Morton White, eds. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1969); Harry Frankfurt, “Coercion and Moral Responsibility”, in The Importance of What We Care About (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds., Nomos XIV: Coercion (Chicago, IL: Aldine-Atherton, 1972).
Michael Bayles, “A Concept of Coercion”, in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds., Nomos XIV: Coercion (Chicago, IL: Aldine-Atherton, 1972), 17.
H. J. McCloskey, “Coercion: Its Nature and Significance”, Southern Journal of Philosophy 18 (1980), 340.
Ibid., 336.
The denial that direct force is a mode of coercion is explicit in Hans Oberdiek, “The Role of Sanctions and Coercion in Understanding Law and Legal Systems”, American Journal of Jurisprudence 21 (1976), 82; Mark Fowler, “Coercion and Practical Reason”, Social Theory and Practice 8 (1982), 329; Michael Gorr, “Toward a Theory of Coercion”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (1986), 383; Joel Feinberg, Harm to Self (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), especially chapter 23; Onora O’Neill, “Which are the Offers You Can’t Refuse?”, chapter 7 in R. G. Frey and Christopher Morris, eds., Violence, Terrorism, and Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Mitchell Berman, “The Normative Functions of Coercion Claims”, Legal Theory 8 (2002), 45. It is implicit but unmistakable in Nozick’s account and in most of the considerable number of theorists who have taken their bearings from him (see note 15 infra). Felix Oppenheim, in Dimensions of Freedom (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1961), offers a forerunner of Nozick’s approach. For those who accept force as a kind of coercion, see Virginia Held, “Coercion and Coercive Offers”, in Pennock and Chapman; Martin Gunderson, “Threats and Coercion”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (1979), 247; Grant Lamond, “Coercion, Threats, and the Puzzle of Blackmail”, in A. P. Simester and A. T. H. Smith, eds., Harm and Culpability (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).
There may be other sets of sufficient conditions as well; for instance, it is sometimes argued that offers of benefits can sometimes also be coercive. On coercive offers, see Joan McGregor’s contribution to this volume.
The Pure Theory of Law, trans. Max Knight (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1967), original German 1st ed. 1934; 2nd ed., 1960, 34.
Ibid., 40–41.
The Structure of Freedom (New York: Atheneum Press, 1965 (originally published 1958) ), 16–17. Also, “[C]oercion in this study means (a) the application of actual physical violence, or (b) the application of sanctions sufficiently strong to make the individual abandon a course of action or inaction dictated by his own strong and enduring motives and wishes”. Ibid., 93.
The Idea of Law (Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1970), 35 (first published in 1964). In his index, the entry for coercion says, “See force, sanction”.
The Principles of Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 57 (Lucas’ emphasis).
Ibid., 60.
Or, more generally, conditional communicated proposals, which may include some “offers” as well as threats.
Alan Wertheimer, Coercion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).
A measure of the influence of this essay is that at least ten subsequent theorists have published works containing recognizable reproductions or variants of Nozick’s list of conditions; many more give substantive responses to his essay. See my “How the Coercer Got Away: Evaluating Nozickstyle Accounts of Coercion”, unpublished manuscript.
Nozick, 440.
Although this is stated as a prohibition, Nozick explicitly intends to cover prohibitions and affirmative directives. Nozick, n. 3.
Nozick, 441. This list substitutes my preferred variable names for Nozick’s, and his amendments in 1', 2', and 5' on 442 for his 1, 2, and 5 on 441. I have also ignored several later technical adjustments to these conditions that are unimportant to the issues here.
H. L. A. Hart and Tony Honoré, Causation in the Law 1st ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959); H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961).
Hart, 19. See also 80.
“[W]e shall use the expressions ‘orders backed by threats’ and ‘coercive orders’ to refer to orders which, like the gunman’s, are supported only by threats”. Hart, 19.
Ibid., 193 (Hart’s italics).
Ibid., 213 (emphasis added).
Ibid., 213–214 (emphasis added).
What I describe here as cases of “undue influence”, Hart and Honoré call more neutrally “interpersonal transactions”. They write that when such a relationship between actors is claimed, Four common features demand attention in the various relationships of this type. … (ii) [Nozick’s 5] the first actor’s words or deeds are part of the second actor’s reasons for acting … (iv) [Nozick’s 3] except in the case where the first actor has merely advised the second act [sic], he intends the second actor to do the act in question. Hart and Honoré, 49–50.
Hart and Honoré, 53.
See, e.g., ibid., 48–54, 134–135, 172–178.
Michael J. Murray and David F. Dudrick, “Are Coerced Acts Free?”, American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1995), 118.
Denis G. Arnold, “Coercion and Moral Responsibility”, American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (2001), 61 (my emphasis).
William Edmundson, “Is Law Coercive?”, Legal Theory 1 (1995), 81. Though Edmundson endorses this view, he recognizes its novelty, calling it a “repugnant conclusion”.
For more detailed arguments about the difficulties with “Nozick-style” accounts of coercion, see my “How the Coercer Got Away”, note 15, supra.
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Anderson, S.A. (2008). How Did There Come To Be Two Kinds of Coercion?. In: Reidy, D.A., Riker, W.J. (eds) Coercion and the State. The Philosophical Foundations of Law and Justice, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6879-9_2
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