As a result of our meditations, upon close inspection, a new field of possible scientific research has opened up to us, a new, phenomenological objectivity, a new science, therefore, phenomenology. 217 So far, we have been exclusively guided by epistemological interests and, if the critical problems were to be solved, this called for the elimination of all natural objectifications, of all empirical judgments, therefore, for the phenomenological reduction. After we have reached phenomenological ground, however, we readily see that a distinctive kind of theoretical interest can be directed toward everything that is to be explored here, an interest that does not seek to acquire and treat phenomenological knowledge simply in the service of problems of critique of knowledge. We can say: No theory of knowledge without phenomenology. But phenomenology also retains meaning independently of theory of knowledge, i.e., independently of the interest in clearing up those remarkable errors and confusions in which reflection about natural knowledge becomes entangled.
In the realm of theoretical reason, skepticism as concerns the developed sciences is never so sweeping that knowledge’s and science’s legitimate claim to objectivity would be seriously contested. But, the meaning of this objectivity is in question and the confusions on this point result in the falsification of this objectivity and, for example, in perceiving it absurdly as universally human or just biological, adapted to the intellectual state of the development of humanity.
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Compare Appendix A XII and Appendix A XIII (Editor’s note).
Talk of pure consciousness is, however, risky!.
Yes, but that is only suitable for the essence theory of acts and of sensorial contents, but surely not for the essence theory of self-given objects of the “transcendent” kind. Therefore, the sound that lasts, the point in time, etc. Therefore, stop.
Compare to this the remarks on p. 488 of Husserliana XXIV (Editor’s note).
And, at the same time, the perceived as such.
But, also the objectivity as it appears in the appearance and without its being posited as “reality”. And, there are still various things to say there.
In addition, the viewpoint of communication. Science is an intersubjective unity. What one researcher finds becomes the common property of all. Scientific objects are intersubjective. Subjects are indeed bracketed out in phenomenology, but without its having made use of their existence in the content of its theories, it claims, however, to be science and its knowledge is also to become common property. But how is that possible?.
Compare Appendix A XIV (Editor’s note).
Essence of the phenomena as act phenomena, but also essence of the objectivities appearing and referred to. Therefore, phenomena in a multiple sense.
All in the multiple sense.
Immanent in a double sense!.
Note: In addition, not to be forgotten also after this grounding of the knowledge of essences in phenomenology is to take into consideration the question of the communicative meaning of its results and the possibility of a phenomenological science as being intersubjective in this respect.
No “supposition” in the genuine sense! Namely, these are not realities for us for which it can be asked just what they are in reality (which presupposes a contrast with what is merely appearing). The depiction is, therefore, not entirely to be countenanced and must be nuanced in some other way.
Naturally, though, no preconceived ideas in another sense either, none, whether existential or non-existential biases.
Transcendence equals positing of what is not purely self-given.
The ideal of Evidenz—is it the ideal of the phenomenological clarification of sources?.
Are critique of reason and ideal of absolute knowledge to be placed on the same footing?.
There, I am probably only thinking about the phansiological.
Not merely going back to Evidenz, but in reflection transcendentally investigating what is given and raising the essence of the ultimate correlations, of the ultimate sources, up to thinking-seeing consciousness.
The matter is not that simple. Namely, it is only that simple in the phenomenology of “experiences”, not, however, in the phenomenology of objectivity and of the “constitution of objectivity”, although psychologically relevant knowledge also lies hidden in there, indeed absolutely so. That, though, would require more careful examination, would presuppose, though, an exposition of the major problem of “constitution”.
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(2008). Phenomenology as Science of Pure Consciousness. In: Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge. Husserliana: Edmund Husserl – Collected Works, vol 13. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6727-3_6
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